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INTRODUCTION 
A :few years ago, two of' the most important recent inter~re­
ters of' and commentators of' Plato staged a militant argument over 
the meanings of' God and gods in the dialogues of' Plato. Accord-
ing to A. E. Taylor, Plato's theory of' divinity included one 
God, a personal, omnipotent, benevolent creator of' the universe, 
very similar to the Christian conception of' God. On the other 
I 
hand, F. M. Cornf'ord criticized Taylor :for drawing a similarity 
between a "Eagan polytheist" and Christian writers. For Cornford, 
11g·ods 11 in Plato referred to the traditional polytheism; "God" 
meant an impersonal principle or purpose behind the formation 
of' the universe. 
I, This controversy indicates the problematic nature o:r deter-
I 
mining Plato's conception of' God. At she outset, the question 
may be asl-ced \Vhether there is a problem of the existence and na-
ture of' God or gods in Plato's thought. ~ne answer is an indubi-
' 
table affirmative, for Plato did discuss the existence and nature 
of God or gods. Then, the problem of' interpretation is to deter-
mine what Plato meant by his references to deity. Since he often 
wrote in mythical form and style, it is possible that Plato's 
I) ref'erences to · God and gods were simply mythical, allegorical per-
sonif'ic~tions of some principle. On the other hand, God may have 
been a personal creator and sustainer of the universe and value. 
I 
j The purpose of' this thesis is to attempt to determine \"1hatl 
--~-- t -Plato -m.ran t by God- and - go <is. I~otlter orcrs ,-" if'-=tnere--wa-s- orre God~---
I -
was he a conscious, individual being, or a term exemplifying 
cosm.lc purpose or natural processes? If the former was the 
case, what was the nature of this being; if the latter, what 
was the relation between references to God and the pl .. inciple 
or truth the term e•emplified? In both cases, what was the 
relation between God and gods? 
2 
The method of examining these questions in this t hesis is : 
developmental in two respects. First, it will be shovm that 
Plato's ovm thought developed throughout his life from his ear-
lier to later dialogues; this thesis will roughly follow the 
chronological development of tha dialogues. Second.; :. . this 
thesis will proceed from an examination of Plato's language 
and the relation of divinity to the theory of ideas to a more 
special and advanced treatment of problems concerning the exist-
ence and nature of divinity in Plato's thought. Chapter I will 
discuss the epistemological basis for any belief in God or gods, 
the meaning of mythical styltlt in Plato's language, the problem1 
of monotheism or polythdtism on the basis of the earlier dialogues, 
I 
the meaning of the theory of ideas, and the relation between I 
deity or deities and ideas, especially the Good. Following I 
this preliminary discussion of Plato's early thought, Chapters 
II and III will d*al with the cosmological functions of God and 
gods, the problem of monotheism and polytheism in the later dil -
logues, proof for the existence of God, and the nature of God. 
CHAPTER I 
THE - EARLY CONCEPTION OF GOD 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the development 
of Plato's conception of God or gods in his dialogues prior to 
the Timaeus and Laws and its relation to the development of his 
conception of ideas or forms. Although a few references will 
be made to the Timaeus and Laws, thexe dialogues vlill be dis-
cussed more fully in the second and third chapters. This chap-
ter may be comsidered as preliminary to the last two chapters, 
which contain Plato's fully developed conception of deity, a 
conception growing out of the latest part of Plato's philosophy. 
The chronological order of Plato's dialogues has been well 
established by the Plato scholar, Lutoslawski. Since his for-
mulation of the periods of Plato's dialogues, few interpreters 
of Plato have diverged from this order. Almost all recently 
accepted formulations of the order of Plato's dialogues are sub-
stantially the same as that of Lutoslawski, who believed that 
the order should not be detel"mined by some arbitrary or ningen-
ious hypothesis."! Without prejudice, nthe true genetic method 
should include a careful study of detail, with many parallel 
comparisons between every dialogue and those immediately preceding 
or immediately following. 112 Lutoslav;ski' s order of Plato 1 s dia-
logues, which will be emp loyed in this thesis, is as follows:3 
1. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 52. 
2. ~ Lutoslawski, OGPL, 52. 
3 
3. Cf. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 194ff. 
I 
lj 
I. Socratic Stage: 
Euthyphro 
Apology 
Crito 
Protagoras 
Laches 
Charmides 
Me no 
Euthydemus 
Gorgias 
II. Origin of the Theory of Ideas: 
Cratylus 
Symposit:un 
Phaedo 
III. Middle Platonism: 
Republic 
Phaedrus 
IV. Reform of Plato's Logic: 
Tb.eaetetus 
Parmenides 
V. New Theory of Science: 
Soph<j;st 
Politicus (Statesman) 
Philebus 
VI. Latest Developments of Plato's Thought: 
Timaeus 
Critias 
Laws 
.:4 
The fact that Plato varied his use of the terms "tiod" and 
" 
"gods," along with his references to the polytheistic Greek pan-
theon, presents the problem of whether he was a monotheist or 
polytheist. The use of the plural form illustrates Plato's con-
nection with the religion prevalent in his day. :Monotheism is 1 
I 
"the belief' that the cosmos is a unity, that only one God exists 
[i :~ ., ~xisting fr~m -a l l ti me] l~the universe, and that he has--=-
5 
Cl"eated and orders all things 11 ;1 polytheism is the belief "in i 
a p lurality of g ods. 112 The problem arises in its most pressinJ 
I 
form in the Tim~e"L~~ and Law~, and will be more adequately dis- I 
cussed in Chapters II and III. However , Plato's thought as a j 
I 
whole seems to have developed from an imp lied polytheism to an i 
ai'firmed monotheistic belief'. I 
VVl1.erever he referred to the "gods, 11 Plato seemed to be co 1-
forming to the traditional p olytheistic concep tion, whether or ,
1
. 
not he sex•iously a greed with this concep timn. In other words, 
1 
Plato never discussed reasons for a p olytheisti c system or ex- [ 
p lained such a system, but rather assumed it in his lane;uage. I 
In the Cratylus , Socrates occupied the position of a teacher-
' philologist who expounded truth concerning the gods through et 1 -
mology . Socrates 1 purpose was to show· why the g ods were named 1 
I 
gods through finding the ·.nne.anings of words, 3 for 11 the Gods must J 
clearly be supposed to call thing s by their right and natural 1 
I 
names . n4 1ney were called g ods because they (e. g ., the sun, 
stars, etc.) were seen as moving and run__ning ; the name was the ,· 
applied to all other deities . ·~ In defining the meaning s of th J 
particular gods , Socrates' principle was to find the meaning s 
of the names by which they were called: 
Of the Gods we 1mow nothing, either of their na-
tures or of the names whi ch they g ive themselves; 
but we are sure that the names by which the6 call 
themselves, whate ver they may be, are true. 
1. Wolfe,Art.(l9~-5), 5o4. ~-· Cratylus 391D (tr. Jowett). J
1
. 
2. Ramsdell , Art. (19L~_5), 774. 5 •. Cf. Cratyfus 397. 
=====#==~===~~C~r.,;a~ti#.~l~u~s~""'3$9~7~.,~· =i=r~ef'eren!!' 6. CratYTus I-OODE (tr. Jowett) r, 
o Pla:to v;£ omrt-rlls name. 
' 
~ ==----===--6 
Thus, since knowledge of the gods themselves was impossible, 
one could only discover the meanings that men had in mind when 
they gave the names to the gods; in the final analysis, the meth-
r hod was to find out vvhat were men's opinions of the gods.l For 
example, the meaning of "Pluto" was "giver of wealth," while 
11Apollo 11 involved the p9wer of the god. 2 Socrates thought that 
Apollo was a particularly apt name for the attributes of the god; 
it expressed unity, harmony, purity, sincerity, and the character-
istics of always shooting and exemplifying the musical attributes 
of "moving together" in concord.3 
Socrates proceeded to exrunine other divine names which ex-
pressed the attributes of gentleness, kindness, virtue, intel-
ligence, manliness, unchangeableness, and truthfulness.4 Then 
he discussed "another kind of Gods--the sun, moon, stars, earth, 
aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year~"5 Again, 
Socrates asserted, since the gods gave the first names, they 
were correct}> the gods gave l~nowledge, 7 and men would have to 
find the primary uses of words to have knowledge. However, Soc-
rates found it difficult to decide whether the divine nrunes orig-
::inated from the gods or from the opinions of men. 
Taken literally, this dialogue seems to express a definite 
polytheism, as well as a more or less agnostic position concern-
ing the nature of the gods. The interpretation of this dialogue 
is difficult, for it is hard to tell what was serious and what 1 
1. Cf. Cratylus . 40l. 
2. Cf. Cra tylus 40lff. 
3. Crat{lus 4o5E (tr. Jowett); 
Cf. Cra ylus 4o4E-405E. - - -
L~. Cf. Cratylus 406A-408C. 
_5. Crat~lus~OBD (tr. Jowett). 
6. Cf. ratylus L~25D. 
-7 ~ Cf. Cra tylus 438C. -
7 
was parodic.l According to Lutoslawski, Plato was here repudia-
ting the notion that language was the product of divine inspira-
tion. Reference to divine origin was no explanation of truth 
concerning deity; reasons and proofs would have to be substi-
tuted for ingenious arguments through words.2 
Plato's references to a plurality of gods seem to indicate 
that in the early dialogues his view was polytheistic, although 
he did not support the view seriously. The later dialogues show 
evidences of monotheism. For example, the singular florm of deity 
was used in the Phaedo,3 and Plato often used the singular form 
in the Republic.4 However, since the plural form was also used, 
probably the development to a more monotheistic position was 
gradual in the thought of Plato. Lutoslawski's conception of 
this development is instructive: 
The doctrine of one God, a perfect Being, developed 
in the Republic, is adhered to in the Timaeus and 
Laws, while in earlier dialogues up to the S~­posrwn a plurality of gods is either tacitly ~plied 
or expressly amaitted.~ 
In the Timaeus and Laws, the gods were created by and were sub-
ordinate to the one God.6 Thus, although polytheism seems evi-
dent in the early dialogues, Plato's fully developed theism was 
probably monotheistic. 
Plato's religious conceptions were in many respects puri-
fications of the traditional beliefs in gods prevalent in Plato's 
day. Although he did not revolt against the traditional conceptions 
1. Cf. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 221. 
2. Cr. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 223. 
3. Cf. Phaedo 62C. 
- }+. Cf. - Repub1i c 381c, -38·2R, 
379A, 380D. 5. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 286; 
Cf. Chapter ·:rr, p. 84ff. 
6-;'--e.f-;----p-. 8 3f'f. - -
8 
in the sense of completely denying their validity or developing 
a radically different conception, Plato envisioned the need of 
a repudiation of the degenerated theistic beliefs in capricious, 
jealous and selfish deities. In the early dialogues, Plato was 
not ~o interested in demonstrating the existence of God or gods, 
or in arguing for their existence, as he was ~n shovdng the neces-
sity of their complete goodness. For Plato, it was necessary 
that God and gods be good and just, and that they care for men. 
The aspects of the old religious mythology which attributed evil 
to gods were false and damaging to the ideal state; Plato sought 
to purify religion of these misconceptions. 
The Socratic and Platonic dialogues developed the spirit of 
morally responsible, good gods (or God), who cared for the wel-
fare of men. In the Socratic dialogue, Eut~hro, Socrates 
doubted that the prevalent stories of the gods were true, that 
the gods r~ally fought with one another,l for the gods approved 
the piOUS· and holy. Piety was loved by all the gods; 2 gods gave 
all good things to men.3 Thus, in challenging Euthyphro's belief 
in the traditional stories of the gods, the Platonic Socrates 
beerune a prophet of a reformed conception of the gods. 
In the Apology, Socrates was indicted on the chal"'ge of im-
piety, mainly because he opposed the superstitious beliefs of 
traditional religion, which fancied the gods as evil. Proclaim-
ing a higher religion, Socrates believed that the divine command was 
1. cr. Euthyphro 6. 3. Cf. Euthyphro l4, 8, lOE. 
2. Cf. EuthYEhro 9C. 
I 
=--=--=-___:, ___ =-=-=--=-
1 
I 
' primary. 1 
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God was wise2 and would not lie.3 Socrates was 
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by God as a gadfly to proclaim a better religion.4 
In the Platonic dialogues, Plato affirmed a lofty concep- I 
tion of the gods. In the Phaedo, the gods stood in a peculiar : 
relationship to men as guardians;5 the gods helped men gain 
truth.6 In the Hepublic, Plato directly attacked the Homeric · 
conception of the gods; 7 the fictions of the poets, which~---tattr:i.b-
·-uted evil to the gods, were ridiculous and harmful. Plato 
asserted: 11We must not listen to Homer or to any other ' poet 
who is guilty of the folly 11 of attributing evil to the gods.8 
The evil caused by the gods was only for punishraent ,9 f or no 
evil was administered for the sake of evil. No matter what ma . 
be the source of evil, it was not due to the gods, who were thJ 
source only of good. 
Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all 
things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of 
a few things only, and not of most things that 
occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, 
and many are the evils, and the good is to be at-
tributed -to God alone; of the evils the caul0s 1 are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him. 1
1 God is not the author of all things, but of good 
only.ll I 
Also, the gods did not grieve or laugh, as they were represent d 
by the poets.l2 
Plato so strongly opposed the traditional stories of the 
gods whieh~d!ithem as evil, that !'or the ideal state he 
1. cr. Apology 7. 
2. Cf. Apology 8. Jowett) 2 
c:r. 9. 
cr. 10. 
- lc 
12. 
I 
I 
,, 
I 
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10 
prescribed that the mythical stories of the gods be banished; I 
the conceptio~s of the gods had to be purified, for they had a ; 
bad effect on the young. 1 In the tenth book of the Republi c, I 
Plato attributed true justice to the gods, for, Plato asserted,~ 
11 the gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just 
and to be like God , as far as man can attain the divine like-
ness, by ~ the pursuit of virtue. 11 2 Finally, in the Phaedrus 
Plato pointed out the purity of the gods, whose existence was 
pattern for the life of men.3 / 
Thus, in ·the earliest a..11.d middle groups of his dialogues, I 
Plato showed his intent to transform the traditional concep- I 
tions of the gods by infusing a liberal conception of their i 
complete goodness and devotion to truth. As will be demonstra : 
I 
ted in Chapter III, the later dialogues advanced a more positi e 
conception of the lofty divine attributes, especially found in ! 
the Laws . Even though Plato agreed with many of the tradition 
tendencies in his earlier dialogues, yet he attempted to puri-
fy religion in accord with a more reasonable view, for he was 
not satisfied with the prevaJL~ent institution of religion. 
The dialogues of Plato show us the ancient religious 
system of Hellas in a state of disint egration and 
transition. Old ideas were passing away:--Homer had 
ceased to be a sufficient guide to men who had sat 
at the feet of the Sophists .••• The f]:ncient myth-
ology vms intolerable to him [ Plato] • ·· · 
A debasement of original formulations and attitudes, the Greek 
religion of his day was considered inadequate and harmful by 
Of. Phaedrus 252ff, 273E-274A. 
L. Jowett, DP II 862 . 
~~~==========~==~~= 
11 
Plato. 1 Denouncing conceptions of the gods as capricious and 
arbitrary, Plato replaced them with the conception of a good and 
just God (or gods) who cared for men. 
Plato had diBficulty reconciling the obvious presence of 
evil with a good God. The problem of evil !s more evident in 
the Laws, and will be discussed in the third chapter; however, 
the problem existed, to some extent at least, in the dialogues 
before the Timaeus and Laws. Despite whatever significance evil 
I 
had, Plato took pains to insure God's complete goodness and lack 
of any evil taint;. Evil, he asserted, was not due to God: 
For the good we must assume no other cause than God, 
but the cause of evil we must look for in other things 
and not in God.2 
God is never i~ any way uru~ighteous--he is perfect 
righteousne:ss • .:S · 
There can be no falsehood of any sort in the divine 
nature •••• A god is a being of entirf? simplicity 
and truthfulness in word and in deed.~ 
~nus, prior to the Timaeus and Laws, Plato affirmed the complete 
goodness of God and gods and recognized the presence of real 
evil. As yet, Plato offered no solution to the problem of evil. 
Another aspect of the concept of God's goodness is divine 
love. 'This concopt must be more adequately explained in connec-
tion with the Laws, which seems to contain the vie-~T that love 
was an attribute of God. Prior to this development, Plato's 
conception of love was different and vague. If the thoughts ex-
pressed in the Symposium are taken as literal (although the lan-
guage is quite metaphorical), love was not of God, but was inter-
mediary between God and men. Love was ~os, 11desirous longing, 11 
---~ -l'T C-f. Solmsen, PT, -3-.59. -
2. Republic 3790 (tr. Cornford). 
- ,3.-!;Phea:ete-tus- 1~9A-{ tr. J0wett) .--4. Repbblic 382E (tr. Cornford). 
12 
for eternal good.l In the speeches on love, Agathon poetically 
described the god Love as one to be praised for himself, for he 
was the most fair and blessed of the gods;2 he was the savior 
and helper of men.3 
Socrates conunended Agathon 1 s speech, but asserted that Love 
had been overly praised.4 Then Socrates commenced his speech. 
Since Love desired something unpossessed, Socrates reasoned, it 
was not good or great but desired to be good and great.5 Love 
was not beautiful but wanted to be; the beautiful was the good, 
and love wanted the good.6 In the tale of Diotima, Socrates 
contin~4 his speech. Love was not fair and good, but also was 
not evil.7 Love was not a god, because gods were happy and fair.8 
Thus, Love was neither divine nor human but was 
in a mean between the two •••• He is a great spirit, 
and like all spirits he is intermediate between the 
divine and the mortal •••• He interprets ••• betvTeen 
gods and men, conveying and taking across to the gods 
the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the com-
mands and replies of the gods; he is the mediator who 
spans the chasm which divi~es them, and ther efore in 
him all is bound together. 
This intermediary was necessary, .for, Plato asserted, "God min-
gles not with man; but through 
verse of god with ma n , whether 
Love was important for seeking 
1. Cf. S~osium 202-203; 
Taylor, LA, 226-234. 
2. Cf. Symposium 195. 
3. Cf. Symposium 197E. 
4. Cf. Spmposium 198. 
5. Cf. Symposium 199Cff. 
Love all the intercourse and con-
awake or asleep, is carried on. rrlO 
the good. 11 
6. Cf. Symposium 201B. 
7. cr. Symposium 202A. 
8. Cf. Symposium 202CD. 
9. Symposium 202DE (tr. Jowett). 
10. Symposium 203A (tr. Jowett). 
11. Cf. Symposium 205, 206B. 
-- -- --"--"'--==~=--=--'---
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The Symposium has important implications. For example, God 
was too perfect and pure to possess love. Since love was incom-
plete, love was not of God. Also, God did not mingle or conunune 
directly with men. Thus, it seems t hat Plato's concept of deity 
at this period of his thought (unless the Symposium be considel"'ed 
entirely allegorical or foreign to the thought of Plato) is of 
deities transcendent in themselves, requiring intermediaries in 
their relationships with men. Love was too v10rldly to be applied 
to gods. The t:nanscendent-God concept Vfas consonant with Plato t s 
later remal"'k that gods n i d not change their appearances, since 
they had nothing to gain by changing themselves. 1 
The Symposium implied that Love, although not a part of the 
divine nature, was yet important in divine-huJnan relations. If 
men were to follow the gods and seek t h e good, they would have to 
avail themselves of Love. Love bound man and gods in the co-
operative pursuit of goodness and its achievement. As his thought 
developed, Plato began to conceive of love or care as an attribute 
of the divine nature. For ex~aple, in t h e Republic, f ollowing 
the Symposium at a later period in his thought, Plato asserted: 
The gods have a care of any one whose desire is to 
become just and to be like God , as far as man can 
atta~n the divine likeness, by the pur:suit of vir-
tuD. 
Later conceptions of care or love wer e devoid of the worldly 
or sexual characteristics of the Eros of the Symposium. 
To gain a full understanding of Plato's conception of God, 
an examination of Plato's own religious feelings would be 
L -:--~--:;:::--~~ 1. Cf. Republic 380E, 381-. 2.. - Republic 6l;)A ( tr • .rowett). _ 
II 
I' 
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instructive. Of course, conclusions concerning the psychological 
phase of Plato's conception of God have no function in deter-
mining the truth or falsity of his belief's; the genetic fallacy 
must be avoided. However, if there are indications of religious 
feelings in Plato, then it seems reasonable to suppose that Pla-
to's conception of God may be better understood by recognizing 
the influence of' the religious consciousness on conceptual f'or-
mulations. In other words, such an examination may shmrf that 
Plato's religious conceptions were not only the result of ab-
stract reasoning, but at least to some extent, the result of' 
religious insight and perhaps mystical illuminationl 
Any indications of Plato's religious consciousness must be 
found in his writings~ Indications of mystical awareness and 
illwnination seem definitely established in a number of the dia-
log~es. For example, in the Phaedo, Socrates felt the religious 
mission of the soul, and believed in the attainment of truth and 
wisdom through a kind of mystical insight or illumination. In 
the Phaedrus, Socrates felt a kind of mystical inspirationl and 
the compelling force of a divine sigh. 2 In mythical formulation, 
Socrates expounded the truth concerning love and the soul in the 
Phaedrus. Tr.ue beauty was knovvn through ecstasy, surpassing any 
earthly vision.3 Plato's religious feeling s are obvious in his 
devotion to the Good, indicated in the Republic. Truth of the 
Good was discovered through dialectic in the surpassing of con-
ceptual hypotheses.4 This truth was attained only in transcending 
1. Cf. Phaedrus 238C. 
2. Cf. Phaedrus 242C; Apology 
2lff; Crito 54. 
3. Cf. Phaedrus ~9E-250. 
4. Cf. p. -18. 
--
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the space-time continuum by a kind of mystical insight into the 
realm of eternal Being.l As will be shown later in this chapter, 
the Good was the supreme object of religious devotion. 
If the E~istles are genuine writings of Plato, the evidence 
of mystical feelings . is increased by noting the reference to 
the Good in the seventh Epistle. A human being could not know 
the form of the Good; the Good could not be explained or con-
ceptually grasped. Surpassing the reach of knowledge, the Good 
could only be envisioned by direct experience. 
Thus, there are indications in the dialogues of what may 
be called a religious consciousness, characterized in part by 
feelings of mystical illumination. These indications show that 
Plato had religious feelings which may have been directed toward 
God or the gods. 
That religious f6elings were directed toward gods and God 
is indicated in several of the dialog-ue s. In the Pla tonic dia-
logue, Phaedrus, Socrates offered a prayer to the grea t god Pan: 
Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this 
place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may 
the out1.•mrd and inward man be at one. May I reck on 
the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a 
quantity of gol~ as a temperate man and he only can 
bear and carry. · 
In the Republic, if the Good was a god, Plato's devotion was di~ 
rected toward a deity. In the latest dialogues, there are pl"ayers 
of invocation before discussions. In the Timaeus, Timaeus, the 
principal speaker of the dialo:gqe, commenced his speech vdth an 
invocation of the gods: 
1. -cf. -~epublic 514-519. 2. Phaedrus 279 (tr.~owett). 
,, 
All men, Socrates, ">Vho have any degree of right 
feeling, at the beginning of every enterprise, whe-
ther small or great, always call upon God. And we 
too, who are going to discot~se of the nature of the 
universe, how created or how existing without crea-
tion, if we be not altogether out of our wits, must 
invoke the aid of Gods and Goddesses and pray that 
our words may be acceptable to them and consistent 
with themselyes. Let this, then, be our invocation 
of the Gods.l 
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Again, in the Critias, Timaeus beseeched the blessings of the gods 
for kno·wledge and the fruitfulness of his discussions. 2 In the 
Laws X, Plato emphasized the goodness and care of God and gods 
for men; men should devote themselves to God and gods. ~Vhen 
truth -vvas desired, one should seel{ divine aid. 3 The gods should 
be worshipped through the offering of sacrifices.4 
Although the recognition of Plato's religious consciousness 
(if the dialogues truly represent Plato) does not demonstrate 
the nature of God or gods in Plato's thought, it is important in 
m~derstanding Plato's conception of God. Plato's mind was af a 
mystical temper when he discussedreligious concepts. It would 
not be suprising, therefore, to f:t:p.d,"·Plato 1 s descriptions of God 
and gods somewhat vague and even self-contradictory. Rather than 
to farce his insights into definite, abstract concepts, Plato 
seemed to employ the mythical style in his formulations for the 
purpose of showing the incomprehensibility of certain notio~s•. 
The formulations of Plato may be compared with the mystical 
insights of Indian thought, especially found in the Vedas. In 
the UEanishads~ Brahman was described as being incapable of logical, 
· l,_,_· ·Timaeus .. . 27DR · ( tr ·~ ··Jowett). 
2. Cf. Critias 106. 
J. Cf. Laws 8870. 
4. Cf. Laws 907D-910D. 
_J__ 
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intellectual, or conceptual comprehension,l but as being knovvn 
through mystical illurnination.2 In the Upanishad~, Brahman was 
the supreme object of worship.3 
If it be granted that there are indications of Plato's re-
ligious consciousness, then it seems important to recognize that 
his belief in the existence of God and gods and his arguments 
for the goodness of God and gods ste1runed not only from philosophi-
cal considerations as such, but also were motivated to some extent 
by his own religious feelings. In other words, it seems probable 
that Plato 1 s conception of God at any period of his thought vvas 
developed through a combination of reasonableness and a religious 
attitude. The practical relation with God and gods was one of 
devotion and discipleship. Religion in practice was to be a part 
of the ideal state in the Laws.4 Furthermore, as a general tenor 
of the dialogUes, practical religion was more than the offering 
of sacrifices, but e:apecially included living a good life in fol-
lowing the gods.5 Also, the importance of objective ·purpos!veness 
" in the universe probably was impressed on Plato by faith in 
divine goodness. It may not be improbabli :: that c.Plato \'Vas a "man 
of profound religious faith, 11 6 which would cause an effect on 
', his theology. According to Calhoun, "his religious experalence 
included a clearly stated confidence in the sovereignty :o:r·. the 
living God. 117 
1. cr. UPA, 25 (Katha), 68 (Mun-
daka), 146 ( Brihadaranyaka) • -
2. Cf. UPA, 75 (Mandl.lk:Ja). 
3. This conviction is prevalent 
thr9u_g_~ou t th~ Upanishads._ 4. cr. Laws 907ff for methods of 
daaling with disbelievers and 
f'e:ii! :.'J3he :iimportance of social 
religion. 
5. Cf. Republic 613A; Phaedrus 
252ff; the purity of the gods was 
the pattern for the life of man. 
o-:- Fie 1 , -=-Ar t :T l9-_3l.f )-, - 2C>9 • -: -
7. Calhoun, Art.(l931), 216. 
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However, it must not be supposed that Plato's religious faith 
and experience were very similar to that of the later evolving 
religion, Christianity. Perhaps Plato was influenced by his af-
j1 finities with the Orphic Mystery Religions,l but he did not str
1
ess, 
·' as did Christianity, an intimate relationship with God a.nd worship 
of God for his own sake rather than for the purpuit of good. i 
II 
1 However, in view of the indications aoncerning Plato's religious 
I' 
I faith, Field probably minimized the case when he \"Trote: "There 
is little or nothing in his writings about the personal relation 
of man to God wfuich is such an important element in Christian 
religious experience.n2 
Plato's epistemological basis for the belief in God or gods 
is vague. According to Plato, ultimate reality was knovrr1 through 
d~alectic or reason. Contemplative insight through reason could 
· lead the philosopher to truth which was above hypotheses. Reason 
was the highest facilU.ty of apprehending truth; reason attained ' 
II 
II 
li 
truth 
by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not 
as first principles, but only as hypotheses--that 
is to say, as steps and points of departure into a 
world which is above hypotheses, in order that she 
may soar beyond them to the first principle of the 
whole; and clinging to this and then to hhat which 
depends on this, by successive steps she descends 
again without the aid of any sensible object~ from 
ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends.J 
Through the dialectic or contemplative reasoning, the soul tran.o; · 
scended hypotheses of the order of understanding and sense-experience 
II l.. Cf. Solmsen, PTr' 123; 
Brightman, Art.(19~5)2, 594. 
2. Field, -Art.(1934), 290. 
3. Republic 511B (tr. Jowett). 
I' I 
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to attain true knowledge of the good.l Such contemplation was 
divorced from worldly pursuits. 
There abides the very being with which true knowl-
edge is concerned; the colourless, formless, in-
tangible essence, visible only to mind, the pilot 
of the soul. The divine intelligence, being nurtured 
upon mind and pure knowledg.e_J _. and the intelligence 
of every soul which is capable of receiving the 
food proper to it, rejoices at beholding reality • 
••• She beholds justice, and temperance, and knowl-
edge absolute, not in the form of generation or 
of relation, which men call exi~tence, but knovvledge 
absolute in existence absolute. 
For Plato, this mystical dialectic and reason applied to 
knowledge of ideas, the basis of supreme reality and truth. 
From the epistemological standpoint, the problem develops as 
follows: (1) Is there a God (or gods) to be knovm? Plato seems 
to assume an affirmative answer to this question without ques-
tioning the existence of God or gods. As already sh ovnn, Plato 
was more interested in arguing i'o:r::r · ~ the .) g¢odness than for the 
existence of God and gods. Only in his latest period of thought 
did Plato systematically attempt to prove the existence of the 
one, supreme, crea tive God. (2) Can God (or gods) be ln1ovm? 
It seems unreasonable that Plato would argue for the goodness of 
gods without assuming that t hey could actualJ.y be known to exist. 
In the Laws, Plato accused those who did not know God and gods of 
heresy. It was integral to Plato's thought that God and gods 
could be knovm. 
( 3) Hovr is God (or gods) 1mmvn? The answer to this problem 
not so evident. An attempt will be made in this thesis to 
1. Cf. Republic 532. 2. Phaedrus 247E (tr • .rc:wet~ ). 
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show how Plato believed God and gods could be knovvn. The develop-
ment of Plato's theory of ideas indicates that the attributes 
dr God and gods were discovered through knowledge of the ideas. 
~nus, the notions goodness and justice would be divine attri-
butes; their meanings and ways of being lcnovm must be examined. 
Through the middle period of his thought, Plato f3robably thought 
that the attributes of the gods were knovm intuitively through 
a kind of mystical insight. This is indicated by the fact t hat 
Plato affirmed the goodness and justice of the gods, and that 
these attributes correspond to t he ~deas of goodness and justice 
-..vhich, according to the Republic, were kno-..m through dialectic 
in surpassing worldly matters to gain mystical insight. 1 Thus, 
if ideas were known intuitively by beholding the true reality of' 
Being, then it would seem evident that the attributes of deities 
were knovm in a similar way. 
The dialogues of' Plato's later periods of thought seem to 
have a different conception of ideas; they were merely general 
notions in minds thi~~ing them, rather than independently real 
and self-subsistent realities, as indicated in the early dia-
logues.2 But still, these general notions led the philosopher 
to the highest truth . Also, the later developed ideas might 
still have been knovm, in part at least, through mystical in-
sight. 
In conclusion, it might be said that God could be known 
through his attributes, vvhich were ideas discovered, in part at 
1. Cf. P• 1,4£;·. 2. Cf. p. }2ff. 
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least, t hrough mys t ical contemplation. For Plato, it was reason-
able that ideas, such as g oodness, justice and wisdom, applied 
to the divine nature. However, a t h orough examination or how 
God was known and or his attributes was not undertaken until 
Plato wrote the Tima eus and Laws. Thus, the full treatment of 
this problem must await the second and third chap t ers of this 
thesis. 
The interpretation or Plato's theory mf ideas and the rela-
tion of ideas to God present difTicult problems, t h e solu tions 
of which must tak e into account the developmental nature of Pla-
to's thought. 1 Beginnings of the theory of ideas are found in the 
Socratic dialogues. In the Euthyphro, the use of 11property 11 or 
"form" mark s the beginning of the concept of idea (e1aos or f olct) 
and appears in the phrase, "the general idea which malces all p ious 
things to be pious. 11 2 Here , the characteristic of piety was a 
standard for judging pious acts, but the concept of form here 
should not be identified :as.· metaphysical entity. 3 The Meno ap-
plied t h e theory of ideas to human conduct,4 and in the Gorgia~, 
thing s par ticipated in good and in evil.5 The notion of idea had 
origins i n Thucydides, 6 Pythagoras ;·7 and Socrates. 8 Also, the 
use of ideas in the Socratic dialogues should not be confused with 
' the later concepts of ideas. 
We cannot agre e wi t )}". Zeller who s·ees vestiges of 
this theory of ideas already in t he ·Meno, Euthy-
demus ~ :9:! and Gorgias. Here we have only the· germ 
1. The following exposition of the development of ideas substan-
tially fol l ows Lutoslawski 1 s commentary in h i s OGPL· 
2. ~t~hro 6E (tr -_ Jowett). -==- 6. Cf. _Lutoslawslri !. _ OGPL,~Oq_~1 -· - --· ~ J· -et¥~toslawski, ~L, 199. 1. Cf. ~rne~, GP, I, 15 • 
4. Cf. meno 72C. 8. Cf. raylor, PLA, 112n. 
5. Cf. GOrgias 4 68A, 497E. 9. Cf. Euthydemus 299. 
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from which the theory of ideas was aftePwards 
developed. This germ is the consciousness of in-
fallible knowledge.l 
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I The theory of ideas in the Soci'atic dialogues seems to ha e 
I 
referred to a priori knowledge rather than an independent, subl 
sistent realm of ideas. The true beginning of the doctrine of j 
ideas was in the three dialogues _Cratylus, Symposium, ancl Phae o. 
II Vestiges of a metaphysical theory of ideas were present in Cra-ty-
lus, if this dialogue is interpreted as expressing Plato 's own l 
thought.2 In the Cratylus, the standard of certainty was f'oun 
I 
in moral judgments, whePe there were absolute distinctions be- ! 
I 
tween good and bad. '11hese distinctions led .. : to the notion of I 
something permanent , while that which was characterized by ap- I 
pearance was changing ; the existence of' things had perrna .. YJ.ence 
of substance apart from words to def'ine them: 
Things are not relative to individuals, and all 
things do not equally belong to all at the same 
moment and ahvays. IJ."11ey must be supposed to have 
their o•i'll1. proper and permanent essence: they are 
not in relation to us, or inf'luenced by us, f'luc-
tuating according to our fancy, but chey are inde-
pendent, and maintain to their• mm essence the re-
lation prescribed by nature.j 
Things were as they were in their ov~m nature; they had a per-
manent and independent essence. Also, actions had ua special 
nature of their ovm. u4 
The purpose of identity of essence in this d ialogue was 
the necessity that ttaings remain the same for the possibility 
1. Lutoslavfski, OGPL, 217. 
2. Cf'. p. 6f. 
3 Cratylus 386D (tr. Jowett). 4: Cratylus 387D (tr. Jowett). 
I 
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of 1cnowledge, 1 since knovrledge referred to determinate beings. 
The objects of knowledge were not material things, but substan-
ces of things, which were different from material appearances.~ 
The philosopher should seek the true essences: 
Let us seek the true beauty; not asking whether a 
face is fair, or anything of that sort, for all such 
things appear to be in a flux; but let u~ ask whether 
the true beauty is not always beautiful.~ 
In the Cratylus, substances had to remain the same. But there 
I 
was no indication in this dialogue that substances must have 
real existence; the independent substantiality of ideas was not 
yet asserted. As yet there was no world of self-existing ideas, 
for the discussions in the Cratylus referred only to linguistic 
usages and the necessity of logical identity. Although the doc-
trine of ideas was prepared for, it had not yet been for.mulated.4 
The idea of Beauty in the Synwosirun carried the process fur-
ther. The discussion of Eros, or Love, led to the use of gener-
1 
alizations; the existence of a general idea did not depend on 
particulars, but was the cause of particular qualities. Such an 
examination was applied to the concept of beauty.5 ·The idea ot 
Beauty was difficult to express, but was vastly different fr•om 1 
particular things. Beauty had a nature 
which in· the first place is everlasting, not grow-
ing and decaying, or waxing and waning; secondly, 
••• bd~uty [isl absolute, separate, simple, and 
everlasting, which without diminution and without 
increase, or any change, is impabted to the ever-
1. C.f. Cra tylus hl~o. 
2. cr. Crat1lus 44oA. 
3. Cratilus~39D (tr. Jowett). 
4. cr. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 222ff. 
5. Cf. S-ymposium 210-211. I' 
,I 
I 
I 
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growing and perishing beauties of all other things • 
••• But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty--
the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unal-
loyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality 
and all the colours and vanities of human life--
thither looking, and ho!ding converse with the true 
beauty simple and divine? 
This \Vas "a solution of the problem of substance proposed in 
I 
j the Cratyius. n2 The real beauty \Vas eternal, objective and 
I 
I 
I 
I 
,, 
I 
I 
' I
,, 
I 
absolute, independent of the space-time continuum. Here, the 
idea of Beauty had existence separate from concl'•ete things, vvh· ch 
owed their beauty to the idea of Beauty. Plato here had for- I 
mulated a theory of ideas, but lllnited it to the idea of Beau- , 
I 
ty. 
I 
In the Phaedo, Plato generalized his notion of the ideal / 
existence of beauty to other concepts, forming a system of ide 1 s. 
Ideal substances existed; they were independent of the untrust ;1 
worthy senses,2 different from material representations, and 
perceived by the soul apart from the body, for ' ~true existence 
was "revealed" to the soul 11in thought."4 
Thought is best when the mind is gathered into her-
self and none of these things trouble her--neither 
sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleastu~e,--when 
she takes leave of the body, and has as little pos-
sible to do with it, when she has no bodily ~ense 
or desire, but is aspiring after true being.~ 
I 
Thus, substances such as absolute justice, absolute beauty, ab1 
solute good, absolute greatness, absolute health, absolute str lngth 
and':~stanbe..-a;_u of the essence or true nature of everything, n6 
1. Symposium 211 {tr. Jowett). 4. Phaedo 65C {tr. Jow·ett). 
2. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 235. 5. Phaedo 65C (tr. Jowett). 
3. Cf. Phaedo 6,5B. 6. Phaedo 65D (tr. Jowett). =--==-~:-__ _d~~~~~~--=-=-=· =---=-=~-=~:::::~~====~J=== 
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were revealed by thought. They were apprehended through the 
intellect, mind and reason alone . 1 Things in themselves were 
perceived by the soul apart £rom the body.2 
The doctrine or recollection or reminiscence gave support, 
Plato thought, to the theory of ideas. The soul possessed in-
nate truth in remembering ideas l~own in an existence previous 
to the present life.3 The doc§rine of recollection, which, Plato 
believed, could be proved empirically (since one nnaturally" 
applies his knowledge of the ideas in his present life~4 depended 
upon and necessitated the existence of absolute ideas and their 
similarity or dissimilarity with concrete t hings o~ present ex-
, perience.5 The ideas were kno\~ before the sense-observation of 
the earthly life took place, and were retained throughout the 
earthly life.6 Thus, the ideas had an eternal existence, in-
dependent of changes among sensible things. 7 For Plato, "beau-
ty, goo&"'less, and the other notions . ••• have a most real and 
absolute existence. 11 8 Ideas were unchanging.9 
In the Phaedo, Plato developed an idealistic metaphysics 
with final causality in the ideas. Ideas had an existence apart 
from particular things, which existed by participation in ideas.lO 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
The Phaedo bring s Plato's Idealism to its highest 
point and contains a conscious representation of all 
consequences deriving from the fundamental hypoGhesis 
cr. Phaedo 65D-66A. 6. cr. Phaedo 75-76. 
cr. Phaedo 65E. 7· cr. l?haedo 75E. 
cr. Phaedo 72E. 8. Phaedo 77A (tr. .Jowett). 
Cf. Phaedo 73A; Meno 82ff. 9. cr. Phaedo 78DE. 
cr. Phaedo 7L~. 10. Cf. Phaedo lOOCD. 
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sought for in the Cratylus, perceived in the ~­
posiUL~, and demonstrated h~re, so far as it couJ[d 
be, for Plato's followers.l 
The Republic developed a more explicit theory of ideas. 
This dialogue, Lutoslawski pointed out, was more advanced in 
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I 
I 
I 
thought to be as early as Cratylus, Symposium and Phaedo; it ~~ 
a more mature and positive philosophy. 2 Although its unity had 
been questioned, the Republic was v~itten as one continuous - l 
work after the Phaedo.3 
Republic: Book I, Books 
Bool~ X.4 
I 
There are five chief divisions of the I 
II-IV, Books V-VII, Books VIII-LX, and 
In II-IV, generalizations were made from particulars to 
li 
11 bread ideas, e.g., the individual generalized into the state, 
, and the three parts of the soul into the three classes of the I 
I state. In V-VII, the theory or ideas was introduced as a well~ 
I established truth. For example, justice and goodness were re~ -' 
I 
I 
resented as single and absolute ideas: 
And of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every 
other class, the srune remark holds: taken singly, 
each of them is one; but from the various combina-
tions of them vri th actions and things and with one 
another, the:y; are seen in all sorts of lights and 
appear many • .? 
The idea of Beauty was assuraed as a fact: 
I would aslc the gentleman who is of opinion that 
there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beau-
ty--in whose opinion the beautiful is the manifold--
he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights, who can-
not bear to be told that the beautiful is6one, and 
the just is one, or t hat anything is one? 
1. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 259. 4. Cf. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 271. 
2. Cf. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 310. 5. Republic 476A {tr. Jowett). 
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Those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither 
see absolute beauty, nor can f'ollow any guide who 
points the way thither; who see the many just, and 
not absolute justice, and the like,--such persons 
may be said to have opinion but not knowledge •••• 
But those who see the absol1,1te and eternal and im-
r.1Utable miy be said to know, and not to have opin-
ion only. 
The idea of good is the highest knowledge, and ••• 
all other things become useful and adva~tageous on~ 
by their use of this •••• Do you thinlc that the pos-
session of all other things is of any value if we do 
not possess the good? or the knowledge of all othe~ 
thing~ if we have no knowledge of beauty and good-
ness? 
27 
.Thingsl:.chgra:cte:eJ::.z.ed -.;by.::: idetis ~JWere .~· called 11 true being. n3 The 
ideas were unchangeable, always remaining the same.4 The es-
sence of th,e many particulars was a unified idea; 
There is 
of other 
there is 
a single 
an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and 
things to which the term 11many 11 is applied 
an absolute; for they may be brought under
5 idea, which is called the essence of each. 
I 
I 
The idea of the Good was the highest, clearest and best o~ 
ideas;6 it was beyond the reach of' mankind, All other . ide~s 
to be looked at in the light of the idea of the Good, whic l 
the 
had 
was the true starting-point of knowledge.7 
Vlhen a person starts on the discovery of the absolute 
by the light of reason only, and without any assis-
tance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intel-
ligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute 
good, he at last finds himself at the end of the 
intellectual world, 8as in the case of sight at the end of the visible. 
The pre-eminent Good was likened to the sun: 
In like manner [as tb.B sun] the good may be said to 
be not only the author of knowledge to all things 
5. Republic 507B (tr. Jowett) ' 
6. Cr. Republic 505A, 518CD. 
7. _Qf. Republic _2o5D. 
I 
I 
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known, but of theiP being and essence, and yet the 
good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in 
dignity and power.l I 
I 
I The Good stood highest in the hierarchy of ideas and truth: 
In the world of knowledge the idea of good appears 
last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, 
when seen, is also inferred to be the universal 
author of all things beautiful and right, parent; 
of light and of the lord of light in this visible 
world, and the imrnediate source of reason and truth 
in the intellectual; and \:.:.::.:; this is the power 
upon which he who would act rationally either i~ 
public or private life must have his eye fixed. 
I 
I 
! 
These passages seemed to make the Good ef'·.fie:tent.:·cr..e.ator .:.o.r. being 
I" 
and reality, thus making the Good function as a god. The most 1 
str±king example of this indication is the passage: ''It was 
the Sun, then, that I maant vrhen I spoke of that offspring whi 
the Good has created in the visible world."3 A difficult pro-
blem arises: If the idea of the Good exereised the function o 
• 
a god in the Republic, what was the relation betvteen the Good 
I 
and the God of the Timaeus? This problem must await Chapter 
to be fully considered. However, two aspects of the problem l 
be considered in the light of the Republic. 
First, Plato 1 s conception of God vras not a fixed one thro ,gh-
out his dialogues; rather, the conception developed, reaching 
its culmination in the Timaeus and Laws. If the Republic was 
written in the middle period, then it is conceivable that Plat ! 
at this time had not as yet fully developed his concept of a I 
I 
metaphysical God, while it may be true that the idea of the I 
cr. Re£ubli~ 518CD. I 
3. Republic 508C (tr. Cornford ). 
I 
1. Republ~~9B (tr. Jowett). 
2. Republic 517C (tr. Jowett). 
I 
il 
I 
ll ~ ~ood was the c>od of the Republic. 29 - -= Neither in pr~vious nor in 
later dialogues is there evidence for supposing that the Good 
funct·i~onecL 'as ~-·.an...tl'ctiv...ely:-_ creative God. Therefore, if the 
Good was God in the Republic, then Plato's conception o~ God 
vfas immatlli'e at this time in vie\V of the developments since the 
I 
R~ublic. I 
I 
Second; 1 Plato's language may be interpreted as mythical ~ 
or allegorical. Rather than supposing that the Good e~erciaed 11 
a cosmological-creative God ~unction, Plato may have meant to I 
emphasize the fact that the Good was supreme in an ethical sen e, 
or that the Good was supreme a1nong t he ideas, although not the~r 
cause. Lutoslawski advanced the belief that Plato's idea of t ! e 
Good was not literal if taken as the fil"st cause o~ all Being , 
~nowledge a nd truth. 1 Lutoslawski pointed out that Plato con-
~essed he had exaggerated the Good; said Plato's Character Soc-
rates: 
I had fopgotten ••• that we were not serious, and 
spoke v1i t h too much excitement. For when I saw 
philosophy so ULndeservedly trampled under ~oot o~ 
men I could not help feeling a sort o~ indignation 
at the authors 05 her disgrace: and my anger made 
me too vehement. 
I 
Plato supported his exaggeration by having 
educational value o~ mythical ~alsehoods.3 
~ormerly asserted tfie 
Again, Plato appeaJI ed 
I 
. .. ·' ·-
to be unceDtain whether what he had said concerning the Good 
was correct: 
I 
I 
I 1. Cf. Lutoslawsk:i., OGPL, 294-f~. 2. Republic 536C (tr. Jowett). 3. Cf. Republic 382C. 
I 
'I I. 
,I 
,, 
ll 
I 
I 
I 
----=---=·= 
Whether what I told you would or uould not have been 
a reality I cannot venture to say ; but you would 
have seen something like reality; of that I am con-
fident.l 
I 
I 
\ ~il==-=-= 30 
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Thus, it may be true that Plato did not seriously mean for the \ 
idea of the Good to be a God. But even if the Good was the Go 1 
of the Republic, there is no reason for extending this concep-
tion to the fubther developments of Plato's thought. 
The conception of the idea of the Good marked a further 
advancement in Plato's theory of ideas. nThis idea of Good in ! 
the Republic; vdth all its brilliancy and grandeur, cannot be 
any thing else than t he final cause depicted in more sober lan-
guage in the Phaedo.n2 The idea was no longer hypothetical, b t 
I 
was more substantial. However, Lutoslawsld pointed out, v1hen 1 
l 
Plat o asserted that the idea of the Good and oth er ideas were 
~~ beyond Being,3 he seemed to af:rirm t h e fact that they had no 
,I separate existence.4 An idea was no longer a substance, but a. . 
I 
notion of minds which determined the existence of substances; I 
truth was to be found in thought rather than in actual raality. 
This conception moved away from the Phaedo, where thought was 
an image of Being. Lutosla.wsk i 1 s theory is supported by a. pas 
sage in the Republic, changing emphasis from actuality to exis l 
tence in thought: 
I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized 
in language? Does not the word express more t han the 
fact, and must; not the actual, whatever a man may 
think, always~ in the nature of things, fall short 
of the truth?~ 
I 1. Republic 533A (tr. Jowett). 4. cr. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 296. 
'· 2. LutoslavTski OGPL, 29.5_:-_296. ~He ublic 473A (tr. Jowett). 1 
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I Here, Lutoslawski asserted, the ideas existed in the s' 
j souls and were a product of their active thought as general no-
1 tions. 1 But even though Plato seemed to be transforming his 
1! notion of ideas, yet the Allegory of the Cave2 described sen-
J 
I' 
I 
I 
I 
,, 
II 
I 
·I 
'I 
II 
sible thing s as shadows of the ideas. 11 This is ••• the only 
hint which the Republic contains that the ideas might be indepe• -
I dent of the human mind and indeed of any existing consciousnes~.u3 
The tenth book of the Republic altered the picture decided 
ly. Here the concep·t; of God was brought in, and the ideas wer] 
furth er extended to include not only mathematical, aesthetical 
and ethical notions, but also ~~ything with one nruae, includin 
even manufactured articles :·. such as chai:rs.4 Th.e unity of the I 
I 
ideas was guaranteed by God, who was the maker of the idea of 
bed. There was only one idea, for if there were two, then som1 
idea would have had to exist for these two.5 Here was an ad- 1 
vance beyond the Phaedo and Republic VI and VII. 
The tenth book of the Republic was interpreted by . Lutos-
lawski as follows: 
The God who mak es the i deas is not the same God who 
is mentioned in earlier dialogues. God make s the 
ideas--this is a metaphorical expression which trans-
lated into abstract speech means: the ideas are a 
nroduct of pure thought--not necessarily of men , but 
of a thinkii1g subject.. This is a consequent develop-
ment of the theory ~bout the idea of Good whi ch was 
the final cause of all other ideas. Now this i dea of 
good is supplanted b?. God , ~ot by some god nor by a 
god, but by "the God 1 ( o £9~"s). The monotheigm ap-
pears well established and a matter of course. 
4. Cf. Republic 596. 
5. Cf. Renublic 597C. 
1. or. 
2. cr. 
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I 
I The Republic marked an important development in the conce ts 
of the ideas and God ; it was a transition dialogue. Plato be-
gan developing his conception that ideas did not exist in an in-
dependent, subsistent realm, but in the mind which thought theA. 
Also, there were here germs of a highly developed cosmological j 
and t h eologica l conception of the one God. 
A further development of the 'gen~_al::. nO:tions was 
I 
I 
I 
containe · 
in Phaedrus. I by the sen -
they i mi- :1 
Ideas were contemplated by reason, not 
ses. 1 Particular things wer e images of ideas, which 
tated: 
For t here is n o light of justice or temperance or any 
of the higher idea s which are precious to souls in 
the earthly copies of them; they are seen through a 
glass dimly; and there are few who, going to the 
i mages, behold tn them the r ealities, and these only 
V'Ti th difficulty. 2 
~~e theoFJ of an immanence of the ideas, as 
taught in the Symposium, and to a certain extent in 
the Pl~edo, is supplanted by the view of a similari-
ty or imitation of the ideas by the things vnlich 
has already been indicated in the Phaedo and accepted 
in the Republic.3 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Since Plato's language in the Phaedrus is metaphorical, the me n-
1 
ing may have been that thing s did not imitate separate ideas b 1 t 
general notions. For example, a difference between men and anJ -
1 
I 
mals was that men used general notions, which "'rere the result ! 
of a union by reasoning of many sensed things into a particul 
context: "A man must have intelligence of universals, and be 
able to proceed from the many particulars of sense to one 
1. Cf. Phaedrus 247, 250D. ~u.r .:::.Pb:a.Bdr.us:!45U; -- . :.>:~· . 
2 Phaedrus 2 OAB (tr. Jowett). , ,3-~utoslaw~, OGPL, 339. 
I 
I 
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33 1 
conception of reason."l Plato often reverted to mythical 
mulation without requiring that such myths be interpreted 
for-
litej 
I 
Soc- ~ ally. For example, in interpreting a,' 'myt~1 Plato, through 
rates, asserted: 
In the description of' the last kind of' madness which 
was also said to be the best, we spoke of' the af'fed-
tion of love in a figure, into which we introduced 
a tolerably credible and possible true though partly 2 erring n~th, which was also a hymn in honour of Love. 
If Plato interpreted some of his stories as mythical, then sim· 
lar stories also shmuld be considered mythical. 
Plato does not require us to t~~e his n1ythical alle-
gories literally: he says clearly that he does not 
insist on everything said in the myth··~ and con-
fesses to have mixed truth with fiction.J I 
By using Plato 1 s method of interpreting myths vr.l th his my+ 
cmncerning ideas, then the interpretation would be that there ' 
were no self-existing , real ideas. The pure ideas beyond the 
I 
stars were part of the myth, which meant only 11 that pure con- I 
cepts of reason are never fully realized in the things to whic I 
they apply, as for instance, absolute equality is never foUnd 
identical with physical equality. 114 
The conclusion of this interpretation of Plato's language , 
is that Plato's ideas stood for the same thing as for Kant; thJy 
were necessary concep ts of reason, uesulting from a study of I 
particulars by reason. ~~is is indicated by the followlng pasf 
sages: 
1. Phaedrus 249B (tr. Jowett). 
2. Phaedrus 26.5B (tr. Jowett). 
3. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 
!.~. Lutoslawsl{i, OGPL, 3)9. 34-0. 
! 
Unless a man estimates the various characters of 
his hearers and is able to divide all things into 
classes and to comprehend them ttnder single ideas, 
he will never be a skilful rhetorician even within 
the limits of human power.l 
~onsider] the comprehension of scattered particulars 
in one idea; as in our definition -of love, which 
whether true or false certainly gave clearness and 
consistency to the discourse, the speaker should 
de~ine his several notions and so make his mean-
ing clear.2 
General notions were formed, then subdivided into kinds for disl 
I 
cussing a particular subject.3 Thus, the particular could be 
, related to the whole.4 The ideas seemed to exercise a logical 
function in definition and dmvision. 
I 
I 
In middle Platonism, the doctrine of ideas vras maintained, ! 
but there was not so much stress on the independent existence 1 
of ideas or on the relation between real ideas and particulars. ! 
Rather, particulars were said to be similar to ideas through obL 
servation of similarities; the center of attention was now on aJ 
I 
I 
logical interpretation, ideas having the function of general no~ 
tions. This conception led to the notion that ideas existed only 
in the soul of an individual being, so that ideas ware indepen-1 
dent of particulars but not of individual consciollll.sness.5 Thus\. 
at first Plato was an objective idealist, believing that ideas II 
existed objectively, or outside of particulars and an individual 
soul; then, in the Syrnposium and Phaedo, there was a 11vague un-
" certainty as to the relation between things and ideas. 11o But 
1. Phaedrus 273E (tr. Jowett). ctht:rnat~e:..: :o.r:~tlie .,sdu.r :·a:nt"EH! 'i-
2. Phaedrus 265E ( tr. Jowett). :.gentlj~ -'-\71-th-but--knovring -~tlie- :na.L 
3. Cf. Phaedrus 277B. ture of the whole? 11 II 
4. Cf. Phaedrus 269D, 270CD; 5. Cf. Lutoslawski, 360. 
_ .aGL~..us _ ( ti!..~J_owe_tt_)_• 'l\.nd __ 6. -Lu.to.slaw:ski 
you think that you can know 
;J 
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in middle Platonism, there was a clearer definition of' the re- 1 
I lationship between things and ideas, characterized as similari~ 
ty, and there was less stress on the independence of ideas. 
Plato did not question whether the ideas were outside of some 
human mind or individual consciousness, but whereas the meta-
phpr.ical visions in the ReP.ublic and Phaedrus indicated that 
I 
ideas were independent of material things, there was no indica1 
I 
tion that ideas were separate from thiru~ing minds. 
I 
The Theaetetus and Parmenides mark the reform in Plato's I! 
11 logic. A classirication or ideas in an order was attempted; thJ 
I list of' categories in the Theaetetus was enlarged in Pa~enide J 
I and Sophist,. But the categories did not include the ideas or I 
the Republic and the othex> previous dialogues. The Theaetetus,j 
whose purpose was to define knowledga, did not employ the theo , 
of ideas, as might have been expected in the argument against 
relativism. 1 
The transition from the self-existing ideas to cate-
gories of reason is made without a f'ormal !"evoca-
tion of' earliel" views. But it must be recognized 
that these views al"e not entirely contradictory, 
and that ideas of moral notions might continue ~o 
exist along with the categories of perceptions. 
No longer were there transcendent ideas, but only subjective no 
tions·; axioms existed in the soul. 3 
Perhaps Plato made his complete break 
ry of ideas (which may be attrib:Utable to 
. I 
with the former theoi 
Socrates) in the Par! 
menides. In the form of an argument with Parmenides, Socrates 
1. Cf. Taylor, PLA, .31.~8. 
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3. cr. Theaetetus 154-155. 
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3 
could o:t':f'ep no reply to the Parmenidean devastation o:r the the~~ry 
or ideas. In the dialogue, existence was explained by both t::l 
one and the many, the one standing :ror general terms rather t , 
objectively real ideas. The arguments against the notion or 
I 
I selr-subsistently real ideas were rather thorough, showing that 
Plato was sel:t'-critical of the notion. The third man arg~ent I 
~that there must be an idea :t'oP a particular and its separate 1 
I 
idea) was employed,l as it had been used in the Theaetetus2 an ! 
Republic.3 The argument was answered by the supposition o:r I 
ideas as notions existing only in souls: 
But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts 
only, and have no proper existence except in our 
minds, Parmenides? For in that case each idea may 
still be one~ and not experience this infinite mul-
tiplication.LJ-
"This explanation is not contradicted by what follows, 11 a-
I 
serted Lutoslawski.5 Ideas as independent and self-subsistent 1 
real would have been beyond human knowledge; thus, they did no~ 
exist: 
If they do exist, he will say that they must of 
necessity be unknown to man; and he will seem to 
have reason on his side, and as we were remarking 
just kow, will be very di:t'ficult to convince; a 
n~n must be gifted with very considerable ability 
before he can learn that everything has a class 
and an absolute essence; and still more Pemarkable 
will he be who discovers all these things for him-
self, and having thoroughly investigated them is 
able to teach them to others. I agree with you, 
Parmenides, said6Socrates; and \vhat you say is very much to my mind. I I 
I 
I 4. Parmenides 132B (tr. Jowett). 
5. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 403. 1 
1. c:r. Parmenides 132A. 
2. Cf. Theaetetus 200B. 
6. Parmenides 135AB (tr. Jowet . ). 
I 
3. cr. Republ~ 597BC. 
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Hmvever, ideas had to have some mea ning and purpose: 
And yet, Socrates, said Pal~menides, iE a man, Eix-
ing his attention on these and the lik e difficulties, 
d oes avvay with ideas of things and will not admit 
that every individual thing has its 0\m determi~-· 
1'18.te idea vThich is alvvays one and the same, he vvill 
have nothing on which his mind can rest; and so he 
will utterly destroy the power of reas~ning , as you 
seem to me ·!;o have particularly noted. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Ideas had an i mportant use; this use was logical or epistemolog -
:ical. They were needed for the possibility of definite knovtlJ 
edge. The Parmenides, if it be accepted as representing Pla to's 
viewpoint, certainly represented the ideas as notions in the s1 1. 
In the Sophist, ideas again o'c·cupied the function of genel -
al not i ons; the cathartic method of Socnates deiUt \rlth twms i 
I 
and genex•al notions in order to define essential properties. 2 i 
I 
I In this dialogue, the presence of activity was the distinguish 
ing rnark of reality: 
Any thing which possesses any sort of power to affect 
another , or to be affected by another, if only for 
a single moment, however trifling t l-:te cause and how-
ever slight the effect, has real existence; and I 
hold tha t the definition of being is simply p ovrer.3 
Reality was neither unchangeable (in which case there wou d 
be no intelligence) nor completely changing (in which ca se t he ', e 
would be no knowledge); reality included both changing and un-
changing characteristics.4 It was not true to state t hat the I 
ideas existed i n an unseen world entirely, for they could not 
knovm if they did so exist. Cnangaless ideas wer e 
of reality; the soul which existed in the world of Becoming 
also real.: 
,. 
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'rhen the philosopher, who has the truest reverence 
for these qualities, cannot possibly accept the no-
tion of t hose who say that the whole is at rest, 
either as unity or in many forms: and he will be 
utterly deaf to those who assert univer sal motion. 
As children say entreatingly "Give us both, 11 so he 
will include both the moveable afd i mmoveable in 
his definition of being and all. 
I Thus, the objects of knowledge were changing ideas, \7hich \'iere J 
one 1 s own notions changed by his mvn i ntellectual activity. 
This view agreed with the Parmenides. Ideas existed only in 
souls,2 including human souls, so that i deas were not real out l 
side minds. 
Etter the Parmenides, no monger was true Being the same a~ 
the ideas as represented in the S~nposium, Phaedo, Republic, a~d 
II 
Phaedrus. Plato was now more interested in the soul and part':fe--
-~Ulars; soul, as the true Being, was the cause of movement.3 
1
: 
"Plato began to thiTL'tc more highly of experience. n4 The fixity 
and necessity of ideas were still asserted,5 but i deas existed ! 
only in the soul. I 
The Boliticus \Vas a continuation of the Sophist. Ideas we . e 
found by classification of notions, not by transcendent beings l 
these ideas maintained an objectivity i n a uniform existence i l 
6 ) ..... ... ' > / 1 
all souls. In the Philebus, eternal ideas (c< eL KolT(I{ Tr;{ cWTo<. l 
. I 
were not separate, self-existtng or independent, as were t he i &eas 
(«VTo KC(S-' otar6) of the earlier dialogues. The i deal notions v-)1 r e 
I 
eternally the same and unchangeable, but had no separate existence: 
I 
1. Sophist 249D (tr. Jowett). 4. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 427. j 
2. ~f. Sophist 248E. 5. cr. Sophist 249C. I 
_.3. Cf. Cha ter III, p . 109.:.-=o· · ==~6~·=C=f=·~P~o~l=i~t=i=cu=s~2=o~"'2~A,;::. B=.~===!J===== 
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As to whet.her these uhities have a real existence; 
and then how each individual unity, being always the 
same, and incapable either of generation or o.f destruc-
tion, but retaining a permanent individuality, can be 
conceived either as dispersed and multiplied in the 
in.finity of the world of generation, or as still en-
tire and yet divided .from itself', which latter would 
seem to be the greatest impossibility o.f all, .for 
now can one and the same t£ing be at the same time 
in one and in many thi ~J.gs? 
Finally, the Timaeus and Laws .fm"ther developed the conce~it 
of eternal ideas existing in souls. For the Timaeus, eternal 
ideas were objects of kno1;vledge; 2 ideas existed only in reason,1 
I 
and reason existed only in souls.3 The idea of the Good, if i~ 
exercised a God .function in the Republic, was replaced by the 
good ID.emiurge in the Timaeus.4 Since the Demiurge was the ori~ 
I 
gin o.f all order and thought,5 ideas were nothing else than Go 's 
I 
thoughts; "their function is to be eternal models o.f 
.first existent in God's rnind, then reproduced in the 
ting souls of men."6 
thought, l 
I 
investiga i 
I 
i 
In the Laws, the only mention o.f ideas was in a descripti ' n 
of' ideas as perfect notions: "And can any one have a more exa l t 
way o.f considering or contemplating anything, than the being 1 
able to look at one idea gathered .from many dif.ferent things?"1 
In this dialogue, the active soul was i mportant. 
The culmination of' Plato's theory o.f ideas was that ideas 
existed only as notions in conscious minds. 
1. Philebus 15B (tr. Jowett). 
2. C.f. Timaeus 27E. 
) •• Cf. Timaeus 30B, 37C, 46D. 
4 C.f. Chapter ., II , p . 56fJ.f . 
5. Cf. Timaeus 30AB. 
6. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 477. 
7. Laws 965C (tr. Jowett); 
Oi'. Iiiltoslawski, OGPL, 491. 
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The separate existence of ideas outside my mind is 
a poetical absurdity which could subsist only for a 
very limited time in the imagination of a thinker 
lik e Plato, and which fas never been expressly affirmed 
in clear words by him. 
0 
The literal interpretation of Plato, resulting in the concept 
objective ideas, may have been carried to an extreme by Plato' 1 
pupils, but Plato showed the absurdity of such an interpreta-
tion in the Parmenides. 
If we take the description of ideas literally, they 
appear to have been for Plato true substances, exist-
·~ ing outside vvery consciousness. But this concep-
tion being very difficult to realize, it may be that 
Plato did not intend to convey it by his highly meta~ 
phorical language, and that he only endeavored to 
illustrate the fixity and objectivity of ideas as con-
trasted wi~h the instability and subjectivity of ap-
pearances. 
The system of latest Platonism is no longer a system 
of ideas, but a sy stem of souls, of different and 
increasing perfection, from the lowest soul of a 
plant to the souls of stars which are termed gods.3 
Describing Plato's philosophy, Dunham asserts that for Plato, 
ideas ••• are the instruments used to identify an 
object or relation or as we now say event •••• Ideas 
belong to objects but can only be comprehended by 
the methods of logical analysis •••• Ideas and their 
primordial images are part and parcel of the cogni-
tive process; that is to sP.,y, they belong to the 
natural habits of thought.4 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Having followed the development of Plato's theory of idea , 
an examination of the relation between ideas and God would be I 
instructive. The conclusions reached in the discussion or ide~s 
would seem to exclude the possibility that God was an idea, fo l 
ideas wette i·UlOtions within minds. This conclusion is the cul-
mination of the development of ideas. 
1 Lutosle.;nsk i _ OGPL"' @7. .2_.~utoslawski...!.. ~~PJ::,__223. 
2. Lutoslawsl-d, OGPL, 521=.=== -4;-Dun:l'lam, rt-;-t"-I9'5CT)-,-9~.==#===== 
Tne difficulty of confusing God with the ideas may be ab-
solved by the recognition that the attributes of God were idea s; 
God was immutable, but not the idea of i~nutability; he was true 
and good, but not the ideas of truth and goodness.l "Plato's 
God is not an Idea, nor are his Ideas gods. 112 In anticipation 
of the discussions in the second and third chapters, creation was 
for Plato a. dynamic process caused by the active soul, God.3 The 
ideas were not active souls. "The Theory of Ideas makes no pro·-
vision for a reality that is moving and eternal, such as a soul. 114 
God was not an idea, for he was an agent in creative activity. The 
difficulty may best be resolved by recognizing that Plat o's con-
ception of God aeveloped through his dialogues. Although the 
early doctrine of ideas may have attributed a God function to 
the ideas, one cannot say that this is true throughout Plato's 
thought. As his concept of the ideas grew into conceiving them 
as notions in minds, Plato's concept of cosmic crea tivity grew 
into the belief that creation was the result of an active soul. 
Confusion of God with the Good presents another difficulty. 
Evidently, if the Good is conceived as an idea and no more, then 
the Good cannot at all be i dentical with God, since "God is a 
soul and not a. .:form."5 However, on the grounds that the Good 
is an objectively r eal idea, some interpreters have conceived 
1 it as identical with God as depicted in the Timaeus. 
For example, Jaeger held a vievr that Plato's God was merely 
a different aspect of the Good of the earlier dialogues. 
·1. Cf. More, RP, 119F. 
2. Solmsen, PT, 92. 
3. Cit. Chapter II, p. 62..L-"'f. 
4. DeLacy, Art.(l939 ), 108. 
_5. Burnet, nP ,- I; 169;- C.:f. 
Taylor, PLA, 288, CPT, 184. 
I 
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In the state described in The La·,vs, God occupies the 
place taken in The He:e.ublic by the supreme paradeig-
ma which the rulers carry in their souls, the Idea o:r 
the Good. There is no essential di:fference between 
the two, only a di:f:ference o:r aspect, and o:r the 
stage o:r knowledge to which, as objects, they corre- -
spond.l i 
According to Jaeger, God was merely the aspect o:r agency in thEi 
I 
Idea o:r t h e Good, which \Vas the supreme standard. "The state- I 
I 
ment that God can do nothing but good makes the nature and ac-
tivity o:r God himsel:r answerable to that standard which is the 1 
Idea o:r Good.n2 Jaeger at least admitted the difference betwee 
I God and the Good. But in m~{ing God a part of the Good, Jaege 
I 
was asserting either a theory that the ideas were objectively 1 
real, or a theory that the Good had qualities of objective rea 1i-
l ty not possessed by other ideas or ideas as a whole. Thus, Ja -
:I ger's theory stands or .falls on his assumption concerning the I 
status o:r the Good. As has been previously pointed out,3 it 
seems probable that the Good did not have objective reality in 1 
Pla·[jo 1 s thought. As an idea, the Good accounted for the attri~­
bute o:r goodness on the part o:r God. 
Theodor Gomperz supposed that God was identical with the 
Good in Plato's thought';. holding a view similar to Jaeger's. 
I:f the Demiurge were not identical with the idea o:r 
the good, he vrould necessarily participate in it, or 
be copied ·:from it; he wouild there:fope occupy a lower 
po sition than that idea, which is contrary to his 
strongly . emphasized ra~~ as a Supreme Deity. The 
complete identification o:r the Dem:i,urge with the idea 
o:r the good thus seems unavoidable.4 
1. Jaeger, PAI, III, 261. 
2. craeger, PAI, II, 286. 
3. Cf. p. 29ff. 4. Gomperz, GT, 211-212. 1 
i( 
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!I Gomperz recognized the dif'f'iculty of his contention: How 
ll the crea tion of the world be the work of a Demiurge which 
I 
coul~ 
vias I 
I' 
J 
I 
merely an idea? His answer to this question was that the idea 
of the Good was developed in Plato's thought from the early to I 
the later dialogues into the charac·l:ierixation of soul-ness: I 
I 
"The enhancem.ent or tnansfiguration of the ideas, moi'e accurate! 
ly their deification, has made further and further progress in j 
Plato 1 s mind. nl According to Gomperz, the idea of the Good wasi 
expanded to include the Demiurge, and the other ideas were in- / 
corporated into the "eternal gods 11 of the Timaeus. Thus, asser1 
ted Gomperz, Plato chose the names 11 God, 11 "Father, n "Generator, ! 1 
etc., for the idea of the Good because of ~n additio~ to the I 
concept of id<ia: "He does so because in his own consciousness i 
that supreme and divine principle has become invested with a 
greater degree of personality," and freedom in action.2 
Perhaps Gomperz's speculations have the purpose of resolv-
1 
ing contradictions in Plato 1 s thought concerning the relation b: 
tween the Good and the Demiurge. Of course, if the ideas are 
notions rather than objective r ealities, Gomperz 1 s theory is 
refuted. But even granting the objective reality of the Good, ; 
Gomperz 1 s theory admits two considerations which seem to mal{e I 
it superfluous. First, Gomperz admi~ed the development in Pla-l 
tors thought, that the God of the Timaeus was not t h e same as I 
the Good, restricted to its definition in the Republic. Sec-
onily, Gomperz asserted that the Good was expanded to include t~e 
I 
I 
' 
'I 
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I 
I These two qualii'ications 
1 seem to deny that the idea of the Good as such was identical 
soul or personality characteristic. 
i 
with the Demiurge. Gomperz 1 s themry really only asserted the I 
I 
development in Plato's thought; it even demonstrated that Plato'' s 
God was not at all identical with the Good. God may have re-
placed the concept oi' the Good , but God was not identical with 
the Good. 
W. T. Stace dealt with the problem by pointing out the al-
ternatives to the identity of God with the Good. According to 
II Stace, there were three possible relations between God and t he 
~~ Good.l First, God may have been the cause of the Good, but t~s 
j was impossible because it contradicted the system and philosoph~ 
I 
:I 
I 
,I 
II 
of the ideas, which were non-derivative, uncaused and eternal~ I 
Secondly, God might have owed his being to the idea of the Goo , 
but this was inadequate because such a contention would have maJtie 
God derivative; God was eternal and uncaused. The third possi~~ 
ble relationship was that God and the idea of the Good were co I 
ordinate, but this would have been impossible because it would 
II 
I
ll have resulted in "two mutually inconsistent accounts of the ul 
timate reality." or a "hopeless d"Q.alism."2 Therefore, since 
there could have been no adequate relation between God and the 
Good, asserted Stace, God and the Good were identical, and God 
did not have a personality, for an idea could not be personal. ~ 
Stace 1 s thaory depends on the assumption that the ideas a le 
objectively real , and~cinde:p~n<;!~nt. : ~of\ _;nind, ~eh :tarh'elldy .:J:'l~;-s ·:: ... bee 
. I 
~~~~~----~ I St .ca HGE. _ 2_Q2.£ • Of. Stace CHGP, 20 • ' 
2. Stace, CHGP, 2-3. 
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shown to be rallacious. However, granting the objective and 
independent reality of the Good, Stace's theory is based on a 
certain inconsistency which tends to discredit it. The first 
two possible relations bet"tJveen God and the Good were refuted 
by Stace on the grounds that Plato's own philosophy contradicted 
them, while the last possibility was discarded not because it 
was contrary to Plato's philosophy, but because it would have 
represented a difficult theory, a ntheory of 11hopeless dualism." 
Thus, Stace's criticism of the se~aration of God and the Good 
was based on the attempt to reconcile a contradiction in Plato's 
thought. Rather than resolving Plato's difficulties in the 
light of philasophy which has developed since the time of Plato, 
it would seem more adequate to describe Plato's own philosophy, 
if one is to determine what Plato himself believed. For example, 
the uhopeless dualism 11 of Descartes' philosophy is recognized 
for what it is, not resolved into a consistent philosophy by 
interpreters of Descartes. However, if the Good was a notion 
in the mind of God (aw well as in the minds of other souls), 
then there is no difficulty of a dualism of God and the Good. 
Plato never at t empted to reconcile his notion of the rela-
tion of God and the Good. From the standpoint of God in this 
relation, the problem must be handled in connection with a 
thorough discussion of the Timaeus and Laws, but from the stand-
I 
ppint of the Good , it seems safe to say that it is possible, al-
t hough not necessary in view of Plato's allegorical language in 
discussing the Good, that the Good exercised a God .function in 
II 
II 
46 
the Republic. However, Plato's philosophy developed since the , 
Republic to a concept in the Timaeus and Laws which cannot per-
mit an identification of the fully developed God with the Good. 
Once again, one may say that God replaced the Good (in the God 
function, i.e., efficient causality, personality and sovereignty), 
but one cannot say that they were identical. 
---- - ·-'=="-'-===="'--'--~-==-= 
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CHAPTER II 
THE COSMOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF GOD 
In no other dialogue did Plato so thoroughly express his 
conception of the metaphysical status and activity of God than 
in the Timaeus. The purpose of this dialogue, written in the :1 
latest period of Plato's thought, was to de:scribe the creation ' 
of the cosmos and the visible results. The creation story is ~~ 
interest to this thesis because of the role played by God in it. 
I 
1~us, the purpose of this chapter is to define the position an 
operation of God in the creation of the universe, according, 
primarily, to the Timaeus, and secondarily, to the Phtlebus. 
An important problem in understanding the creation story 
is to determine the extent of mythical formulation in Plato's 
language. The problem of myth and allegorical interpretation 
presented difficulties in connection with other Platonic dia-
logues. 1 While the myths had some reference to truth, inter-
pretation being in many cases allegorical, the problem is to 
what extent the meanings expressed should be taken literally. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
:j 
,, 
II 
I 
Certainly, interpretation should be controlled by an objective ! 
I 
I 
point of view, rather than by an attempt to read into the myth 
some meaning not actually represented by them. G. C. Field i! 
I 
warned readers of Plato to 11beware of the temptation of trying 
to force Plato 1 s thought into modern mouldm. n2 I, 
I 
_,.1. Qt:._._ p_. _]_2ff ; :q,.ff, _27ft .__ _ 2. Field, Art. ( 19.34), 289. 'I 
- --- --~7 ==-===-- ==,, --==--- -
,, 
II 
I 
~=-=o_41 
It seems to be a natural inclination to fit some of Plato •1 
phrases into the thought patterns of one's own mind, while~-~ 
·.l ecting other pas sages in Plato which would tend to contradict~ 
such interpretations. It is difficult to understand what Platol 
I 
I 
really had in mind when he discussed God and related concepts, 1 
but the diff±culty leads to gross misinterpretation when thoug~t­
processes of the Miii<iB.e Ages and the modern age are re~d into I 
Plato. II 
i' Perhaps Plato employed myths because, for him, reality es-
1 
caped conceptual or verbal formula tion; as a medium, language ,I II 
was incapable of expressing the nature of the eternal, for eter,-
nal truth did not easily fit into semantical signs and concepts. 
Hence, in expressing truth through linguistic formulation, it 
.I 
was better to . ~ut; e; it into concrete form which could be easilYj 
grasped, in order to lead the reader to r ecognition of truth. 
Demos suggested that in order to make his presentation concrete, 
Plato probably thought it better to use mythical :form.l Plato [I 
may have used his imagination to explain something which escap 'd 
· · 2 II 
scien t ific and log!cal accuracy. However, it must not be thought 
I 
that no truth was conveyed through Plato's myths, for they were 
not mere fairy tales. Through myth, Plato probably intended t~ 
,J 
express certain truths, aclrnowledging the inadequacies of hu- ,1 
man fo rmulation s and knowledge, for 11 to be absolutely sure of 
the truth of matters concerning which there are many opinions, 
is an attribute of the Gods not given to man. 11 3 
More, RP, 198ff. I 
T· taws :Otj]Jit-=(;t'r'. truvrett-)~ _L-=--==·--= 
I 
I 
I . 
49 1 
I 
I 
1 
The use or myth seemed to be determined by the intrinsic 
1' nature of the v,rorld of Becoming. The world of Being was char- ' 
I acterized by the constant, eternal nature of truth; in contrast 
·Becoming was a continual flux, in which nothing was constant. 
I 
Hence, Plato thought that the best way to describe the world o~ 
Becoming was through the myth, in order to construct "a geomet-' 
I rical science of nature."1 Myth conveyed the truth of the gen 
II 
11 eration of the sensible world; no hard-and-fast concepts could 
II 
I 
I 
I 
li 
!j 
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be used because of the ever-changing nature of the cosmos. In 
the Timaeus, the world of generation was described in mythical ! 
I 
form; "as generation is an image of being, so an account of it i 
I 
is only an image or the truth. 11 2 j 
\Vhile certainty could be attained in relation to thw worl 
I 
of Being, probability was characteristic of knowledge of the 
world or Be coming. .:i?lato -•o:Ctgn:.:. dep£-.e:eis. ted: .. the ·:; k:nowle'd.ge::. 0 t -: .;,.· 
Becoming;) his emphasis was on the worthlessness of Becoming i 1 
comparison with Being. Plato bad greater concern for the worl1 
of Becoming and experience in the Timaeus.4 Rather than dis-
card natural science, he made it secondary to dialectical stud 
of Being. In the Timaeus, natural science and sensation had 
so rae reference to and importance for truth. Ove-rs-bat:ing-;:·. Fi-eld said: 
"Plato never suggested that reason could replace observation a 1 
1. Taylor, PLA, 441. the Parmenides (Of. p. 3lff j ) 
2. Demos, Art.(l936 ), 535. and his examination of the len-
3· Of. Republic 507ff (espe- sible world in the Timaeus. In 
cially the Divided Line), his dialogues after the Rep blic, 
532AB, Phaedo 65B. Plato seemed to depart from llhis 4. This is indicated by Plato's anti-empirical attitude of ~he 
__ riticism_Q ~bsistent ideas in Republic (Of. Republic 50?r ~ ~. 
.. 
l 
I 
I 
il 
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a method of discovering"·>truth.l Sense-observations could, i'o~i 
. Plato, be best expressed by means of myth. 
I 
The Timaeus was not merel.y a mythical story. The purpose lloi' 
the dialogue was ~atianalhl.¥-~tp consider the nature of creation :, 
I 
and the cosmos. Plato pointed out the qualifications of the I 
essay's mouthpiece, Timaeus: He was "our best astronomer," whd· 
11has made it his special task to laarn about the nature of the 
Universe.u2 These remarks and the general tone of the essay 
I 
seem to indicate the seriousness of the discussion, as well as 1 
I the purpose to formulate into words the best possible explana- 1 
tion f or the universe. The discussion was important enough to 11 
invoke the approval of the gods; the ensuing discussion was dew·· 
scribed as a very worthwhile venture, in which the purpose to b~ 
intelligent was foremost.3 
Evidently, the Timaeus (much of which is mythical) VtaJ.g. :tntp~­
'!_:i.a.n:b-::- f'Ol\ knowledge. According to Eemos, myth "belongs to the - ~~ 
I 
third segment of the divided line, which is understanding. 114 I 
I 
However, Demos pointed out _that there was a problem of whether ! 
I 
Plato meant for the cosmology to be in the third or second lev~l 
of knowledge. Timaeus 29C seemed to indicate that the forth- :1 
coming cosmology would be in the sphere of opinion, while 48D 'I 
indicated that cosmology was the search for the greatest proba ; 
bility, thus placing it in the tht~d level of the Divided Line 
II As a solution to this problem, Demos placed the cosmology 
I 
I 
1. Field, Art.(l933), 136. wise specified. 
2. Timaeus 27A; the transla- J. Cf. Timaeus 27E. 
tion-=for.--theJ .imae:us il be"--==-=--4 ... -Demos., Ar.t ....  t~2.3Ql_SJ • 
that of Bury unless other- -~~==tr1 ==, 
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l 
11 somewhere between opinion and understanding."l 
-5~~------
Hmnrever, Pla tq 
attempted to transcend the sphere of mere opinion to gain the 
I 
I greatest probability for cosmology: "We ought to 
tale which is probable and enquire no further. n2 
accept the 
11 
I Thus, if the :I 
divided line in the sixth book of the Republic was applicable 
1
/ 
to the Timaeus, then probably cosmology was not a matter of me~e 
opinion. On the other hand, due to his greater emphasis on ex 1 
perience and probability, the Divided Line may not have applied 
I 
to the Timaeus. @alhoun suggested that it '"'as inconceivable 1 
I 
that the myths in the Timaeus were mere opinion because of the ! 
I 
intent of Plato to subject conceptions to critical scrutiny.3 i 
I 
The myths of the Timaeus vaa:e based on truths obtained throu.gh 
II 
reason. The cosmology was developed from basic truths or prem-
1! 
. ·· 1ses.L~ Describing the function of myth in Plato, Ludwi g Edel~ 
stein remarked: 
If one constructs nature in such a way that the 
story shows how God created the world so as to make 
it as perfect as possible; if one constructs history 
in such a way that the story shows how God is pr§s-
~~\ent in history, how the various periods of the 
develonment of ma~~ind were nearer to God or far-
ther r~moved from Him--under this condition and 
to this extent is the account truthful.~ 1 
- . . , . . . .. , .. I Th.us:7· -~ tha·>pw.pose'~'Oi' CiiJ.Yth ·-in '· the ~Jilim8.16us ::waa-:·-to ~demo·nstrate ·:et, r-
Ii:a.l .. :tJmths incapable of complete abstract conceptualization. 
1
1 
One may assert that Plato's views were not necessarily ex~ 
pressed in the mouthpiece of Timaeus, that Plato's O\vn thought i 
. I 
was expressed through the character Socrates. Perhaps, one 
1. Demos, Art. (1936), 539. 4. Cf. P• 53 • 
I 
I 
I 
;, 
_ 2. Timaeus _29DJ_ __ __ 5. Edelstein, 
--3.- Uf. Calhoun, Art~(T95I:)-; . 9~f_f~ ---.- -
Art.(l949), 46ffi. 
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lj 
might argue, Socrates was the real mouthpiece of Plato, and Soc1-
·I rates was merely listening to Timaeus expound certain scientifijc 
doctrines without necessarily concurring with the whole of them 
I 
(although agreeing with the basic premises).l As Taylor pointe~ 
I 
out: "Plato was not likely to feel himself responsible for the1 
details of any of his speal{er' s theories. n2 However, the prob,j 
'I hlem of whether or not Plato expressed his o\m views is no more1 
applicable to the Timaeus than to any other of his dialogues. ·I 
There is no evident reason for supposing Socrates to be Plato'~ 
only mouthpiece. For example, in the Parmenides, Socrates was !I 
I 
virtually defeated in attempting to defend the doctrine o£ ide Is. 
I 
In the Timaeus, the mathematiciafl.,..scientist Timaeus was a natur.al 
I 
character for the dialogue, for Socl"ates \Vas admittedly incapabl e 
of the'· i:htri:catelt complex scientific theories of the Timaeus. 3 
Interpretation of the Timaeus should not isolate this dia-! 
ll 
logue from others. Taylor suggested that the Timaeus should be 
read in correlation with the Laws: 
The imagery is mythical, but when we come to dis-
cuss its philosophical meaning we shall need to 
remember that, as the tenth book of the Laws shows, 
Plato believed quite seriously that it can-De 
proved by rigidly scientific reasoning that God, 
the all-good and all-wise 'fux.6, exists and that 
He orders the course of the world. 4This Theism is no part of the mythical imagery. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
There seems to be no reason why the Laws should not be employed 
to help the interpretation of the Timaeus. Both dialogues werel 
II 
written in the later period at about the same time. However, I 
I 
1. Cf. Timaeus. 29D. .3· Cf. Timaeus 27A-C. l 
=--2• T.a-y_lor, - .CP.Tt= -19. -== :-=--==--4. _Tay,.lo_~, C.:tT, ~=· ====== ~~ -~ 
------ ------ -'r=-· 3 ! 
I conceptions of the Laws should not be forced into the language ! 
I of the Timaeus. 
Plato emphasi~ed the limitations of human nature in the 
quest for truth, pointing out that only one who was a ".friend 
I 
I 
o.f God"1 could attain knowledge o.f the principles behind ob-
served phenomena. Knowledge o.f creation was characterized by 
probability, but was no worse off than any other knowledge of 
probability. 2 The fact that absolute certainty was unattainable 
'I 
was no reason why hypotheses should not be formed; the second I 
best was better than nothing at all. Since there were degrees 
of knowledge, a compromise with the best was necessary so long l 
as the soul was in the body.3 
Following his invocation to the gods,4 Timaeus initiated 
. I 
I 
I 
his lengthy discussions by establishing three important pr%m- ;j 
:rJ.ses or presuppositions)> The first premise concerned the dir 
ference between being and becoming: II 
'I 
I 
First then, in my judgment, we must make a dis-
tinction and ask , vVhat is that which always is and 
has no becoming; and what is that which is always 
becoming and never is? That which is apprehended 
by intelligence and reason is always in the same 
state; but that which is conceived by opinion with 
the help of sensation and without reason, is always 
in a procegs of becoming and perishing and never 
really is. 
According to Plato, only the existent or eternal was in- I 
telligible through reason because of its continuous uniformity 
Interpreted in the light of the definition of ideas as dependef t 
1. Timaeus 53D. 4. gr. P· 15f. I 
2. Cr. Demos, Art.(l936), 536. 5. f. Cornford, PC, 21. 1 
• Cf. Timaeus 29CD; Demos, 6. Timaeus 27E-28A (tr. Jowett). 
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I 
on minds and consistent of general 
here was to the nature of general 
notions, 1 Plato 's reference I 
ideas or concepts which re- il 
mained constailt;J:.:r_ ~pel"·manent. 'I'he permanence of truth depended, 
i 
.for Plato, on the logical identity of these concepts. On the , 
other hand, the sensible world came into being through genera-
tion and conti~ually passed out of reality; as soon as it came 
to be it perished and was ttnever really existent. 11 2 Obviously ~ 
the permanent aspect of rea.li ty and truth could not depend on 11 
the sensible world. Something behind sensible appearances was !I 
necessary to postulate. What the character of the permanent 
aspects of reality were, Timaeus had not yet asserted. 
Permanent reality, according to the above passage, was known 
I 
through intelligence and reason. On the basis of Plato's for- : 
mer discussions of ideas, it may be supposed that at least par~ 
of the permanent aspect of reality was ideas. I V'lhether or not 1 
Plato also meant to include some soul or souls was not evident 'I 
in this premise. If the first premise can be interpreted in t :e 
light of conclusions reached by Plato through the development 
of his beliefs in the former dialogues, then the realm of being 
which was said to be permanent consisted of at least forms of 1 ~ 
thought or logical ideas and general terms. In the light of t J e 
Phaedo, it might be said that along with ideas, the imperishab~Je 
II 
souls constituted permanent reality,3 but there is no evidence II 
in this premise for such a conclusion. 
3. cr. Phaedo l05ff. 1. Of. p. 39~. 
2. Timaeus 28A (tr. Jowett). 
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The emphasis of the first premise seemed to be placed on 
the fact that the sensible world, due to its nature of flux 
(as Heraclitus pointed out), could not be described with any 
certainty, since its fleeting nature prevented any definite 
characterization. Plato's emphasis was still (as it was in the 
Republic) on the supremacy of pure reason. He relegated sense-
experience to a subordinate place, but he did not depreciate sense-
experience so much as he did in former dialogues.l 
This premise poses for Plato the problems of the meaning 
of eternity and the relation between the realm of eternal Being 
and the realm of temporal Becoming. The solution to these proa-
'- lems have an important bearing on the nature of God, presupposed 
in the second premise. The problems are most evident in the 
Republic, where Being was sharply contrasted with Becoming. If, 
in this dialogue, Plato held to the theory of independently real, 
self-subsistently existing ideas, then his view of Being may have 
been characterized by timelessness. The mystical awareness of 
the supremacy of the Good may have led Plato to t he notion of a 
timeless eternit;y, itself characterizing true reality, time being 
only an appearance. However, such a view was not def~nitely ex-
pressed by Plato. 
Plato n~y have meant to emphasize the fact that the Good 
and other ideas were timeless in the sense of applying validly 
throughout all time; in this sense, 11 timeful" would be a better 
term to apply to Being. If the developed conception of general 
_ 1_. Cf. p. 18f.f. 
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I) 
notion~ rather than independently real idea~ is accepted as Pla-
to's theory of ideas, then evidently, Being existed or subsisted 
as ideas within the minds of God, gods, and men. If this is 
true, then Being was no timeless eternity, but the characteriza-
tion of ultimate truth; truth was obtained through the application 
of universals, which could be known through a kind of intuitive, 
mystical insight. Thus, Being could be known by philosophers 
in the eXpression of their ovm thoughts. In distinction from 
Being, Becoming was characterized by knowledge through sense-
observation. 
The relation of God to Being will be discussed in connec-
tion with the senond and third premises. It might be asserted 
that God existed in a timeless eternity, and that since ideas 
existed in .the mind of God, then Being (composed of ideas) existed 
in a timeless eternity because it was in the mind of God. How-
ever, this assertion concerning Being depends on the notion of 
a timeless God. Also, if Being were timeless in God's mind, it 
is difficult to see how human beings, existing in time could have 
any knowledge of Being. The relation between time and a timeless 
eternity is a difficult one to conceive and has haunted many 
philosophers, such as absolute idealists. Not only is there no 
definite empirical evidence for a timeless eternity, but the no-
tion seems to be quite irrational. 
The second premise was efficient causality, that everything 
which became necessarily owed its ~ecoming to a cause: · "Now 
everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be 
---·-- -
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crea ted by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be crea-
ted."l Thus, to come into being pre supposed being caused. The 
cause was ultimately an "artificer, 11 functioning as efficient 
cause; he "k eeps his gaze fixed on t hat which is uniform, using 
a model," so that the object of becoming "must of necessity be 
beautiful.n2 
This premise seems to have important implications vThich 
? Cornford was not willing to grant • ..J Here, Plato presupposed the 
existence of an ultimate cause, which he called Demi urge or God. 
For Plato, there had to be a supreme, efficient cause because an 
object of becoming (the effect) presupposed a cause. This c on-
struction of argmaent was made by means of reason without myth. 
Apparently, Plato accepted the existence of God by reason, ap-
plying myth to the process of creation. Since the second prem-
i .se postulated the cPea tor-God, in connection with the first 
premise, knowledge of God must have been associated with the 
realm of Being , described in the first premise. God was not 
knovm merely from examination of the sensible world of Becoming ; 
this fact, along with the fact that God was presupposed from the 
beginning , seems to indicate that for Plato, God was knovm through 
t he realm of eternal Being. 
This premise did not mean that God existed in a timeless 
eternity or that he was i rrunutable, for it asserted on:iy that 
knowledge of God was attained by reflection on universals. The 
i 1mnutability of God would be c ontradicted by his active operations 
1. Timaeus 28A -(tr. Jowett);. 
cr. cha-pter -III, p. - f o 9f f . 
2. Timaeus 28AB. 
=------ --3. Cf. Cornford, PC, 2lff. 
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in forming the universe.l An active God changes, r1and a changing 
God cannot be i mmutable. 
The third premise concenned the goodness of' the Demmurge 
and the fact t hat he followed a "pattern" in his creation: 
The wor~ of' the creator, whenever he looks to the 
unchangeable and fashions the form and natur e of' 
his work after an unchangeable patter•n, must neces-
sarily be made fair and perfect; but when he look s 
to the created only, and uses a created pattern, 
it is not fair or perf'ect.2 
This premise presupposed that the Demiurge was completely good, 
so that anything he did would be done according t o the best; 
God was "the best of' all Causes. u3 Hei'e, thePe seems to be no 
indicati on of' myth in coru1ection with these basic truths about 
the fact and natul"e of' God. In connection with the first and 
second premises, it seems evident t hat for Plato, God was kno\~ 
through the r ealm of' eternal Being. 
As discovered through the realm of' eternal Being, the Demi-
urge was known by the application of universals. Thus, it seems 
evident that even before direct exrunination of' the wo~ld of' Be-
c oming , God was known by rational ref'l~ction on universals and 
by my stical intuition of' religious principles. Rationally, the 
concept of' goodness may have led to the notion of ah all-good 
God, the s ource of' all goodness, as indicated later in the Ti-
~~' where it is as serted that God was responsible f'or develop-
ing the order whicg caused the manifestation of' goodness. Also, 
l>~ Plato 1 s ref'el"ence to gods as "unchangeable" in Republic 380E 
and 381 seems to involve not immutability, but the maintenance 
of' goodness by the gods; they had no need to change their outnard 
form since they could not gain in_perfection by doing this. 
2. Timaeus 28B -(-Er. Jowett). 3 ;- Ti maeus 29A. --
by an examination of the unive r se as a whole (without observa-
tion of details as such), one might be led to the notion of a 
God to account for teleology or purpose operating in Becoming. 
Mystical insight, Plato may have thought, could lead one to the 
notion of purpose throughout eternity in connection with God. 
These suppositions are not explicit in the premises. They 
are not even notably implicit. But they are definite possibili-
ties in connection with Plato's thought on the whole and his 
beliefs in the second premise that God's existence is knovvn through 
the realm of Being, and in the third premise that God was per-
fectly good. The premises seem to contain hints that God was 
known to exist by contemplation on the realm of eternal Being. 
Hmvever, Plato warned the reader that nto discover the :Ma ker and 
Father of this Univer-se were a taslc indeed; and having discovered 
Him, to declare Him unto all men were a thing impossible."l Even 
though there was good reason for affirming the existence of God, 
the description of his nature and modus operandi were beyond the 
limits:·of human conprehension; such knowledge that could be gained 
would at best be an approximation through the means of myth. 
This passage seems to be a further indication of the importance 
of mystical insight in discovering the existence of God. 
These premises were important for the remainder of the dia-
logue. For example, as the efficient cause of crea tion, the 
Demiurge was posited in opposition to all contentions that the 
cause was mechanical and resident in the world of Becoming itself. 
1. Timaeus 280. 
11By requiring God as a cause, Plato is denying that mechanical 
causation is sufficient to account for the world."l A primary 
cause of motion was necessary; physical cause could not i nitiate 
motion; t h is conception was further developed in the Laws,2 
which contains the notion of God as the only self-moving soul 
who causes the movements of all other souls. 
Cosmological explanations, according to these premises, had 
to recognize the difference between Being and Becoming, so that 
I 
accounts ·· dealing with Being by thought 11will be abiding and un-
shrucable; and in so far as it is possible and fitting for state-
ments to be irrefutable and invincible, they must in no wise fall 
short thereof."3 But t he account of Becoming in the scheme of 
cosmology was, as a description of sense-observation, a like-
ness of likeness (i.e., Becoming), and would "possess likelihood" 
only ,4 for :11as.. Being is to Becoming , so is t r uth to Belief. n5 
Therefol"'e, in accounts of 11 the Gods and the generation of the 
Ulh.iverse,"6 which .formed .part of the cosmological process of 
creation, one coul d not always be self-consistent and exact. 
1 Thus, the purpose was to produce accounts superior tor:~all others 
in likeligood, and, recognizing human incapacities ~ to accept it 
11and forbear to search beyond it. u7 Knowledge of the gods and , 
' the cosmos was in the realm of' belief, in which there was no final 
statement. But it is important to notice that Plato did not subsume 
1. Demos, Art.(l935), 561. 
2. Cf. p . 107ff. 
3. Timaeus 29BC. 
4. Timaeus 290. 
!). Timaeus 290. 
6. Timaeus 290. 
1. Timaeus 29D. 
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II 
knowledge of the creator-God under this limitation, since God 
was assumed in the premises. This was mot merely the opinion 
of ~imaeus, for Socrates confirmed all that Timaeus had said.l 
~ Cornford, who believed that the Demiurge was a part of the 
myth·· of the Timaeus,_ tended to overlook the fact that Plato as- I 
smned the existence of God, apparently knowable by reason, with-
out placing God under the knowledge limitations associated wit~! 
the Cornford suggested that the Demiurge "was not real!ly 
II 
cosmos. 
a 1maker 1 , 11 2 because God was merely poetical for Plato. Howeve1r, 
Corrlford supplied no evidence for his statements; rather, he 
interpreted God by the poetical nature of the physics and cos-
mology which followed the preliminary discussion including the 
I 
I 
premises. ! 
In support of his contention, Cornford asserted that "hePe j 
he [Plato] warns us not to imagine that, in using this image, 
he has declared the true nature of the cause. It is to be ~aken, 
not literally, but as a poetical figure. 11 3 In this connection, II 
Cornford offered no evidence for his assertion; apparently, he 1 
n 
was referring to Plato's , statement concerning the impossibilit~~ 
of:;: obtaining complete lcnowledge of the na tuPe of God. 4 However, 
while it is true that Plato affirmed the lack of knowledge con- I 
cePning the nature of God, he affirmed the fact of the existen~~ 
I 
of God as an assumption before beginning his description of cosj 
mology. Coriiford attempted to force the entire dialogue into · Jl 
1. Cf. Timaeus 29D. 
2. Cornford;-FC, 26. 
3. Cornford, PC, 27. 4. Cf. Timaeus , 2~C. 
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myth. Rather than presupposing all of Plato's statements in th~ 
Timaeus are mythical because some of them are, an interpretation 
should distinguish myth from what is to be taken literally. 
Cornford was correct in pointing out the mythical character 
, / 
of the cosmology, which was characteri§ed as 11 likely 11 (€l -xws), 
"probable, 11 or 11plausible. 11 This aspect of the Timaeus is poetry 
or image, not exact truth; it was a story of temporal events, 
the growth of the universe as the work of a divine Craftsman; 
I 
it was mythical elaboration of what was observed through percep'-
tion . Vfuat Cornford overlooked was the fact that the Demim"ge I 
was not an allegory, but a matter of truth (rather than opinion). 
Only the subordinate gods of the Timaeus belonged to mythology. !~ 
The Timaeus reported Plato's view of ~osmology, in which 
the temporal world was produced by the creative or formative 
work of God, copying the eternal pattern. This cosmology re-
vealed the influence of PythagoPean mathematics and Empedoclean 
biology and medicine upon Plato. 2 In the construction of the 
world, God was the efficient 
world of Becoming.3 "God is 
cause, responsible foP order in the 
distinct from the universe, presid~ s 
at its creation and engraves upon it the characters of his own 
intelligence. 114 As the agent of creation, God was called the 
'I 
I 
Demiurge, 11 a word which Plato and the Greeks generally apply to I 
an artisan engaged in useful activity, as a rule of a manual !I 
type. n5 God was the divine craftsman who looked at his pattern! 
4. Dunham, Art.(l951), 102. 
5. Solmsen, PT, 110. :! 
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as a human craftsman mentally visualized the ideal pattern of 
the product he \'las about to make. On the basis of the eternal 
pattern, the divine craftsman made the world. One of the 
tant uses of this analogy was to express the teleological 
~ity of God in creation: 
imparl~ · 
acti~-
There can be no universal teleology unless it can 
be shovm that there is a cosmic crea tive genius 
which plays the role on a large scale that our 1 
:j 
mind plays on a small scale in art and society. 
The becoming of' the cosmos seemed to ~ n~ro>J.:~e.) two aspects.1f 
The first aspect was the coming into existence of something, i.lle., 
the creation of the universe as such. This aspect of coming i ruto 
being was demonstrated in the activity of the craftsman fashiod-
1 
ing a product. Thus, the first task of the Demiurge in creatid 
I 
was to begin the processes of Becoming; he initially fashioned 11 
the universe by placing the cosmos in the realm of Becoming. II 
The second aspect was the process of change, in which the~e 
! 
was perpetual becoming and perishing. A thing came into being 
1 
and then passed away; there was a continual flux of things and 
' I 
events. By implication from the facts of the initial creation,!! 
the continual beco~ng and perishing of the cosmos, and the ma~n-
1 
tenance of order, the second task of the Demiurge was that of J 
sustaining the universe, i.e., continually ordering it. There 
"must be a perpetually sustaining cause."3 If God sustained 
the universe, he aimed at what was good, for the Demiurge was 
guided by the good; chaos had to be continually brought to 
1. Boodin, Art.(l939>,493. 
2. Cf. Cornford, PC, 24f'f. 
3. Cornford, PC, 26. 
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thetical to goodness, and goodness sought to manifest itself. 
Hence, God desired to establish goodness to the best of his 
ability. Second~-:; · , Plato assumed that whatever was orderly wa 
Bef'ore cr~t~on, 
I 
good, and that whatever was disorderly was evil. 
disorder reigned. Thus, God desired to bring order ~:nr dis- J 
order because he, being good, sought to establish the good I 
wherever possible, not being limited in his desire by envy or 
jealousy toward any other power or condition. "For bm who is 
most good it neither was nor is permissible to perf'orm any act on 
save what is most f'air. 11 3 God's purpose f'or creating the univeirse 
was that it rationally followed from his goodness that he shou~d 
t 
have sought to spread goodness to all things. 
1. Timaeus 29E. 3. Timaeus 30A. 
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Commenting on God 1 s motive f'or Cl"eation, 'raylor remarked: 1 
11 This means, exactly as the dogma of crea tion does in 
Christian theology, that the physical world does not 
exist in its own right, but depends on a really selP-
existirg being , the 'best ~v~ry 1 , God, for its exis-
tence. . 
The purpose of both Plato and the biblical w~iters was to por- 1 
I 
tray a cosmology dependent upon a God who was a soul (Plato) 
or person (Bible), in opposition to creation by mechanical 
f'orces resident in nature. However, Taylor se emed t o overstate 
Plato's remark s on God's love in crea tion : 
So just because God is good, He does not keep his 
blessedness selfishly to Himself'. He seek s to 
make something else as much like Himself i n good-
ness. It is the very nature of goodness and love 
to 1 overflow'. 2 
I 
II 
'I Cornford opposed this view, showing t hat Taylor's supposition 1 
was not only unfounded but misleading. Plato, in the Tima~, ;! 
sa id nothing about God's love for his created beings in his I 
motive for creation. In describing the nio ti ve, Plato establisJ ed 
the reasonable basis for creation as if it were deducible from ! 
certain granted premises. While it may be true that Plato's 
God loved hisc creatures, this particular passage in the 
contained no evidence for such a confention. 
Timaeus 
--,1 
I 
I 
There is a problem in why God l3hould have been motivated 
i 
I 
at all to create t he world if he wer-e completely good and did nl t 
need a world, since crea tion may imply something unrealized.3 ' 
I 
Plato's answer was that God created not i'rom deficienoy, but 
from abundance of goodness for the purpose of' bringing order 
il 
il 
II 
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o.o:ho.f. disorder (characterized by the Receptaclel). God did not / 
craate the universe because he had or needed to. His creation I 
was based on his desire, which was to manifest his goodness n~ t 
, I 
so much from love as from the desire not to let evil be mani-
fested anywhere. Disorder was somethinB for God to avoid. 
The creation of the woEld was, for Plato, the ordering of 
pre-existent chaos by the pattern. Tfie creative factors were 
four in number: "the DetePminate, the Indeterminate, the Mix- 'I 
I 
ture of the tvro, · and the C~'\lse of the I'liixture. u2 The deter-
! 
minate represented the pattern, or the limited.3 The indeter-
minate was the pre-existent chaos, the unlimited, or the Recep 1 
tacle. The mixture was the sensible world; embodied vrith sou1 1 
by God, it was the World-Soul. The cause of the mixtui•e was t ? e 
'I 
Demiurge, or God. In the progress of this chapter, each crea-
tive factor will be discussed. 
,, 
;I 
i 
The background of this division of creative factors was 
the differentiation Plato made between Being and Becoming. 
Plato accepted the Heraclitean description of flux for the sen~ 
sible world of particulars, the concrete objects of Becoming.4' 
However, Plato did not stop with Heraclitus; the flux formed 
i 
certain patterns of structure; hence, the pattern was a neces-1 
c i 
sary creative factor./ Thus, the becoming of the sensible world 
!) 
il 
was a mixture of Being and not-being; Being contributed form 
and particularity; not-being depreciated form. Plato differed ' 
from his predecessors by claiming that the real was immaterial'! 
,, 
_l. Cf. ~·-7J.f'J' ___ 3. 9~· Demos, PP, 7ff. 'I ~ 
2. Fuller, HP, I -, -16~ - - LL-:-c f. ul ier ,- --;;- ~ :rterr-; --1 - -=-~ 5~ Cf. Timaeus 2oA, 29BC. I 
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and reached not by sense-perception , but by reasoning.l For I 
Plato, the real nature oi' reality was universal; only the f'ormJI 
or ideas were real in the sense oi' remaining eternally permanent. 
!I 
Unity in reality was accounted i'or by the f'orms, whi ch involveq' 
a coherent system oi' reality as a whole. The crea tive I .factors, 
'I 
God, the eternal pattern, and the Receptacle, seem to have 
treated by Plato as eternally co-existent.2 
been! 
I' 
I 
The Timaeus described each creative .factor and the relations 
' between them. The eternal pattern o.f creation accounted .for thle 
ideal o~ order; it was not created, but was 11mixed 11 with the 
Receptacle in the act of creation. As the limit, the pattern 
1
1 
was the principle of order, setting boundal"ies and arranging bYj 
I 
classes; its use systematized the Receptacle into distinctness ,, 
in quantity and quality. It \Vas the principle of discriminatio~ , II 
individuation, and relationship.3 ~I 
Thi s factor was presupposed in the third premise i n the 
Timaeus.4 If the "Cosmos is beautiful and its constructor good, 
I 
it is plain that he fixed 
identical and uniform. 115 
his gaze on t h e Eternal, 11 t he "self- 11 
Two bas ic assumptions of Plato were 
very important fo r the Timaeus: the beauty o.f the cosmos (an 
assumption of Greek culture it8~~.f)and the goodness oi' God or 
I 
I 
the craativa Demi~ge. Thus, Plato asserted, if these be gran~ed, 
then it necessarily followed that God created the world accord~ng 
II 
to some model J(. the' ·;]a""'t::l:ieT.il). 
1. Cf. Timaeus 27E-28A . 
2. C:r. T~maeus 28, 29; 
e=nro-s ~ -P-, - 2e; - --
Thus, Plato reasoned, the model 
J. Corni'ord, PC, 26. 
4· Ci'. P. 58. 
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appeared to be something objective, some eternal pattern, on t~r 
basis o~ vn~ich God ordered the world. The nature of the model ·had 
three possibilities. It could have been "that which has come I 
into existence, ul or identical with eternal ideas within liod' s '' I 
mind, or something apart ~rom God and the ideas. The first ~1- l 
I 
ternative ·"is an impious supposition, u2 ~or everyone realized I 
that God's gaze was ~ixed on the eternal, since the cosmos was 
beauti~ul and God was "the best of all causes. u3 In other worct1s, 
.I 
I because God was completely good and the best cause, God must have 
-I followed the best pattern. Obviously, the creation itsel~ did II 
,I 
not fulflll these conditions, ~or a created pattern would have ·I 
been inferior to an eternal pattern. "The work o~ any malcer 
will be good only i~ he ~ashions it a~ter an eternal model. The 
work is good; so its model must have been eternal."4 
Consequently, the pattern was either an aspect of ideas, 
de~ined by the development of Plato's theory of ideas in the 
I 
preceding · dialogues,5 or something entirely different from thJ 
,, 
ideas. Vvhich of these two possibilities applied to the Timaeusj 
I. 
is problematic. However, the probable indication of the dialogue 
is that the pattern was an aspect o~ the ideas, rather than a 11 
I 
:I 
separately existing entity. This indication is based on two 
observatinns. 
II 
First, if Plato intend ed for the pattern to be some entity 
different from anything he had formerly posited, it is probabll 
that he would have given some description of and basis ~or it 
1. Timaeus 29A._ . 
~r 2~ -Timaeus 29A .-
1 3. Timaeus 29A. 
4. Cornford, PC, 21. 5 :- "' c:r:---cnapt er - -r=. =--=--=·==~~ 
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I 
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rather than presuppose it. The pattern was assumed fr om the 
beg ilLning in one of the premises.l In the third premise, the 
pattern was described as unchangeable and correlated with the 
unchangeable aspect of reality in general . 2 Also, the three 
premises are not formally distinct from each other in the dialogue; 
I 
thus, it seems evident that the "unchangeable 11 in the third prein-
ise is identical with the "that which always is and has no be-
3 ~ 4 coming " of the first premise. As has already been pointed out', 
the permanent reality referred to in the first premise was prob~ 
ably a composition of certain ideas. Plato presupposed this nal_ 
ture of the pattern before he proceeded with his theory of I crea-
tion and cosmology. 
Second:; · ..: , there is more positive evidence that the pattern 
I 
was a composition of ideas. An ideal pattern for creation cou~r 
hardly have been, in Plato's thought, anything other than the 
ideal forms or idaas, for there was nothing higher or more su-
preme than the ideas. 
If it be granted that the pattern was i denti cal with cer-
tain of the ideas, the problem of the nature of the pattern 
then seen to depend on the nature of the ideas in general. 
Plato offered no explanation of the nature of ideas in the 
is 
I Since 
Timaleus 
(alth ough he affirmed the r eality of ideas as known by reason5)~and 
since he presupposed the existence of ideas in this dialogue, 1 
I 
the logical explanation of the problem is to conform the naturej 
1. Of. p. 58. 4. Of· P: .53f!'. 
2. Of. Timaeus 28A. .5. Of. T~maeus .51. 
'7.=-3· Timaeus_27E _{J;:f'_. _Jowett)· ---=---~- --=- I I 
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I of t he pattern to t h e natur e of the ideas as defined in the 
70 lj 
dia-
logues pre ced~lllg;J; the Timaeus. Since Plato's developed theory 1 
I 
of ideas were probably general notions in minds, rather than 
independent, self-subsistent realities, the pattern was a com-
position of general notions which must have existed in some 
mind; since the pattern was used by the Demiurge, it existed 
1/ in his mind. 1 This much of Pl ato 1 s description of the pattern I 
1! was presupposed. As the myth of the Timaeus progressed, 2 Plat 1 
II 
1 described the pattern in mythical terms. 
The model was the "intelligible Living Creature" in the 
world of ideas; it was 11 that Living Creature" which "embraces 
and contains within itself all t he intelligible Living Cr eatures."3 
11The Pattern is called a li vine; t hing , an intelligible animal; :1 
'I 
••• that is, The Pattern has articulations, is an organic whole 
of parts, • • • a One in a :Many. 114 
As one whole living creature, the pattern determined t he 
unity of the one world; there was only one world because the 
one pattern nece s sitated only one world. A plurality of world1 
would have presented a condition contrary to the pattern.5 Pl~­
' to opposed the Atomists, who claimed that there was an infinit 1 
number of worlds. In answering whether the world was one or 
I 
many, Plato said: 11 0ne it must be termed, if it is to b e framed 
il 
after its j3attern."6 He invoked t he third-man argument to pro . e 
h is point: 
I 
, 1. This is an argument for the r eality of a soul-God in the Ti ~ 
1 maeus, since no pattern could be posited unless it existed in-~ind. 
1 
_ 2._.Pf_._ Tirnruill.s 22Eff. 5. Cf. Timaeus 31B. 
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For that which includes all other intelligible 
creaturescannot have a second or companion; in 
that case there would be need of another living 
being which would include both, .and of which they 
would be parts, and the likeness would be more 
truly said to resemble not the~, but that other 
71 
which included them.l 
The motive for creation was the Good.2 Demos seems to haj e 
overemphasized the Good by terming it a nfactor distinct from t ;he 
I 
Pattern," the "principle of the best 11 whlch chose among pa.tternls.3 
I 
Although the Good was the pre-eminent idea in creation (and in 
il the Timaeus it was the guide supreme over other ~deas), it was :I 
itself an idea and part of the pattern in God's mind. Also, if! 
the Good was nothing more than idea, then God was not the Good, / 
fo1 ... God was a soul, and the Good vvas "above him ••• since it i~ 
the pattern by which he fashions the vrorld. 114 The Good was abdve 
God in the sense of being a standard to follow. 
In ordering the univer se, God did not create ex nibilo, b t 
from pra-existent material, called the Receptacle. 
The creative act does not, for Plato, mean a crea-
tion out of nothing . The cosmos, or well-ordered 
universe, is created in the sense that the Dem"iurge, 
or artificer, imparts form into the for.rriless, opder 
and regulal"'ity to the disorCI.erly and irregular.-> 
The Timaeus indicated that thel"e was a disorderly stuff existe · t 
II 
0 J The ueceptacle vms the ma te, ial 
with which God worked aecording to the pattern. The Receptacle 
before the creation of the world. 
II 
seemed to have several aspects, perhaps characterized as a cause 
I 
or function (necessity} a condition (space), and a substance 
---=.=..::.-= 
I 
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(matter). As necessity, the rteceptacle was disorderly, irregul r 
and chaotic n1otion, as described in mythical terms; in this ruJc-
tion, t he Receptacle was described as ac t ive.l 1 It was "an ever, 
I 
restless power i mposing certain inevitable conditions upon creJ[ 
tion. 112 Through this aspect, the Re ceptacle was a cause in cre' -
tion; it \Vas an errant cause which hindered the worl{ of the Dej l 
I urge. "The Demiurge has been operating all through under cer- ; 
tain given conditions, which he did not originate and which setl 
a limit to the goodness of his work. 11 3 Cornford pointed out t J ht 
I 
the fundamental factor in the Receptacle was space~ But there 
was more t han mere space; there was a tendency toward chaotic 
'' motion.4 It is di:rticult to interpret the Receptacle in its , hi-
cal context; probably, it was a condi tion of disorder which by I 
its very condition hindered creation. I 
I 
II 
,, 
I 
II 
,, 
II 
II 
As another condition, the Re ceptacle was passive, or the I 
unlimited, which was the factor of indefiniteness and vaguenes,~ 
of being without boundaries or wholeness, of complete negation I 
of form. Plato called this space, mass, or substance; it was 1 
the potentiality for matter.5 ~ae Receptacle was the place or 
condition of things before the introduction of structured order, 
as such , it vms the neutral, abiding thing. 6 Interpreted· l:l.t- I 
I 
:e;aally:. ~·- tlie .·Heeeptaele':·probably·:·was )w!'&hofit --d~finit'ely .· orderedJ 
1,1 7 form. 
II 1. Cf. Timaeus 53A, 4 8A, 52D. 
II 
2. More, RP, 216. 
J Cornford, PC, 159. 1 4: Cf. Demos, Art. (1936), 545. 
_ _ 5.J_ Cf. Timaeus _,50A-C; Cf. More .J 
===- - rrP·, ·ro. -
6. Of. Taylor, PLA, 456f; 
Shorey, WPS, 337. 
I 
II 
7. Evidently, the myt;hs contr -
ticted each other. If the Rec~ftacle 
was chaotic motion, then it could 
hardly have been neutral and ~oid. 
_BlJ,t _after the m ths are inter:Q_rr>e-__ _ 
ted, Plato's descr ption or- e 
Receptacle malces sense. 
II 
II 
Jl 
I 
I 
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I 
The most vague aspect of the Receptacle was its material 
forn1, if it had any. Plato had difficulty accounting for the 
elements of the world, such as fire, air, water, and earth; he 
did not accept the views of his predecessors that these elementls 
were ultimate. 1 True being was changeless and self-identical, j 
while the elements were determinations of something. To escape' 
the in£inite regress of determinations depending on other dete~L 
minations, etc., Plato posited the Receptacle, 2 a.s the indeter-'' 
minate material form from which the elements were formed. The 
Receptacle accounted for the 11 something 11 by contributing the 
11wherein 11 so that the object was 11 somewhere. 11 3 It was distinct 
from the ideas, from physical matter (since it was completely 
indeterminate), and from physical space (since in it there was I 
no positional status~ "The Receptacle is the container of events; 
it is itself nothing, a void in which events thrive and perish. 114 
These three aspects of the Receptacle will be discussed 
II 
I 
later in connection with the Philebus • .5 They were not definite, I 
II 
divisions of the Receptacle. Plato's mythical form hindered I 
1. Of. Timaeus 48B. Timaeus .50C. 
2. Of. Demos, Art.(l936), 539· 4. Demos, Art.(l936), .541. 
- 3· Of-.-Demos, Art. C-1~.36) ~ , .540_;=-- ~$-•=- Of ·= P ·-9-}f.f -- = =-=--~=--
I 
'l 
--- -- ~ -
--=- -- --'- - -~~="'-"---- -- -- 74r-- --=--
/! time; "it is a spatio-temporal continuum, in which determinate 
,/ 
events take place."l In this way, the Receptacle provided for 
I 
plurality in the cosmos; since t he world necessarily partook of 
I 
plurality, the Receptacle was necessary for all events. As a lj 
creative activity, the Receptacle \Vas also the principle of II 
destructiveness, not in the active sense of being destructive, 
but in the sense o:f being not entire ly under the orderly super~~ 
vision of God; t hus, disorder always reigned to some extent. 
The continual passing away or perishing of things illustrated 
t h is factor of creativity. As pure potentiality, the Receptac ,e 
was both receptive and passively resistant, a contradiction in l 
terms because, for Plato, it can be understood only in mythica] 
formulation . 
In its condition of receptivity, the Receptacle was a cre, -
tive factor because it could receive t h e order imposed on it bl 
God. Taylor described t h e Receptacle as a willing "servant" or! 
"slave 11 amenable to the intelligent persuasion of God.2 Neces / 
I 
! 
sity was passively plastic to t he will of God; "its function is 
everywhere to be instrumental to the intelligent and beneficiaAt 
purpose of 'mind' or God. u3 According to Demos, the Receptaclf1
1
, 
had in it a primordial tendency for order. 4 /1 
The production of the visible world was the result of the !l 
co-operation between reason and necessity. "This cosmos in its 
origin was generated as a compound, from the combination of I 
I 
Necessity and Reason. n5 
_fl. 
The errant cause had to be included 
- l._~_eJ1lQS_, =-Art_._ ( 12--36-b, -543 !_ 
2. Cf. Taylor, PLA, 454~f. 
___ Lb_. Cf ._pemos, Art. (1936), 548'. 
- - 3 :- Timaeus 8A:.-- -----
3. Taylor, Art.(l947), 60. 1 
I 
II 
I 
--~~~ -------'-- ---- ~----~J~I ==-=-75, 
in the construction of' the world. God persuaded the 1\ pre-existent 
I 
material to take on order. Reason overcame the errant cause 
necessity yielded itself' to orderly determination: 
Inasmuch as Reason was controlling Necessity by 
per suading her to conduct to t he best end the most 
part of' things coming into existence, thus and 
thereby it came about, through Necessity yielding 
to intelligent persuasi:on, that this Universe of' 
ours was bling in this wise constructed at the 
beginning. 
Once again, Plato pointed out the lack of' complete knowled' e 
concerning these things; the purpose had to remain that of' pres ll nt-
ing the "most likely account."2 The Receptacle was a concept I 
difficult to understand. It had "no qualities of its 0 \"111 11 be- I 
fore qualities entered it.3 Knowledge of' the Receptacle was 
greatly different from knowledge of the ideas, which.~were known . 
1 by reason. However, it was knovm for certain that "these two 
kinds must be declared to be t wo, 114 i.e., that reason in knowing 
I 
the realm of ideas and opinion concerning the Receptacle were 1 
different kinds of knowledge referring to different realms of I 
. I 
n reality, for these two realms "have come into existence separat , ly 
and are unlike in condition. 115 ! 
Although the Receptacle was opposite to God in purpose, it ! 
I 
I 
was not evil; it was other than God, but not antithetical to be~ng 
used for good. It was neutral in relation to good and evil, be ng 
evil only in the sense of lacking order and being unattached 
the good. 6 · 
to I 
I 
II 
1 • Timaeus 4BA. 5. Timaeus 51E. JL 
2. Timaeus 48CD. 6. Cf. Demos, Art. (1936), 554f; I 
~g~~~~~~ri~' _18I~ ='-===--~~r~ , RP, 219; Morrow, Art. (1950), , 
!I 
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Thus, the Receptacle took on orderly form when God persuaded 
it, but it is. doubtful that the Receptacle was wholly without 
form :O·e-fore coming under the persuasion of God at the creation of 
Becoming. It would be difficult to prove that the Receptacle must 
always have had some form, since Plato spoke of the· Receptacle 
as entirely formless and boundless. However, it seems inconceiv-
able that something could be called a thing unless it possessed 
at l .east some determination; to be something, it must possess at-
tributes. Of course, Plato's concept of the Receptacle \Vas clothed 
with mythical meanings; nevertheless, he was referring to some 
condition or substance that existed before the world was created. 
That the Receptacle was independent of God is indicated by the 
fact that it was a chaotic condition which later caused the pro-
duction of evil, and the fact t hat God was completely good and 
possessed perfect motion. 
The difficulty in Plato's thought is that this condition or 
substance must have had some determination and form in order t~ 
be a separate entity or principle. Cornford asserted: 
It is now generally agreed that this disorderly con-
dition can neve r have existed by itself at a time 
before order was introduced. Bodily motion cannot 
exist without a soul to cause it.l 
Plato hinted at the fact that the Receptacle must have had some 
form bef~re creation when he described how God placed order in 
things that were · in a state of disorder: "For at that time 
[i.e., the time of creation] nothing partook thereof [i.e., o~ 
ord.er], save by accident. "2 Thus, there is the possibility that 
the Recep t~c_le ha?. taken on at least ~or::_~ order_ before order was 
1. Cornford, PC, 203. 2. Timaeus •69C. 
II 
ll 
I 
II 
I 
,I 
I 
l 
I 
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11 
. 7711 ,, 
in·!iroduced a.~ 'CJ?~~tion; tP.i~ . :· mant1,te .or9,er _may.! ~:ve ·_ qe~~ .. giy~IJ. . ~he 
' d 
Receptacle :.~om.· all ·t;J:;me _in the past by God. 'I 
The problem may arise \Vhether Plato 1 s Demiurge may be call~d 
II 
If to be the creator ot the world , God must have crea-
ted exr;.n'lllilo, then obviously, Plato 1 s God was not a creator bui 
a creator. 
,I 
an orderer .' o.t pre-existent ma:berial. On the other hand, the Demi-
1' urge was a creator in t h e sense of creating novelty, bring ing i~­
to existence order a nd goodness where there was previously dis- 1 
order. The supreme creative function of Plato's God was the 
il creation of t he World-Soul and individual souls from the Recep-
1 
tacle. However, although the Demiurga created new form, he was 
I 
I 
,
1 
not a creator in the traditional sense of ex nihilo creativity • J 
II The World-Soul was a unified organism; it was a perfect hal"-
' mony, the "pattern of numbers analogous to a musical scale. 111 I 
Created as a rational animal (in mythical form), the World-Soul l 
was a k ind of intermediate stage between the eternal and the \ 
11 temporal. 2 Plato's description of the World-Soul, the body of 
1 lj the world, was cl~thed in mythology. 3 In constructing the uni-
1 
1 
verse, God used four primary materials in order to present unit 1 
I in the body of the world. Fire a nd earth were first used,L~ but '1 
II II there was need for a third element to unite the other t wo, so 
!I that the unive rse might be a unity of form. Also, because t h e \ 
universe was solid, not p lane, another (middle) element wa s 
needed. The necessary element was provided by the combination 
of water and air, supplied in equal ratio:,lwith each other, 
3. Cf. Timaeus Off. 
====~~-cr . ~Ti!ffiieus 3IB. 
I 
~-
---=---
I 
II 
-~L __ 
·j 
"harmonized by proportion. 11 1 
781 
11
'11he se conditions secured for it 
Amity, so that being united in identity with itself it became 
indissoluble by any agent other than Him who had bound it to-
gether."2 
II 
Thus, God created the World-Soul to be everlasting, but its 
being everlasting depended on God's will. The body of the worih 
was made all-inclusive, being composed of the four primary ele-
ments, resulting in a whmle, complete, single, and everlasting 
' unit. The four elements represented Plato's debt to Empedocles, 
but it is tl.oubtful that Plato intended these elements to be pril 
I 
mary substances as in the Empedoclean metaphysics. For Plato, 
were necess~y ror geometrical proportion t~ ~ 
the body of' the Wol"ld-Soul. "The bond is s~m-
the f'our elements 
1 
produce unity for 
ply geometrical proportion. u3 The four elements themselves rna~ 
have been purely mythical, symbolic of the geometrical unity of 
t he v1orld. If they were not mythical, they must have been 
ted to give form to the forld-Soul. I 
GOd made t h e body of the world spherical in shape, in orde 
to include all t he shapes of creatures within this Living Greal l 
ture; the purpose behind this was that similarity provided by 
the spherical form was better than dissimilarity.4 On the out-
side, God made the body "smooth with great exactness"5 because 
it was self-suf'ficing , depending on nothing outside itself, since 
this was deemed better by God. 6 The movement of the body of t lie 
----1. Timaeus 320. 
2. Timaeus 320. 
4. Timaeus 33B. 
5. Timaeus 330. 
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world was rotary because this type of movement "specially be-
'I 
longs to reason and intelligence. rrl This circular type of ro- il 
tation of the whole universe was symbolic of the control of rea-
son and geometrical peBfection. Here, Plato owed much to the 
Eleatics2 and Pythagoreans. 
The 1 ~orld-Soul was the soul of the un:bverse and the body 
of the world. Plato's mythical terminology appeared to relega~~ 
the soul aspect to the unity of the World-Soul and the body as j 
pect to its physical nature. However, it is difficult to tranJ, 
late the mythical language into self-consistent conceptual know~-
' 
edge. 
I Plato Peferred to God 1 s pihans for cx>eating the World-Soul:; 
"Such, then, was the sum of the reasoning of the ever-existing 
I 
God concerning t h e god which was one day to be existent. 11 3 God 
applied soul to t he newly-formed body of the world: 
And in the midst thereof He set Soul, which He 
stretched throughout the whole of it, and there-
with He enveloped also the exterior of its body • 
••• And because of all this He generated it to 
be a blessed God.~ 
The soul aspect was constructed logically prior to the body, in 
order that it should be ruler of the body through reason. 
The World-Soul was made of three substances from abstrac-
tions. The abstractions were indivisible and divisible kinds 
of existence, sameness, and difference; these abstractions were\ 
first mixed to produce intermediate kinds of existence, sarnenes'~ 
i 
and difference. The fi nal mixture of these three abstractions 
1. Timaeus 31+A;" Cf. Laws 898A. 3. Timaeus .34-AB. 11 
;~--=-2. or. Corn.rora---;- :Pc, 57. ~___,._=---!j:. Tim.aeus=:3!:t-E--=. =====~==tt1 
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~~~ I Each part of the V/orld-Soul was composed of / resulted in Soul. 
II 
'j 
II 
II 
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II 
II 
II 
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,, 
I 
II 
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i 
II 
a mixture of these three elements. 1 Tho three ~ngred" t I ~ ~ 1en s wer~ 
mixed into a unity by the Demiurge; thus, the DemiUl~ge was the 
creator of the World-Soul by the use of these three important 
ideas in the realm of Being.2 
I 
I 
:I Due to this mixture, the World-Soul and all individual sou1 s 
I 
world of i hadeingredients from both the world of Bei~g and the 
Becoming; thus, each soul belonged to both worldw.3 Belonging I 
to the realm of Becoming, the World-Soul was characterized by 1 
I 
change. Soul was akin to t h e ideas, but "unlike the Forms in 1 
that it is alive and intelligent, and life and intelligence can 
not exist without change. n4 Thus, in order to be souls, these ! 
souls had to partalce of the l~ealm of change and time. Because 
it was a soul, the World-Soul was not purely intelligent; it hatl 
internal feelings.5 The result of the creation of the World-So:l l 
was God's pleasure: 
And when the Father that engendered it perceived 
it in motion and alive, a thing of joy to the 
eternal gods, He too rejoiced; and being well-
pleased He designed6to make it resemPle its Model still more closely. 
Since God could not make the copy eternal like the model 
(for it was impossible to make the generated eternal in every 
aspect), God arranged the movement of the heavenly bodies to 
measure process according to number, called time. Time was 
created in order to make the univevse as much like the eternal 
• 
------"-=-,aiL~ 
model as possible. 1 Time came into existence along with the II 
creation of Becoming; 2 here it meant measurement by means of t~t 
heavenly bodies into "days and nights and months and years. 11 3 
11
1 
Produced simultaneously with the earth or cosmos, time was at 
least of the type of being measured by physical movement; thus, j 
time did not apply to eternal Being . Time was the measure of 
Becoming, not applying to God and Being. However, there is no 
reason v1hy temporal succession did not apply to Being . Plato II 
I 
failed to deny tamporal succession in eternity, and his concep- ~ 
tion of time resembled what he ca lled eternity. Time was con- 1 
I 
I 
tinually related to eternity, for it "imitates Eternity and cir.,. 
4 II cles round acc ording to number." There obviously had to be some 
relation between time and eternity; if time, in the broad sense 
was created, then before that creation there had to be a tim~. 
It is inconceivable how there could be any relation at all if I 
eternity meant comp lete timelessness. However, the mythologicaf 
character of the context in the Timaeus prevents forcing Plato 'rj 
position either into complete contradiction or acknowledgement 
of the temporal character of eternity. 
It may be that the timelessness of eternity applied only t ;p 
the chara cter of truth in the realm of Being , so that truth wa s il 
eternally timeless in the sense of applying to all time. How-
ever, such a conception could hardly have applied to souls. 
Plato further remarked that time was only a temporary thing, 
existing along with the universe, destroyed when the universe 
1. Timaeus 37D. 
__ _ 2_._ Cf_. Timaeus 3-8B;-== 
~- -
1
- Uberweg, HP, I, 123. 
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ceased to exist, if it should cease to exist; time and the uni- !1 
verse were created or generated along with each other.l In this 
sense, time seemed to depend for its reality upon the movement lj 
of the heavenly bodies, wij.ile eternity could have been time witln.-
out beginning or end: 11 Whereas the pattern is existent through 
I 
all eternity, the copy, on the other hand, is through all time. 11 2 
"Throughout all etel"ni ty," unless interpreted as mythically ref l r-
ring to the timel.essness of eternity, implies temporality in pr~ ­
cess. In God's plan, "the sun and moon and five stars, which 
' bear the appiUation of 'planets,• came into existence for the 
determining and preserving of the numbers of Time. 11 3 Whatever 
1 eternity meant for Plato, his conception of time was such that 
it was inseparable from physical motion.4 
I 
I 
The purpose of the planets was to measure time; in this th y 
I 
I 
had to co-operate. In his description of the planets and othe~ 
heavenly bodies, Plato called them "heavenly gods,"5 and "the 
1 
I eternal gods. n6 The apex of temporal movement v.ras provided by 
the sun: 
And in order that there might be a clear measure 
of the relative speeds, slow and quick , with which 
they [the heavenly bodies] travelled round their 
eight orbits, in that circle which is second from 
the earth God k indled a light which now we call the 
sun, to the end that it might shine, so far as 
possible, throughout the whole Heaven, and that 
all the living creatures entitled thereto might 
participate in number, learning it from the revo-
lution of the Srune and Similar.7 
1. Cf. Timaeus 38B. 5. Timaeus a9E. 
2. Timaeus 380. 6. Timaeus 37C • 
.3·. Timaeus 38C. 7. Timaeus 39BC. il 
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I 
Thus, the s~cial purpose of the sun was to measure time according 
'I 1 to night and day, which also aided men in developing 1nathematics. 
:r The Demiurge proceeded in his craative action to provide 
I j for the world other living creatures, which would resemble the 
I 
tl 
J 
II 
I 
:I ,, 
.I 
il 
i 
model. 
According, then, as Reason perceives Forms existing 
in the Absolute Living Creature, such and so many 
as exist therein did He deem that this World also 
should possess. And these Forms are four,--one 
the heavenly kind of gods [i.e., the stars]; another 
the winged kind which traverses the air; tqfrdly, 
the class which inhabits the waters; and faurthly, 
that which goes on foot on dry land.2 . 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
,1 There were four kinds of living souls, each of which Plato pro- I 
firs~ 
I 
,, 
'; 
I 
II 
ceeded to discuss. Most of his attention was given to the 
and last, the stars and creatures that walked on land, and only ! 
the human kind of this latter. I 
I First, the divine class, the fixed stars, were made mostly ! 
of fire, in order to be bright and beautiful, and spherical, 
11 11 liRening it to the All. n3 God placed it in the intelligent 
same and distributed it "round about over all the Heaven, to be 
unto it a veri table adornment cunningly traced over the whole. 11 i 
God gave each star two motions, rotation around its own axis, 
whereby it "conceives always identical thoughts about the same 
objects."5 and forward motion, a revolution of the sphere of' 
II 
I 
stars, due to its being controlled by revolution of' the same 
similar. These were all the motions possessed by the stars, 
and. 
I in 
order that they should have been as perf'ect as possible. The 
I 
stars wer e the only kind of living creatures a~!l5eated' ;by.:. ::.G:G:tt;-~::;: l jj 
=--~= :t~ O:fl";.-' ~ord:.ror<l,--~-1~~=-
2. Timaeus 39E-40A. 
~ma~~4eA~=============*========~ 5. Timaeus 4oB. 
, 3. Timaeus 4oA. 
I 
II 
t.::;._ 
he provided all living creatures that were made with their souls. 
The material portion o~ all living creatures other than the stars 
was made by subordinate gods, which were formed in a hierarchy, 
sue!! that there was a descending sel~ies of creatures, each crea-
ture the cause and ruler of the one below; the creatures became 
the . creators of the rank below their ovn1. This scheme was simi-
lar to Aristotle's b!trarchy of beings. 
The earth in this scheme stood at rest with respect to the 
other heavenly bodies, although it was probably moving around on 
its axis along with the complete movement o~ the whole universe.l 
The earth was 11 the first and eldest o~ all the gods which have 
come into existence within the Heaven. 11 2 
The subordinate gods, created by the Demiurge, might have 
been the gods of the Greel-[ tradition. It is didl~icult to deter-
mine if these gods were purely mythical ~or Plato. Plato asserted 
the di~ficulty of knowing these gods: 
Concerning the other divinities, to discover and 
declare their origin is too great a task ~or us, and 
we n1ust trust to those who have declared it afore-
time, they being , as they affirmed, descendants of · 
~ods and knowing well, no doubt, their O\vn fore-
fathers. It is, as I say, impossible to disbelieve 
the children of gods, even though their statements 
lack either probable or necessary demonstration; 
and inasmtj.ch- as they pro~ess to speak of family 
matters, we must follow custom and believe them. 
Therefore, let the generation of these gods be sta-
ted by us, ~allowing their account.3 
The problem of whether Plato was a monotheist or a poly-
theist has caused controversial interpretation of the Timaeus. 
1. Cf. Cornford, PC, 120-131. 
2. Ti mae us 4o_B_?. 
3. Timaeus 40DE. 
8~ 
'But~, Plato se emed to be ironical in suggesting t hat the descend! 
I 
ants of the gods were right in their reports; but on t he other I 
hand , Plato seemed to accomodate himself to traditional beliefsj 
I 
and account for them in his cosmology . Pla to proceeded to trace 
rl 
the origin of t h e most i mportant gods, G~, Uranus, Oceanus, il 
T.ethys, etc.l This was the description of the "deities of popu!L 
lar be l ief (such as Homer depicts).n2 Cornford claimed that Pl-
I 
to insinuated the falsity of belief in these traditional gods, I 
since assertions of their existence lack ed proof.3 According 
to Cornfor d, they did not exist because they were neve r seen asj 
::waee t h e celestial gods.4 Thus, ac cording to Cornford, Pla to 
was agnostic in respect to the gods of tradition, at the same 
time urging worship of .them. 11 The irony in our passage is ai:m1 , 
not at the pious beliefs of the common man, but at the pre ten- ! 
sions of •theologi am!P to know the fa.mily history of anthropo-
morphic d~ities. 115 
Cornf.ord conceived no reason why Plato should be termed a 
monotheist. He asserted that ther e was no suggestion in the t j ' m 
11 God 11 tha t Plat o was a monotheist; 11he beli eved in the divinitYj 
o:f the world as a whole and o:f t he heavenly bodies."6 On the i 
other hand , Burnet remarked: 11 No doubt the subordinate gods o 
the Timaeus belong to the mythology of that dialogue, and we c 
II 
hal"'dly doubt that Plato was a monotheist, 11 7 Cornford 1 s conten"'i ion 
1. Of. Timaeu~OE-41A. Phaedrus 2460, and La~s 904A. I 
2. Bury, PT, 87. ~Cornford, PC, 13~ I 
· I G_. Of. Cornford, PI!T, 138. 6. Cornford, PC, 35. 1 
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I 
was based on his belief that Plato's concepts of bot};l the gods 
11 
II 
il and God a re part o:r the mythology. r:r Pla~o was a monotheist, 
II then it must be shown that "God n was not mythical, while "the 
,I 
I 
iJ 
I 
I 
I 
:I 
II 
I 
godsn were either mythical or created by the one God. 
I 
I Plato probably felt no pressing need qf stating a monothe- l 
istic position if he were a monotheist. The question of mono- 1 
theism or polytheism was not important to the Greeks.l Thus, J 
I 
to determine whether or not Plato was a monotheist is a task of' l 
I 
finding the main stream of thought in the dialogues. No one nas-
,_ I 
sage should be considered sufficient f or answering the problem, / 
! 
I 
I for there were indications of both views. 
Plato's thought on the whole indicated that he was a mono- ' 
theist. The concept of the "best soul" in the Laws, the one soul 
-- II 
·which was supl"eme in the lb.ierarchy of souls, is strong evidence II 
for Plato's conviction of the supreme rule and creative activity, 
I 
of one God.2 The same conception seems to have dominated the 
I 
Timaeus. Taylor asserted: "All through the story there is onl~ 
on e God who can be called 'everlasting', the creator himself. 11 3 
· I The other gods of the Tim~ were entirely subordinate to the 
one supreme being. "Plato might have admitted other gods, so 
long as they were strictly subordi nate."4 The gods created by 
the one supreme God were not immortal, for they cou ld be taken 
apart by the creator if he so willed; they owed their existence 1 
to God.5 In the Timaeus, Plato distinguished between the one 
1. Cf'. Burnet, GP, 337. 4. Burnet, GP, 337-338. li 
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cre~tor God and the intelligent souls, attached to the 
bodies and d~used through nature. 1 
heavenl$ 
! 
I 
There are numerous .:Yd'11t'l"~eu.:IJb.; passages in the dialogues I 
concerning this problem. A difficult one to interpret is in 
the La\VW. Plato asserted the operation of more than one soul 
in the universe, in order to account for evil: "At least we 
must assume not fewer than two, one beneficient, the other ca- i 
, 
I 
pable of t he contrary effect. 11 2 
passage was that it did not mean 
Taylor's explanation oi' this :
1 there ~as an evil soul as wel~
I 
I 
I 
as a good one i n the world, but only that to account for all 
which happens, at least two souls were necessary, one to acco I t 
for the good, another for ··con·crary. 3 Plato's meaning here see i ed 
I 
to be that there were souls, at least one, responsible for ef- i 
fects contrary to good. God was not responsible for evil be- / 
I 
cause he was perfectly good. Although there nmst have been so~ls 
II ::;·:h:~o:::rr:::::·::~·t:o:.·::::~:·::d:~•ms to be no reasrn 
The problem is aggravated by the fact that Plato d id not 1 
i 
"provide a definite argument for the monotheistic position, no 1 
I 
does it seem to have been his intention to attack traditional I 
polytheism as such. 114 Perhaps Plato acknowledged the tradi- j 
tional polytheism as a matter of course in his dialogues with-1 
out himself' agreeing with the conception. However, it seems ) 
that Plato's metaphysical position was based on the distinctiok 
!I 
between the creator God and the created gods. There was a hierarchy 
I ~r=1~~,-~~~ ~-====-=2~~aylor!.t CPT, _257ff. 
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I Taylor criticised Cornford for calling Plato a "pagan polYj 
1 ( A'\ / I theist, 11 simply because Plato used the term oc.. \J£OL as well asl 
e Ll / t 
0 vt:os. Taylor's argument was that one was not a polytheist 
I 
I until he claimed that there was more than one independent god. 
! 
of beings controlled by one supreme 1 He asserted that a number 
being was compatible with monotheism. I A glance at the proposed 
I 
I definition of monotheism reveals that a monotheist is one vtho 
believes in only one eternal, creator God. 2 Actually, the prob~ m 
I 
is a semantic one, since it depends on the definitions involved. 
If monotheism is the belief in only one divine being, then the J 
I 
Upanishadi~ thought is poiliyth~is~ despite Brahman, since there 
1 were numerous gods; also, Chr~st~anity would be polytheistic b~ 
I 
virtue of angels. On the other hand, if monotheism means that I 
! 
i only one divine being is eternal, and that he created all othe~ 
beings, gods included, then Plato was a monotheist. 
Taylor's assertion was that to be a God was to be eternal 
and uncrea ted; thus, for Taylor Plato was a monotheist. 
I 
In sup' 
i 
port of his argument, Taylor referred to the creation story of 
the Timaeus;3 the gods were lower than God, and were made by 
God, the Demiurge. In a later article, Cornford qualified hisj 
former positd:on to admit that it was truer to say that Plato w 
"at h-... t a monotheist. n4 goL s ~ Cornford asserted that the lesser u 
did not present an incompatibility with monotheism. I 
ff. 
It seems probable that the Timaeus divinity was composed 
or only one supreme God, other gods being the creation or this 
God.l For Plato, the gods represented the link in the relation-
ship between God and the World. God could not create the mortal 
nature of human beings, ror such work was beyond the dignity or 
goodness of God. Hence, gods were created for this task. The 
existence of a supreme God was asswned before the myth was pre-
sented.2 Plato's recognition of the various gods was almost 
unrestricted. Not only were there various g ods for particular 
virtues, but there was a god for every soul incarnate in man. 
In the Timaeus, Plato called the stars gods; each star was the 
abode of a soul in man; every soul had a god or star.3 
Human being s we :c"'e next in t h e plan of CPea tion. The Demi-
urge directed the gods in crea ting the living creature s other 
than the stars; the address was made to all the visible gods. 
; First, God assured the gods that he respected them and would 
II 
manifest his goodness to them: 
To will to dissolve that which is fairly joined to-
gether and in good case were the deed of a wicked 
one. Vfuerefore ye also, seeing that ye were gen-
erated, are not wholly immortal or indissoluble, 
y et in no wise shall ye be d issolved nor incur 
the doom of death, seeing that in my will ye pos-
sess a bond greater and more sovereign tha n the 
bodds wuer e':Vith, at your birth, ye WePe bound to-
gether. 
Only God could dissolve the work he had done, but he promised 
not bo because of his complete goodnes2. 
1. Cf. Timaeus 29E, 4lB. 
2. Cf. p.~;-
3. Cf. Timaeus L1.lE-~.2A. 
4. Timaeus 4}B·~-=--- ==-
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Then, God informed the gods that there was need of 
the other three mortal k inds of being, :hn order to make 
verse as perfect as possible: 
But if my my doing these creatures came into exist-
ence and partook of life, they would be made equal 
unto gods; in order therefore, that they may be 
mortal and that t h is World-all may be truly All, 
do yet turn yourselves, as Nature directs, to the 
work of fashioning these living creaturex, imita-
ting the power showed by me in my generating of 
you.l 
I 
creati~ 
the unf~ 
The reason . why God could not have generated these living 
creatures was that his crea tions were on a much higher level than 
those which v1ere necessary for the other three mortal kinds of I 
living creatures; God could have created only gods. These gods 
I 
who were on a lower level of divinity than God, had to create I 
t h e other living crea tur es, for the gods were not on as high a 
creating level as God. In forming the living creatures, the 
gods were directed to imitate God: 
Now so much of them as it is proper to designate 
•immortal, • the part we call divine which rules 
supreme in those who are fain to follow justice 
always and yourselves, that part I will deliver 2 liUto you when I have sown it and given it origin. 
Only the physical organism of men was created by the gods; ! 
men's souls were created by God, either at the birth of the par 
ticular organism or at some time after the birth. The purpose 
of the gods was to form t he physical organisms of men, provide 
1 
for the care and ~ishment of them, and take care of them when 1 
they ceased to function: 
L. Timaeus 4J_c. 2. Timaeus 41C. 
I 
II 
'I 
! 
For the r e st do ye weave to§ether the mortal with 
the immortal, and thereby fashion and generate 
living creatures, and give them food that they 
may grow, and when they waste away receive them 
to yourselves again.l 
Cornfol"d pointed out that 11 this delegation of the rest of the 
I 
work to the celestial gods may perhaps be connected with the I 
notion that the heavenly bodies, especially the Sun, are actiVie 
in generating life on Earth. 11 2 
The composition o~ the human souls by God was determined I 
by the goodness of God, fule., in a just manner. Resulting was 
the law of destiny, for all creatures were created equal. I 
Once more into the former bowl, wherein He had 
blended and mixed the soul of the Universe, He 
poured the residue of the previous mater ial, mix-
ing it in somewhat the same manner, yet no longer 
with a uniform and invariable purity, but second 
and third in degree of purity. And vwhen He had 
compounded the whole He divided it i nto souls equal 
in nmnber to the stars, and each several soul He 
assigned to one star ••• and deelared unto them 
the laws of destiny.3 
At this first birth of hrnnan souls, the same conditi ons 
I 
! 
I 
applied for all, 11 in order that none might be slighted by Him 1 
[God]."4 Then, God showed the created souls that their purpo , 
must be to "grow into the most god-~earing o~ living creature, u5 
Finally, according to necessity, t h e souls were 11 implanted in 
.bodies, 116 which were subject to process. As a result, man 
developed sensation, desire with pleasure and pain, and fear, 
anger, and other emotions. 
1. Timaeus 4lD. 4. Timaeus 41E. 
2. Corn.r0rd, PC, JltJ.. 5. Timaeus 42A. 
il __, Til@.eu:;;_ lDE._ 6. T"imaeus 42A. 
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and if the soul still refrained f1 .. om being good, it would be 
incarnated into a beast, not recelhving better incarnations ·and 
final blessedness until mt changed its will and actions to yie]J 
itself to reason. 2 Thus, the human souls were created with se~-
' 
will, to follov; either reason or to degenerate into wid,kedness.l 
I 
The reason for this address to the god s and God's intentidn 
of placing the ere a ti ve function of living creatures in the haJ ds 
I 
of the gods was that God be resolved from any evil that might I 
eventuate, "~hat He might be blameless in respect of the futur~ 
wic~i:ednes s of any one of them ti. e., the living creatures J . n3 i 
Then God formed the individual souls from the "soul-mixt 1e,n 
and gave them to the "young gods,"4 in order t hat the living 
creatures might have their mortal bodies; the gods were to pro ! 
Yide the mortal bodies and to govern the mortal creatures to t ie 
best of their ability, refraining from being the cause of the ' 
evils committed by the living creatures themselves. 
LTimaeus 4;lB. 
2. mf. Timaeus 42C. 
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Having given his address, God "was abiding in His ovm prop 
er and wonted state, 11 vthile the gods followed their "Father's I 
command 11 and made the body to bind the "1 .. evolutions of the im-
mortal soul."l At first, the newly created living creatures 
were irrational in their movements, but ~hen, calmness entered 
in gradually, and their revolutions set themselves aright, so 
that intelligence ensued.2 The purpose of the newly-cPeated 
souls was to attain goodness through intelligence, for 
must affirm, the one and only existing thing which has 
erty of acquiring thought is soul. tt3 Because it was a 
11
as we I 
the prop 
soul, a I 
living creature had to manifest the characteristics of soulness 
by being intelligent and. keeping its sight on Being, rather th 
. . ~ 
on Becomdmg. One of the most important boons of this mnv crea-, 
! 
I 
tion was sight, for through vision the soul could learn the art! 
of number, i.e., mathematics and philosophy, by observing the I 
heavenly bodies. "God devised and bestowed upon us vision to 
the end that we might behold the revolutions of Reason in the 
He~ven. 114 The soul had to imitate these revolutions by being 
intelligent. 
Thus, the process of creation was the result of several 
creative factors working together under the supervision and or-
dering activity of the Demiurge. There .is an analogy between 
the creative factors of the Timaeus and those of the Philebus • 
The essential idea underlying both the Philebus and 
the Timaeus is that the physical world can come into 
,, 
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being only through the imposition o~ ~orm ar limit 
on an indeter~inate substrate, by the agency o~ an 
ac·t;i ve cause. 
The ~irst of the four classes o~ being reported in the 
I 
I 
Philebus was, according to Demos, the unlimited, "the ~actor oil 
inde~initeness, ••• boundless."2 This was the principle o~ vaJ ue-
1 
ness and chaos in nature, "sheer multiplicity and sheer quali- ~1 
tative confusion. 11 3 This factor seemed to bear a close resemb] nee 
I 
to the Receptacle of the Timaeus. However, Demos warned again~ 
J 
strictness in this analogy; ~or 11 it would be rash to assume t~rt; 
Plato repeats himsel~ ~rom dialogue to dialogue; his approach I 
is always ~resh. uL~ The unlimited seermd to resemble the ReceptJ cle 
in the aspect of space. The unlimited and the Receptacle both 
11are that upon which God wor1rs in creating a world. u5 Both had 
the character lbf inde~initeness, the Receptacle "by complete nJ -
' gation, as the absence o~ all forms, 11 and the unlimited "by cor 1-
plete · a~firmation, as the con~usion of all forms. 11 6 
The second factor of the Philebus, t he limit, was the 
ciple of order," setting "boundaries within the flux, thus bre~ -
I 
ing it up into separate events."? The limit had the function o 
systematizing and was the factor of measurability and organiza I 
tion. The limit controlled the unlimited, supplying purpose a 
direction. It included the factors of relationship and classi 
cation, being thus more general than the pattern of the Timaeu • 
I 
1. DeLacy, Art.(l939), 110-111; 4. Demos, Art. (1935), 566. I 
Philebus 23C-27D. 5. Demos, Art. ( 19 35) , 566. 
2. Demos, Art. (1935), 565. 6. Demos, Art. ( 19 3.5) ' 566. 
3. Demos, Art. (1935), 565; ?. Demos, Art.{l93.5), 566; 
01. Phi l.e.-b!.ls.-2 _ Cf • . Phi1ebus 25. 
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11 The forms are examplifications of the Limit, ••• the definite 
ways in which the Limit operates on the Unlimited."! 
The third factor was the class of the mixed, the actual 
I 
world. "It is the mixture of the Limit with the Unlimited; thel 
'information' of matter; the introduction of configuration • I ~nto. 
space, of rythm into the flux."2 
I 
The mixture corresponded to 11 
the sensible copy of the Timaeus. 
The fourth factor was the cause of the mixture, the creati e 
I 
a gent, who joined the world and sustained and ruled it.3 The 
creative agent of t h e Philebus was a soul with a mind ,4 thus 
similar to the Demiurge of the Timaeus. God was distinct from 
the other cr eative factors. However, it must be continually 
borne in mind that there was no necessary correlation between 
the creative factors mentioned in the Philebus with those of th . 
more metaphysical Timaeus, although there was probably some conl 
i 
nection in Plato's thought. The primary purpm e of m~ntioning I 
the creative i'actors in the Philebus was a means oi' developing I 
the discussion concerning the virtue of the soul. I 
"In the early dialogues the metaphysical implications of t e 
I 
God is seldom i 
11' mentioned excep t in myths or in purely ethical contexts. 115 The I 
. I ~~ Timaeus represent ed, for Plato's thought, the culmination of co -
activity of the soul are not fully worked out. 
I mological dissertations; it relegated to God his final position ~· 
in a metaphysical scheme. The relation between the creative 
11 1. Demos, Art. (193.5), 567. .3.· Cf. Philebus 26E-27B. ~~. il 2. Demos, Art. (193.5), .567; 4 Cf. Philebus 28. 
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ractors in Plato's metaphysical position presented a problem o 
1
1 the relation between God and the Receptacle. Apparently, there 
I 
!I was a dualism here in Plato's thought which would be difficult 1 
:1 to explain. 'l.'he pattern may be another aspect of this problem.! 
I 
I' 
I, 
Although the pattern (since it seemed to be composed of ideasl )', 
i 
probably existed in the mind of God, Plato's language seemingl Y: 
placed the pattern outside God's mind, 2 thus further . increasing 
I 
the difficulty of the relationship of the creative factors • 
• J According to Brightman, 
Plato's ultimate metaphysics remains unsatisfactory 
and disunified, because both the principles of rea-
son and the disorderly infinite seem to be external 
to God. Thus Plato preserves the goodness of God 
at the cost of metaphysical coherence.3 
Brightman criticized the inherent dualism in Plato's t houg t, 
suggesting tha t chherence could be gained only by placing the I 
:
1 
g iven nature of reality, i.e., the Receptacle and patter n, with~ 
in the nature of God. However, placing the Receptacle within 
God would be abominable to Plato, who sought to preserve t h e 
!I inherent goodness of God. It is true that the given nature of 
11 God would not be evil, since t he Receptacle was neither good 
!,I nor evil;4 thus, God would be completely good. But, Plato waul 
1 point out, the works of creation, in which God was the supreme 
' cause, ·manifested evil. This evil would have been t he 'vvork of 
I 
I God, since it would have resulted from nothing but what was witlli -
:1 
in God., e~v_en; :thougp. :tt ~ be cop.trary ·t ·o -· G.erd·~t s ; '"ill.: ay·. plaei'ng 'the 
:1 I 
;I 
I, 
I 
1. cr. p. 67rr . 
2. Cf. Timaeus 28, 29. 
J •• Brightman, POR, 288. 
4 cr. p. 7.5. 
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Receptacle outside of God, evil could be attributed to the char-
acteristics of the Receptacle which hindered order and good. 
Even then, Plato did not account for the problem of evil. 
Although he was certain that evil could not have any relation 
to God's nature, Plato could not account for the actual presence 
of evil. If evil was the work of some crea ted and subordinate 
gods, then God must have crea·t:;ed them capable of committing evil. 
Or if evil resulted from use of the Receptacle, then Go d caused 
evil by employing the Receptacle, so that as a result of God 's 
v'lillful action, evil resulted. However, an indication that Pla-
to could have overcomB his difficulty is found in the fact that 
God, finite in power, could create only by using the Receptacle; 
deeming creation better than no creation, God may have sacrificed 
his complete·,lgoodness by causing the production of evil. Thus, 
in his ovwn inherent being , there was nothing which could lead 
to the production of evil. However, even this conception would 
not solve the problem, for God could not be completely absolved 
from the production of evil if he willfully acted on the Re cep-
tacle. Although Plato left the problem unsolved and incapable 
II 
of being solved, he thought he was asserting the complete good-
ness of God and the lack of anything in his nature "1i7hich would 
lead to the production of evil. In asserting the duality of God 
and the .deceptacle, Plato was caught in a dilemma from which he 
did not resolve his metaphysical position. Apparently, he sac-
rificed metaphysical coherence to prexerve the complete goodness 
of God's nature. 
= 
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CHAPTER III 
THE COMPLETED CONCEPTION OF GOD 
The purpose of this final chap ter is to discuss the com-
pleted or final conception of God, formed primarily in the Timaeus 
and Laws. The value of the Laws is established by the fact that 
Plato's most advanced discussions of God's existence and nature 
are contained in the tenth bool.t of this dialogue. According to 
Tay lor, the Laws X was the basis of Plato's natural or philosoph-
·ipal theology, 
the foundation of all subsequent 'natural' theology 
the first atten~t in the literature of the world to 
demonstrate God 's existence and moral government of 
the world from the known i'acts of the visible or-
der.l 
The Laws was also the first attempt to deal with erroneous be-
liefs about Go d and to suggest means for punishing atheists 
through an inquisition. 
Since the Laws was written during the latest period of Pla-
to's philosophy, it would seem that within this dialogue could 
be found Plato's most mature thought. 
There is no work of Plato's which has been so little 
appreciated as the Laws, and yet it contains much 
of his maturest thought which we should otherwise 
know~:nollhing about, and embodies the resu~ts of a 
long and varied experience of human life. 
By criticizing three prevalent heresies on the bases that they 
wer e unreasonable and tha~ they were blasphemous to God or gods, 
Plato attempted to deve lop a demonstration of God's existence. 
1. Taylor, LP, li-.- ------ -- - 2.-~Burne""t ,-GP,-"--':302-;- --· --- """'~4·'""-'--'- -- --
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~I The first of these heresies was atheism, the denial of the 
,, 
ence of the gods. The second and third heresies assumed the 
existence of the gods but reduced them to unreasonable 
phemous positions. Although these two heresies did not 
I 
and b]a s-
1 
Pequire i 
I 
Plato to argue directly for God 1 s existence, the: .. argUm.ents-'against 
tb.~m . ~d important bearings .. on the natur e of God. 1J 
The purpose of the discourse against these ~.he~esies;: ~ dem ... .. -· 
onstPating God's existence and goodness, was to provide a reason-
'! 
able basis for the ensuing provisions for the punishment of at~e-
ists and heretics_, punishment "for all verbal or practical out i J 
rage offered to the gods by speech or act.nl The speaker in t J e 
dialogue offered an a&nonition to the legislature of the ideal ~~ 
state: 
No man who believes in gods as the law would have him 
beli eve has ever yet of his own free will done un-
hallowed deed or let slip lawless discourse; if a 
man acts thus, 1tis from one of three causes; either, 
as I say , he does not believe, or a gain he believes 
that t hey are, but are regardless of mankind, or 
lastly , that they are lightly to be wo~ over by 
the cajoling of offerings and prayers. 
In order to pre scribe punishment and have grounds for it, 
i 
I 
il it was necessary to prove t hat God existed. Bare ::·assertions ·1 
i wer.e_-not. _ su,;f'ticient • . _ :· .. : ... ·: . . ; 
I 
Your case for the existence of gods may not be 
much be.tter t han that of the other side, but per-
suade us that it is better in the one point of 
truth, and you may perhaps make converts of us. 
So if you thi~~ our challenge a fair one, you 
must try to answer it.3 
1 ~-:Laws 885B; the translation for the L~ will be that or Tay-
_ l_Q_r unless othe ..r~:w-1 se s: c.i£.i-e.ci 
2. Laws 885B. 3. Laws 885E. 
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Plato first offered a preliminary argument against the first 
heresy. In order to meet the challenge of disbelief, Plato had 
to offer sufficient grounds for believing in the existence of 
God to fulfill the main purpose of the tenth booR, which was to 
supply religion with a basis for justice in h~~an and legisla-
tive affairs. The immediate reaction to this challenge of dis-
belief was similar to the Kantian exclamation of the beauty of 
the starry heavens, as part of the reason for God's existence. 
II 
vVhy, to begin with, think::_ of the earth, and sun, and 
planets, and everything! And the wonderful and beau-
tiftli order of the seasons with its distinctions of 
years and months! Besides, there is the fact that 
all mankind, Greeks and n£n-Greeks alike, believe 
in the existence of gods. . 
In this passage, there is a two-fold argument. The first part 
is !'based on the general nature of the material physical VIOl"ld, n2 
.the awe resulting from observing the beauty, vastness, and mag-
' nificence of the visible universe. Plato's insistence on the 
beauty of the cosmos3 had been established in former dialogues.4 
In this argument, Plato exclaimed 11 the remarkable order displayed 
- il 
II 
in the motion of the heavenly bodies, 11 that "they are the effect 
of a perfect soul."5 
In other words, in order to account for the beauty and un-
usual order of the cosmos, a soul had to be posited; this soul 
was supreme and good, because beauty and order si~nified good-
ness, and the importance and vastness of the cosmos required a 
supreme soul as · cause of its motion. 
1. Laws 886A. 
2. Field, Art. (193l~), 289. 
verse. 
~-· Cf. 
3. Etymologic·a-~ly-; he word refer• -
red to the beauty of the uni-
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In the above passage, the second part or the argument ror 
God's existence is that o£ universality o£ belief in the existence 
o£ a God. Plato did not stress this argument. As a matter of 
fact, he minimized its importance by showing that the existence 
of the gods was not universally believed, for some men disbelieved 
in the gods.l Also, whether Plato realized it or not, univer-
sality of belief proves nothing and asserts nothing about what 
kind of God was universally believed in. 
These two arguments were proclaimed by Plato, through the 
mouthpiece of the Athemian, to be insufficient to prove the exist-
~nee of God, for they presupposed that if one could subdue his 
passionate emotions, he could recognize God's existence. How-
ever, Plato claimed, one did not become an atheist merely through 
his impiety as a result of sensuous pleasure. The primary cause 
of atheism vms the adverse influence of certain literai'Y works, 
prose and poetry, which reputed to be truth and wisdom. Some of 
these -,7orks claimed that the gods were born, associated with 
each other, and even fought among themselves; but these ancient 
myths were not so bad as other really dangerous ones. 2 
The really dangerous influences w·ere "the theories of our 
modern men of enlightenment,"3 or> "the novel views of our modern 
scientists. 114 Plato probably had in mind the materialists, e.g., 
followers of Democr>itus. These materialists were dangerous 
1. Laws 948c. 
2. cr:-Laws 886A-D. 
3. Laws 886D .• i 
L~. Laws 886D ( tr. Bury) • 
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becauj e while Pla t o maintained "the deity or divinity of' sun 
and mo on, planets and earth," they claimed that the se heavenly 
bodies "are but earth and stones, incapable of minding human 
conduct."1 According to t he materialists, Plat o's views were 
spiced with i maginary ideas. 
Thus, an adequate proof' i'or the ex istence of God had to seek 
an end dii'i'erent i'rom that proposed by the two i'ormer proof's, 
which v;ere aimed a t fl"'eeing the emotions so that one could 1d>ok 
about him, see the glory of God, and become a believer. The 
pu~pose of an adequate proof' was to be philosophica l and ration-
al, i'or the r eal opposition was a contrary philosophj: whi ch 
claimed to be reasonable. 
For Plato, this problem was highly significant; d6fense of 
God's existence had to be pursued, at grea t length if necessary, 
in providing the most inclusive explanations possible. 11And 
•tis of the first importance to give our plea i'or the existence 
oi' gods, and good gods with a superhuman reverence for ~ight, 
such persuasiveness as we can. 112 In a sphere other than religion, 
a rational argument for justice would be the best dei'enxe i'or 
legislation in government. Hence, a proof for the existence of' 
God had to lay aside psychological considerations, e. g ., the 
desire to persua~e people through the emotions; it had to be phil-
osophical, to 11plea for the existence of gods dispassionately. 11 3 
1. Laws 886E. 3. Laws 8878. 
2. Laws 887B. 
'I 
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For Plato, it was Unfortunate t:futt, o..f.fenders .d:Id not have faith in I 
I 
what they were taught in childhood concerning the existence of I 
the gods, but the task had to be faced; :to~ 'be .. 'ratiorial~ ..fo~ce:f!;g.l 
language had to be subdued in the argument. 1 :1 
Before presenting his proof, Plato wrote a long preface. 2•, 
I 
,, He warned that since the religious issues concerned were the 
I 
I 
;I supreme ones in all thought, maturity had to be gained before 
No one was such 
:I 
attempting to be certain in religious beliefs. 
l
ij an atheist that he continued in such disbelief in the gods until 
~ I 
1 his old a ge, although some men had believed in the gods' laclc of 
i . :1 
care for men and their dishonesty through accepting bribes. cori-
!I into their minds, and they sho.uld have sought guidance, especiailly 
11 sequently, men should have waited for clear judgment to come 
II 
1! from legislators. But while they were seelcing the truth in such 
I ~
I matters, thaj; had to "beware of all impiety towards gods. u3 It li 
11 was the business of legislators to prevent impiety and instructll 
ii men in the matter of true religion. I 
As a background to the argument, Plato described the con- 11 
tentions of materialists. An underlying presupposition, claime~ 
Plato, taught to many men and widely accepted, was that the pro~ 
ductive cause of every existing thing was nature, art, or chanc:
1
• 
This teaching supposed that creation was largely the result of 1 
il 
lj 
I 
II 
forces in nature acting by chance, art being an insignificant 
il 
' factor. According to thfus theory, 
II 
1. cr. Laws 887C-888A • 
• c r . Laws 888. 
3. Laws 888D. 
I 
I 
I 
i· 
II 
I 
,, 
art takes over the grand primary works from the 
hands of nature, already formed, and then models 
and fashions the more insignificant, and this j.s 
the very reason why we call them 'artificial'.l 
More specifically, continued Plato, this theory supposed that 
I• 
fire, water, earth and air were products of nature and chance; 1 
thus, these elements were the soul-less agents for producing 
other :::bodies, "the earth, sun, moon, and stars. u2 This causality 
was by chance, a ccording to the materialists, the fitting togeth-
er of elements by accident; art was a l lately formed product of !I 
these elements, becoming as much of a creative factor as the 
four elements. Then, it was claimed, art produced the insignif.-
.J.cant things, such as statesmanship, legislation, etc.; the rell.. 
sult of this theory was that because of their immateriality, :J 
1' things produced by art were unreal, since art was derived from 
I' 
1 material elements. 
The materialist theory had important r elevance for religion, 
I li said Plato, for such theorizers asserted that the "gods have no1 
real and natural, but only an artificial being, 11 3 since the gods 
I 
j were asserted to be t h e products of art, which was unreal. Ap- 1 
,, pal"ently, according to Plato, this theory claimed that art had .I 
I 
no existence outside the human mind which falsely believed in . :1 
., the reality of art. Thus, for this theory, belief in the gods 
1 was based on convention only. Therefore, not only did the gods l 
, not exist, but "ther e is absolutely no such thing as a · real and j 
natural right. u4 ~ The ~ d€mial".cof :""vights :~could . prepare~ t~rft:fie -·:a.sf 
p~ndancy .~.o_..f' ·: might, ::which ·:'Plaito ,cpp_0sed,5 This materialist theory 
I 
• 
2. 889B. on 
,, 
il 
I' 
II 
II 
lj 
I 
II 
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was contrary tm the basic concepts of Plato's philosophy; it op-
, posed justice, the primacy of the soul, goodness, the realm of 
ideas, and1 God~ . Plato remarked: 
ful irreligion. 111 
"Hence our epidemics of youth-
1 
best in persuasion, not f'orce, 11 to plead in support of the old 
traditional belief of the being of gods" and of their goodness 
and justice.2 For those who persisted in their unbelief and 
I 
blasphemies, Plato later in the dialogue directed certain forms ' 
of punishment.3 However, th~ masses would be persuaded throug~j 
,, 
argument, for mere statements that the gods existed would not 1 
suffice. These arguments had to show that the soul was not 11 
derived from the four elements, and that the soul was not a prod-
·.uct of nature, which was just another name for the four elemenlts.L~ 
lj 
Thus, Plato denounced the materialists 1 contentions: IJ 
In the doctrine of which the soul of the ungodly 
is the product, the primal cause of all coming to 
be and ceasing to be is pronounced to be not pri-
mal but secondary and derivative, the secondary 
primitive. Hepce their error about the ~eritable 
being of gods.;, 
In other words, the soul was not a product of matter, but ij 
matter a product of the soul; the :I gods existed before matter a~d 
produced it. This, according to Plato, was the crucial point 
in opposing the contention of the materialists. 11 Soul ••• is 
among the primal things, elder-born than all bodies and prime 
4. Cf. Laws 890E-891D; Timaeus 41 1'9 
the special creation of souls. I 1. Laws fJ90A. 2. Laws 890D. 
3. cr:-Laws 908-909. 5. Laws 891E. I 
" 
II 
jl 
.I 
il 
10 
source of all their changes and transformations •••• Soul is 
older than body. 111 Soul was previous to all material bodies, 
and soul was not asserted to be produced by any thing or sbU.l.:.' 
other tha.n'lthe· soul, ·1.God."L . 
However, there was never a time when there was only soul, 
for soul was not claimed to be the temporally first kind of 
being. Rather, "soul ••• is among the primal things."2 CorPe-
lated with the Timaeux, Plato probably meant that soul was eter-
I 
nal (in the form of God), but eternal among other kinds of reali-
ty, e.g., the Receptacle of the Timaeus,3 and the pattern of ideas 
if they were any~hing other than God's thoughts.4 But since the 
materialist theory of reality was based on sense-perception, the 
soul, for Plato, vras ~~priiott:~r in existence to all that the eye 
could see. The four elements were the products of the soul and 
the Receptacle, which was neither matter nor soul.5 Therefore, ! 
I 
since legislature and art were qualities of soul, they were 
I 
prior in existence and im.portance to the qua.li ties of bodies. 6 II 
By nature they [the materialists] mean v;hat was there 
to begin with; but if we can show that soul came 
first--that it was not fire, nor air, but soul vlfhich 
was t here to begin with--it ·will be per.ffectly true 
to say that it is the e~istence of soul which is 
most eminently natural. 1 
Having stated his belief in the primacy of soul, Plato pro-
ceeded to prove it. Proof for the existence of the gods depenJ ed 
on showing that soul was primary to the four material elements J 
For this task of proof, aid from the gods had to be sought: 
6. Of. Laws 892B. 
7. Laws 0'920. 4- p. 67ff. 
3. Of. p. 7lff. 
:I 
II 
!I 
!I 
Let us tal\:e it as understood that the gods have, 
of course, been invoked in all earnest to assist 
our proof of their own being, and plunge into the 
waters of the argument before us with t~e prayer 
as a sure guiding-rope for our support. 
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Plato was now ready to present his argument against the 
mechanistic view of creation, that everything, soul included, 
was nthe product of unintelligent motions of corporeal elements. 11 2 
Plato's argument was based on an analysis of the concept of mo-
tion, from which he would show that motion was due to soul; God 
was the supreme soul responsible for motion in the universe.3 
The argument was based on the contention that it was unreasonable 
to suppose that mind could have evolved from unconsciuus, non-
mental, or m~intelligent phenomena, following 1nechanical laws. 
furtherinore, empirical observation revealed the existence of 
purpose in evolutionary movement. Plato affirmed the view that 
the world depended on mental pU11 pose for its movement; ultimate 
purpose was contained in the one supreme, good, self~moving soul. 
According to Taylor, since the good followed one purpose, and 
since there appeared to be order toward good in the movement of 
the various souls, there had to be one soul which was supreme, 
the }~perfectly good soul. u4 
Plato first gave an analysis of motion.5 Both motion and 
rest applied to all things. Circular motion existed around a 
resting center; circular motion was at all points in a disk, 
except in the center, with proportionately varying velocities. 
Also, a thing came to be _by change and motion. Thus, the 
1. Laws 893B. 
2. Taylo~, PLA, 49-0. 
3. Cf. Laws 893ff. 
4. Cf. Ta~lor, PLA, 490. 
~ Cl'. Lavts "1393 -:- 94. 
I' II 
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importance of motion was established. Plato then suggested that 
I 
there were several kinds of motion, t wo of which vrere as f ollovis: 
There was one "which can regularly set other things in movement; 
but not itself, 111 and t;here was another "which can re gularly set! 
h 
itself going as well as other t hings. u2 The least significant . 
motions were those effected by other motions. 
The question was asked, which kind of motion was the "most1 
0 3 powerful of all, and most superlatively effective? 11 The answer 
Ji was Qbviously not that motion which was caused by another motion 
because the other motion would have been prior to the motion it' 
caused. In order t o avoid an infinite r egress of motions, t h e 
most superlative motion was the one not caused, but "which can 
.I move itself. n4 However, the motion which moved itself vras it-
' 
I
I I self still insufficient for the best of all motions. The best 
1! motion was "that which moves itself as other things--it finds 
its place i n all doing and all being-done-to, is veritably cal~~d 
transformation and motion of all that is. 115 This motionwas I 
"primary causation•"6 The best motion had to be a self-moved 
1 motion because that which was moved by some other motion could 
not be the first cause; it had to be the cause of all othe r mo-l 
I • 7 t~ons. 
!' 
Ther efore, "the source of all motions whatsoever, • • • I 
the motion which initiates itself we shall pronounce to be nee~ -I I 8 . I 
sarily the earliest and mi ghtiest of all changes." Plato's ar-
gument for t he first cause is commonly known as the 
argument. 
Bury). 
I 
I! 
II 
II 
I 
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Plato next inquired into the charadter of a thing in moticih, 
fox• motion was "alive, • • • and when 1JVe see soul in a thing, the' 
I 
case is the same, is it not? We must allow that the thing is 
I 
alive."l Thus, motion implies a soul operating on a cosmic basis. 
Plato considered this argument complete proof for the existence 
of God. He stressed logic by pointing out that the name of 
something and its definition referred to the same thing; soul 
was the name, and the definition vras "the motion which can set 
I 
I 
itself moving"; thus, soul was 11the prima:il! becoming and movement, 
., 
••• the universal cause of all change and motion, ••• the first! 
born of all things. "2 Therefore, "soul is prior to body, body :1 
I 
secondary and derivative, soul governing in the real order of' I 
things, and body being subject to governance.") Also, all 
I· characteristics of' soul, e'eg•, ·-tQo-gght'mni:~se., were prior 
the 11 
to ! 
'I 
I 
,I 
I 
I 
II 
body by virtue of their being integrally connected with soul. 
On the doctrine which Plato maintains, that soul 
is the cause or principle of motion, the ultimate 
explanation of things must be spiritual rather 
than material~ or teleological and not mechanical 
in character .L~ 
In dealing with this first heresy, denial of the existenc, 
of the gods, Plato applied his conc~usions of . the primacy ~f II 
soul to answer certain problems. FJ.rst, was pr.bn,al ·'.cmovemen'f:. .. Jdue 
to one soul or many? The answer was ·.that .i.t.bad m·~b:e "by more 11 
,, 
than one. At least we must assume not fewer than two,, one bene-
ficient, thec o:ther capable of the contrary effect. u.5 In order II o 
e~laih.' the ~ .pr;e:s:eri'c-e . of evil, Plato supposed that there was at 
1. Laws 89~C. 3. Laws 896C. Laws 896E. 
2. Laws 96AB. ~· Forsyth, r-f:\T9JZ , 
110 
least one completely good souJ.. tairlne}.- "Lto f e.JL:pl:a:Lrt good --mqtion, and 
at least one other soul to account for disorderly motio~, i.e., 
evil. The purpose of this reasoning was to discard the idea that 
I 
a self-moving soul (:Go.d). couldl "~b.e gedg(SJ:"fie.tl:t. The soul stirred 
up other motions in bodies by her ovTn motions of reason and pur-
pose, conducting all things for good and right; the opposite efL 
feet occ~d through t he lack of reason by other souls.l This 
attempted solution to the problem of evil was in harmony with 
'l the Ti maeus. 2 
Secondly, which soul had control in the world? The answer ! 
would result from observation of orderly movement in the univer~e, 
,I 
which derived its guidance from 11 the supreme good soul that tak~ s 
forethought foP the universe and guides it along that path. rr3 11 
,, 
The argument had superiol" cogency in proving the existence of God 
because of the prior proof of the primacy of soul. This argu-
- ;! ment was a more convincing assertion of the existence of God, 
,I 
1 for it connected the apex of soul with the divine being. 
Thirdly, what was the nature of "the movemen~ of wisdom, 't41 
·! i.e., God? In answer, asserted Plato, it had to be recognized I 
that only an approximate truth, inadequate as it wa::; could be 
gained. The answer to this question could not be attained by 
st~dying God himself; "rtwill be the safer course to turn oUl~ 
gaze on an image of the object of our quest. 11 .5 The nature of 
I 
I 
'I 
I 
' God could be lcnown only by approximation through studying that 'I 
II 
1. Cf. Laws B97A-D. 
2. cr. p:-8"3rr. 
,3. Laws 8970. 
4· Laws 897D. 
,5. Laws 897E. 'I 
• 
r 
I 
I 
I' 
1 which could be supposed to have resembled God most among the ob j 
li jects of human thought. That which could be supposed to have 
I resembled God most, ancording to Plato, had to be something of 
Ill ,: God's production, i.e., a motion which God, a self-mover, had 
caused. 'f.his would be the motion, among the various kinds of 
motion (ten in all), which wisdom resempled. 1 Since Plato as-
j 
sociated orderly motion with wisdom and goodness, the most order-
1! ly motion observable would have been the best motion. 
' 
I' 
,I 
tl 
I' 
il 
I 
r 
The type of motion that Plato had in mind vtas circular mo- 11 
tion, regular mmd uniform, or revolution 
serving the most orderly of all motions . 
around a globe. By ob 11 
man could possibly see ~ 
I 
one could know what kind of motion God caused. "The soul by 
which the circle of the heavens is turned about with all foresight 
il 
Sinee and order is either the supremely good, or its contrary. 11 2 
il 
ordered motion was pr.oduced by the good God, disorderly motion 11 
was caused by evil souls or gods. 
il 
The fourth problem,-~': eopne.eted \dth:the f1rst; i 's.c'- tha:t '. o.f"J e:vil. 
I 
' Mcttan.was bY a soul or mor e than one 
II 
soul 11 of absolute goodness. 11 ' 
I ,, 3 
1
1 
& w· could any evil result? 
I, 
1
·: 
I 
Thus, an apparently good soul caused evil motion when it ceased 
1 to follovT reason in causing motions. The ansvver to this proble 
,, 
was not sufficiently given by Plato. If evil was caused by 
Plato's only answer to this ques- II 
of following reason. ~~ tion was that evil .resulted from the lack 
souls other than human souls (and how could men be responsible 
'j for disorderly celestial motions?), then Plato must have posite& 
~ . r 
======'i== B. 2. Laws 8 8C. 3. Laws 898C. ~! 
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evil gods which vmre not eternal and depended on God for crea- 'I 
tion. But the problem remains: How could gods be evil if they 
were created by a completely good God, who created no evil? 
Without a doubt, Plato insisted, God was completely good.l 
"God is never in any way unrighteous--he is perfect righteous-
ness.u2 "God .•• travels according to His nature in a straight ! 
line towards the accomplishment of His end. 11 3 God was claimed , 
I 
by Plato to be the 11perfect embodiment; of ideal:S. n4 As a result, 
I 
, Plato's philosophy was theocentric. God was the measure of all 
I 
I 
,I 
II 
things and the supreme norm. "Now God ought to be to us the 
measure of a~l things. 115 Plato placed emphasis on the intrinsic 
II 
connection between good and reason. For God to be good was to II II 
f'ollo·w the laws of reason. Since God was good , he could not 
will anything but good; moral goodness was based on reasonable-!! 
ness. 6 I 
I 
The problem of evil was difficult for Plato. If God was 
perfectly good, whence came evil? It has already been noticed 
that Plato referred to the existence of souls other than God 
to account for the presence of evil, which consisted in the 
lack of using reason.7 In the Timaeus,evil was represented as 
being due to at least one soul, not God. Plato made his most j 
ardent attempt to account for <evil in the Laws. 
'I I 
1. Cf. p. 7ff, 58ff 5. Laws 716D ( tr. Jowett). II 
2. Theaetetus 176A 1tr. Jowett). 6:-rrf. Ritter, EPP, 378. 1 
3. I.aws 716A (tr. Jowett). 7. Cf. p. 92; DeLacy, Art.(l9391 • 
4. Boodin, . Art. ( 1929), 499 • ·-~ .' . ~ . · . 
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God's primaPy interest, Plato asserted, was in the whole, 
each part being subservient to the condition o~ the whole. 
He v;ho pPovides ~or the w·oi•ld has disposed all 
things with a view to the preservation and per-
fection of the whole, wherefore each several ~hing 
also, so far as may be, does and has done to it 
what is meet.l 
FoP Plato, everything was 
directed towards the whole •••• 'The purpose of all 
that happens is what we have said, to win bliss fop 
the life of the ~hole; it is not made for thee, 
but thou for it.2 
The indication is that evil existed only in the sphere of the 
parts, while the whole as a vwhole was completely good. Such 
explanation explained away the reality of evil so far as the 
whole 1:vas concerned. This explanation of evil seemed to con-
anlj 
tradict Plato's answer to the second heresy.3 In arguing against 
· the second heresy, Plato asserted that God caPed foP each indi- , 
vidual part; Plato seemed to indicate God's high evaluation of 
the individual. But in his atten~t to explain the source and 
, significance of evil, Plato denied the importance of the indi-
vidual, for the vrelfare of the individual was subservient to the 
welfare of the whole. I The whole was i mportant and chaPacterized 
by complete good; the individual part existed only for the sake 
of the whole. ~Vhat was best for the whole was important so farl 
as good was concerned.4 The ul1.l"eality of evil was affirmed; 
"' injustice was really justice on the whole. -.' Plato 1 s "m~thologyll 
leaves evil in the cosmos as a n1ysterious unaccountable fact, 
1. Lavts 903B. 
2.~_20 c. 
• Cf. 1'. 117ff • 
• Cf. Ritter, EPP 381. 
1 
for which no person (that is, no conscious will like our o\•m) 
is responsible."l 
Plato's explanation of the presence of evil seemed clearly 
to be interested in explaining evil away as mere lack of human 
insight into the whole. Since the whole existed only through 
its parts, if some of' the parts w.mm evil, then the whole was 
characterized by some evil. Thus, evil as incomplete good is 
an incomplete explanation from the logical point of' view. 
It is cogent only if we know in advance that every 
whole is necessarily good, or that this is true of 
the univePse as a whole. From incompleteness alone, 
the goodness of the complete cannot be derived. 
In fact, it is as true in some cases to say that 
good is incomp~ete evil as to say that evil is in-
complete good. . ,, 
. However, <=el:~sewhe.re:: lii;''t:he -::d_~aio~ces'-} ~ -W.9:t0C re~e~iirz:&ii::. nea:.l.f 
evil, 3 that the perfect whole was, as Brightman affirmed, con- ] 
I 
11 tradicted by "the chaos of empirical evils vre confront. 114 In 
II 
I 
contrast to his solution of the problem as depending upon the 
nature of the good whole, Plato asserted: "Evils ••• can never 
pass away; for there must always remain something which is an-
1 tagonistic to good.
115 
I 
I 
11 
II 
,, 
Thus, the indication is that Plato realized the insufi'icieh cy 
• ·I 
of explaining a\¥ay evil by the good of the whole. The only sati1 
isfactory at t empt of Plato to explain evil was by the existence! 
and nature of the Receptacle, which hindered perfect motion and • 
the complete expression of good in Cl"'ea tion.6 Having given no 
11 
Brightman, POR, 265. :I 
264. Theaetetus 176A (tr. Jowett ij . II 
II 
II 115 il 
i' adequate solu,~ion, Plato pointed out that God so contrived it Jl 
I i that he arranged for the development of virtue in the presence lj 
II !I of obstacles for man, and for the destruction of evil "through- 1. 
!; out the whi>le. nl The universe was chosen as the region f'or thi~ 
1,1 
li 
1, 
\I 
II 
battle. But, it happened that the completely good God gave · eacn 
II 
· created being free will and action so that the destruction of !I 
evil by individuals might be the outcome of their own endeavor. IJ 
"The causes of the formation of either type [i.e., good or evilll 
he left free to our individual volitions. 112 God gave the indi- '1 
' 
vidual freedom to follow his own desires. II 
I For souls to have had adverse environments was probably du~ 
~~ to the nature of' the Receptacle, which by its hindrance of' goo~ 
I. brought about tempting conditions for men (an explanation of 
I 
moral evil) ., and irregular motions in the universe causing evil 
conditions beyond man's responsibility (an explanation of cosmie 
evil~ However, if' this was Plato 1 s solution to the answer, gai !! ed 
by interpolation of the Timaeus into the Laws, then the problem! 
of the relation bf the Receptacle to God presents a difficulty. 
Plato's solution to the problem of evil in the Laws was insuf-
' ficient for complete philosophical investigation, but it was 
I 
certainly an advance over his predecessors. Also, Plato was on 
~ of the first to assert such a solution to the problem of evil, 
II 
lj 
II 
I 
I 
I 
'I j, 
I! 
II 
in the sense of maintaining the absolute goodness of God and 
attributing evil to other beings. 
1. Lavvs 904B. 
2. Laws 90lj.B. 
3. Cf. P. 96f. 
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1i Finally, Plato summed up his argument for God's existence 
I 
by pointing out the relation between the whole and its parts.l I 
:I 
If the soul moved t h e v1hole, it also moved each part of the whole. 
This princi ple was to be understood by l"'eason and thought, sinci 
human beings did not perceive souls through sense-perception. ;j 
As an eXSJ.Uple, Plato proposed the analogy of t he sun as a god- I 
soul which brough t light into the world. In this manner, God II 
of all good. 2 
I 
was the cause Thus, t hose who denied the gods I 
had either to deny that the "primary source of all things 11 was 
!I 
I soul, or be a believe r in gods.3 
Plato had completed his proof for the existence of God; I i ,, 
1 this argument . has often been called the "cosmological proof, 11 !I I . 'I 
lj bec~use it .started \Vi th the vvorld as da. tum and argued from eff ee t 
II 
'i I 
I 
I 
·I 
to cause; also, by the a posteriori method, t h e argument was fr <!>ln 
the presence of design.4 Plato's argument was one demonstratin~ 
the existence of souls, especially one "best soul, 11 to account !l 
for regular motion. Burnet asserted: 
It is in this way that Plato reaches what he 
to be a scientific proof of the existence of 
and it is only when he has done this that he 
explain the world •••• This is w:j.thout doubt 
central thing in his philosophy.~ 
believes 
God , 
can 
the 
I 
,j 
lj 
' According to 
., 
Burnet, Plato was t h e first in philosophy to main- , 
I tain t h e concept of a good, living God, so that his conception 
! I! was far sup eriOl"' to any conception of deity of any pr e ceding:; 
!i philosopher. 6 
II 
" II 
1. 
2. 
L~ . Taylor, LP, lv. 
5. Burnet, GP, 335. 
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In the argument against the second heresy, 11 we are now to 
admonish him :who confesses the being of gods but denies that 
they take any heed of the affairs of man."l Plato solved this 
problem by showing that 11 the gods are more, not less, careful 
for small things than for great. 11 2 Since reasonableness and 
valor belonged to goodness, and the gods were said to be ner-
fectly good, then negligence was not a characteristic of the 
I 
I 
il 
I' 
! 
gods, for negligence was characteristic not of goodness, but ~~·~· 
of the opposite of what the gods were.3 The negligent were to 
be condemned as bad: "It must never be sairi that God has such 
a character as this, a character God himself abhors.n4 A good 
god was one who was careful of the small things. Otherwise, 
eithe~ the small things were considered by the gods to make no 
diffel.,ence to the whole, or making a difference, the gods dis- ii 
regarded the small things and showed indolence concerning them. J: 
Plato showed that God was interested in the minor detailR II 
of human existence and that the nature of God implied his care 1 
I 
for men. If God was completely good and did not 11have a nature' 
which He Himself hates, 11 .5 then he would not neglect even the ! 
small matters of his business. Plato clinched his argwnent by I 
showing that if a mere human workman toolc care of his work, 
certainly God did so infinitely more: 
Let us not, then, deem God inferior to human work-
men, who, in proportion to their skill, finish and 
perfect their wor1cs, small as well as great, by 
4. Laws 901A. 
5. Laws 901B (tr. Jowett). 
then 
!I 
II 
r :I 
jl 
i! 
,, 
I 
! 
.'I 
one and the same art; or that God, the wisest of 
beings, who is both willing and able to ta1ce care, 
is lilce a lazy good-for-nothing, or a cov.rard, who 
turns his back upon labour and gives no thought 
to sm!ller and easier matters, but to the greater 
only. 
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Plato often pointed out the tender care of the gods for men. 
d 
They were spoken of as shepherds of men, guiding by persuasion.2 
God and the gods allied with man in the overcoming of evil and 
the accomplishment of good: 
For since, as we have agreed among ourselves, the 
world is full of good things, but no less full of 
their contraries, and those that are amiss are the 
more numerous, the fight we have in mind .is, we 
maintain, undying and calls for a wondrous watch-
fulness; god s and spirits are our allies in the 
warfal,..e and we, moreover, the property of these 
gods and spirits.3 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Here there was almost a sense of personal love of God and the 1 
I 
gods for men, but since Plato was arguing logically, that a goo'a 
l 
Plato's God loved men personally. The problem of the relation 
between God 's goodness and his love will be discussed later.4 
Plato answered the first alternative in the problem, that 
small things were considered by the gods to m~ke no difference 
'I to the whole, by supposing that it be granted that the gods were 
the gods had power over the wholl , concerned about the whole. If 
I 
Plato pointed out, surely that power would have extended to the ;! 
parts, since it was much harder to have power over the whole ;J 
l
lji than over some parts of the whole. Plato assumed that to be ·,I 
concerned about the whole involved concern for the parts that 
1. Laws 
2 • 
I 
II 
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made up the whole. Therefore, if the gods were concer ned about
1 
the parts and had power over them, then they would have been as 
mindful oi' each part, as whey were of the whole as a 'V'thole. In I 
other words, God took heed of each and every affair of men, as 
well as of every thing that happened.l 
I The second alternative, that small things made a difference 
but were disregarded by the gods, was easily ansVIered by the 
basic assumption of the goodness of God. If the gods were con-
' 
cerned about the parts but decided to neglect them, then the gods 
would have been committing an evil act; but this was impossible 
because the gods were perfectly good. There was no possibility· 
of indolence in the character of the gods, for "no god ••• can 
be negligent from sloth or indolence, for none, we may presume, 
has any lac.!<: of courage .n or knowledge of details. 2 
As a correlate to answers to these problems, Plato asserted 
1 the complete knowledge and power of the gods, so tha t they would 
have had both knowledge of all details and power to deal with 
1 them. 3 Since man was a part of the whole, and a very important 11 
part because he vms 11 the most god-fearing of all living creatur~s, 114 
the completely good gods cared for him. }!All living creature s 
' 
.•• are chattels of the gods.".51 Therefore, whether man be con- 1 
1 sidered small or great in the world, the gods were committed to :l 
providence, not neglecting men. Fux·thermoPe, it was actually 
easier to tend t o the small affairs than the great, asserted 
Plato; the parts wer e necessary to the whole, so the welfare 
02B. 
I 
II 
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of the whole depended, to some extent at least, on the we lfare 
of the parts.l "We. must never suppose that God, who is at once 
supremely wise and both willing and able to provide, make s no 
provision for the small matters. 11 2 
Plato then considered the third heresy. "That gods can be' 
perverted by the receipt of gifts from the wicked, that again 
is what none must admit and we must dispute to the best of our 
power. 11 3 This her esy was "the doctrine that an impenitent of-
.fender can escape God's judgment by gifts and o.fferings."4 That 
God could be bribed was directly to denounce his goodness because 
it claimed that he cared not about man 1 s attitude but about his1 
not have accepted bribes, for such an action would be cl1aracter-
is tic of an eviLi .. nature. 
Plat.o showed that Go d and the gods were interested in help1-
ing man in the battle against evil. " "Now are not the gods, one1 
and all, our chie.fest guardians, and the interests they guard 
our chief interests? 115 Since the gods' purpose was to help man 
attain goodness, they would not be perverted by bribes, for su9~ 
conduct would not be aiming at the welfare and goodness o.f man.
11 
i1 Also, taking bribes would be a poor exa.rnple for men to follo\v; :1 
I; 
~ I .furthermore, such action would not be to man's advantage in the long run because it would not be aimed at the good of man. 
--cr. Laws 90.5D. 5. Laws 907A. 
Ta lor, PLA., 490. 
I 
II 
Finally, because the gods were completely good, they would never 
accept bribes, for such action vms evil. Thus, Plato asserted 
"that there are gods, that they are mindful of us, that tlley 
are never to be seduced from the path of right. 111 
Plato recognized that the reason back of these heresies 
was the experience of evil in the world, "the fortunes of evil 
and unrighteous men in private as well as -public life."2 In 
observing the obvious impiety of men, whose souls were said to 
have been created by God, certain individuals supposed that if 
God were good, then he did not care about men, for if God were 
good, then he would so care for men that they would all manifest 
t! goodness. But Plato opposed this reasoning by accounting for 
I 
the problem of evil by other means.3 
I 
I These arguments revealed ·\P'~a:t.ut-s ±ns:irs.tene:e ~on>.the ·gbo"d ... :. 
!r 
than to believe in a careless one; a careless &od would be moral -
ly harmful. A God who would have crea ted human beings and then 
not have cared what happened to them or whether or not they were 
·I 
'1 good, would not be a good God. A good God was no ·absentee land 1 
lord, but a God who continually desired to manifest his goodness 
I 
and to help crea ted beings to achieve goodness. The third heresy 
was "the worst of all,"~: <' To have .. said·,_that. God could be bl"ibed I 
would be directly to have denounced his goodness. 
3. cr. p. 113rr. 
4. Taylor, PLA, 490. 
l. Laws 907B. 
2. Laws 899C (tr. Jowett). 
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il 
Having shown that God created because of his goodness (in ii 
the Timaeus) and that he cared for men, a basic problem is the 11 
relation between God's goodness and his love. 
I 
Did God manifest ll 
I' 
i goodness to man and help man achieve good merely because he was ll 
II committed to the good, or because he loved man? Was part of thif 
" I :1 final end of God his interest in the development of persons as i 
1 ~ well as hi$ ~;p~9se ·,dn follovdng the standard of the good? It ! .. 1· 
I' might be said that Plato's God had love, but that his love was 
I 
I 
I 
only for his own goodness. Not only is this 
t~ Plato's thought, but true love could not 
I 
conception foreign~~ 
be restricted to 'I 
II I !I oneself; love is for someone. The question of God~ s love :~. con- ; 
!1 cerned his attitude of care toward his creatftras. The care that 
God had for created beings, presented in the Laws, 1 indicates 
some form of love. The problem is to designate the nature of 
II 
that love. 
:I 
The Timaeus affirmed God's providence and · :shbw:e·dc '- that 
'I the reason why God created the world was that his goodness shou~d 
be manii'ested in bringing order Out.<£ chaos. 2 Taylor asserted II 
that the Timaeus posited the concept of love expressed in Chris , 
1l tian thought.3 According to Taylor, love was expressed in as- : 
I serting 11 that he [God] is good, and therefo r e will not keep hisl 
II I 
, goodness as a solitary possession for h i mself, but will conwuni: 
li 
l
!l ca te it to something else. uL~ Taylor de scribed that as overflowf 
ing love: 11 It is of the very nature of goodness and love to !I 
11· r:! '1! 
I 
'overflow'. 11 / In opposition to this interpretation of Plato, 
, I ~ I 190. I 
Ill 
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Cornford asserted that Plato 1 s Timaeus said nothing at all abou~ 
God 1 s overflowing love; God was simply analogous to a craftsman 
who wanted his work to be as good as possible. According to 
Cornford, there would be no overflowing love of the divine crafts-
I 
man for his work; the gods were masters and the men l"lere slaves,.l 
11Neither in the Timaeus nor anywhere else is it suggested that 
the Demiurge should be an object of Virorship: he is not a reli-
gious figure. 112 For Cornford, the God of Plato was not the ' God 1 
of the Bible; there was n o warrant for the notion of 
love of any kind , prompting a god to malre a world. 
It is not fair either to Plato or to the New Testa-
ment to ascribe the most characteristic revelations 
3 of the Founder of Christianity to a pagan polytheist. 
Others have sided with Cornford against Taylor in this ttmp_or--
tant · .. discussion: "The Demiurge is not a religious figure, nor 
I 
is it suggested that he be made an object of worship •••• He is, 
a mere symbol. n4 
This argument seems to be useless to a certain extent. It1 
I 
may be that the God of Plato as expounded in the Timaeus was not 
presented as an object of worship, but the Timaeus was primar•il~ 
a cosmological and biological essay, not a sermon. All that 
I 
Plato said in the Timaeus about this subject was that God desired 
to make other things good like himself. Plato did not say 
God loved these other things, or that all crea tures should 
I 
that' 
I 
wor-1 
ship him. It did not seem to be part of the spirit of' the Ti- 1 
maeus for such considerations to be explicated. The scientist ' 
3· Cornford, PC, 35. 
4. Allan, Rev.(l938), 74. 1 
1. Cf. Cornford, Art.(l938), 32lff'. 
2. Cornford PC 
12 I 
Tirnaeus purposed to describe in as scientific fashion as possible 
the origin of the universe. As a scientist, Timaeus did not 
seek to describe the natur e of God for religious purposes. 
I• Even if the Timaeus is taken by itself to represent Pla to's 
conception of the natur e of God, imp.or:tant~' :f'aa:\bo(I[>S may be noted ' 
I 
that indicated the love of God,even though this love may not 
have been nearly so greatly emphasized or have as great a quality 
as the Christian conception. Plato said that God wanted to man~-
·' fest his goodness because he himself was good, that he recogniz~d 
the ·supreme value of goodness, and that he desired that other 
souls, lac1c ing in goodness, should also partak e in good. In 
desiring that other souls should have what he thought was most :1 
valuable, God was manifesting love to some degree at least, for .! 
,, God respected the significance of other souls and considered th~ se 
II 
other souls to be of sufficient value that they should have had 
I 
1 value shown to them by one who knew what was most valuable. 
I' i! 
I' II 
The 
I 
I 
desire "that all thing s should be as lltke himself as they could , 
be 111 seemed to indicate love to some degree. 
!I 
At least God was 
I 
not r e stricting lus feelings to himself; there was some feel i ng , 
I towal"d something otheP than himself. 
I 
God 
Perhaps deficiencies in Plato's statements 
l in 1 
I' 
jl 
Ill to t he 'rimaeus. 
It seems unreasonable to restrict Plato 1 s com eption of 
connection with religion could be made up through t he other dia-
il 
I logues, especially the Laws. The care of God for his creatures 'i 
indicated some form of love. 2 However, Plato's God hardly 
2. Cf. Laws 02. 
I' 
,, 
I 
I 
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reached the standards o~ love possessed by the Christian God. 
The "generosity o~ the Craftsman ••. [.ralls] ~ar short of the 
Christian conception of the love of God overflowing in creation."l 
: 
It seems obvious that Plato's view of the love of God really '- wa-s 
not i dentical with the Christian concept o~ a God who would love 
even the uru ... ighteous. FurthePmore, there vtas not as much empha-
sis on the person-to-person aspect o~ God's relation to man in 
Plato's concept that existed in the dhristian . For Plato, God 
ovmed men, who were his slaves. 2 
Ji.t t he p-1ae~r:~ w1fefte Gopnford corrected Taylor's insistence 
that Plato's concept acquired a pre-Cbristian position o~ Chris ~ 
tia.n love, Cornford was probably correct. However, it was prob'~ 
I 
ably:n,vrong to eradicate the concept o~ love in Plato 1 s thought 
of God; the analogy of the cra~tsman to his woi·k, although used 
by Plato, was not to be extended too far. Plato's concept of the 
soul striving to attain good, and his conception of the gelp of 
God in this process,3 seemed to indicate some type of love in 
li the relationship between Go d and man. To be good and help others 
'I I 
,I 
The creation and be good . was to express love to some extent. 
;I 
providence of God was specifically correlated with God's good-
I ness. There was at least a germ o~ the idea of' divine love in \I 
:I 
Plato's thought. 
All the discussion concerning the existence of' a good God 
1 had been a prelude to the "laws against impiety."4 The laws 
1. Armstrong, IAP, 48. 
2. Cf. Laws 902B. 
) •• Cf. P• 118. 4 Laws 907D. 
I 
II 
126 
against impiety toward the gods provided for the punishraent of 
heretics, i.e., those who committed themselves to one or more 
of the above three heresies. Simple disbelief in the existence 
of gods did not incur heavy punishment because these hhretics 
may have shunned evil and sought good. But those disbelievers 
who were incontinent and did harm were the atheists that were 
heavily puhished. Finally, those people connected with the last 
two heresies, asserted Plato, needed more punishment than one 
death could provide.l 
The problem of the nature of God raises an important ques-
tion of whether God is infinite or finite. The term "infinite" 
comes from the Latin 11 infinitus, 11 which means ''not bounded. tt2 
With reference to God, the term means that God is without any 
limitation. However, a God who freely creates other beings may 
be limited by some other power or by involuntary lack of con-
trol, unless he is self-limited. Thus, in opposition to the 
notion of an infinite God, a finite God is 11a God vi1.ose power 
is limited by realities which he did not create. 11 3 These un-
produced realities may be either within or outside of the nature 
of God. 
The definition of infinite as meaning unbounded needs quali-
fication. Obviously, a God \WlO creates other beings is bounded 
by them in the sense that more than one being exists and that 
3· Brightman, Art.(l945) 1 , 279. 1. Cf. Laws 907D-910D. 
- 2 2. Hartshorne, Art.(l945) , 370. 
- ==-----=--==="--= .:#---
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God must be in relations with other beings. Infinit}r usually 
means that God was the only existiU,g reality before he created 1 
' other realities, :·.i.e., that God is the only eternal reality, and 
' that he is unlimited in goodness, power, knowledge, and any other 
conceivable attribute. In the act of creation, God would have 
,: limited himself in the sense that he was not the only existent 
'I being . However, if Plato believed in an infinite God, he did 
not believe in the · kind of infiniteness which would rule out 
relations, for such infiniteness vwuld conceive everything as 
God and be pantheistic. 
For Plato, God was infinite in at least one respect, his 
goodness. God was the absolute measure of goodness because he 
was completely good. The problem of whether or not God was • I ~n- • 
fini·l;e would depend on the metaphysical status and the power of 
·: God. Vvas God the only eter•nal reality? Was God all-powerful and 
OranipOtOflQC) • ur~~l<gjca_J..) :eJ.gli:em.ftl in nature served II the good Of I 
the whole, though ww may never be able to see how. 11 3 Thus, 
1. 3. Ta-vlor, Art. ( 19 38), 19 3'! 
2. 
IJ II 
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omnipotence for Plato, claimed Taylor, did not mean that God 
could do anything and everything, but that there was no outside ! 
condition limiting God. 
I 
In his defense of omnipotence in the nature of Plato's God, 
Taylor vTas unconvincing. He attempted to absollze Plato • s diffi~ 
I 
culties with the problem of evil by claiming that Plato's solu-
tion rested on the mmnipotence of God and the lack of complete 
knowledge by human beings. There seemed to be no evidence that . 
Plato's intention was as Taylor claimed. Furt;hermore, Taylor 
tacitly admitted the finiteness of the power of Plato's God in 
affirming that there vva.s no power outside of God limiting him, 
but that there were some things which God could not do. Thus, 
Taylor seemed to i mply that there were limitations v1ithin the 
ll nature of God. 
There were indications in the dialogues of the great power / 
I 
1 of God. These statements 'I:Vel"'e primarily of a. religious nature, 
as an affirmation of the supremacy of God, rather than a philo~-
I' 
I 
I ~phical analysis of the nature of God. I· 
The overwhelming powe~ 
I ;i of God was expressed in the Republic: 
:1 
It 
,I 
'I 
ll 
This is he who is able to make not only vessels 
of every kind, but plants and animals, himself 
and all other things--the earth and heaven, and. 
the things which are i~hea.ven or under the earth; 
he makes the gods also. 
'I 
I 
I 
1: 
I 
This passage did not claim God \Vas omnipotent; it merely avowed,1 
the uupreme power of God, which was far more than anyone else 
could have. 
1. Re ublic 596C (tr. Jowett). 
" 
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I 
Some passages in the Laws came as near as any to expressing 
the great power and knowledge of God. Plato claimed it could bF 
~ssumed that the gods "can do all that is possible to be done hy 
mortal or immortal. nl However, there vtas no indication of omnip-
II I 
:1otence here, for God could have been limited by possibility and 
what any mortal or i~nortal could be eJ~ected to be able to do. 1 j! 
I' I 
1 Plato also ass~~ed that the gods knew everything that happened. ! 
11 That the gods perceive, and hear everything, that nothing vtithl 
in the compass of sense or knowledge can fall outside their cog~ 
nizance, 112 v1as affirmed by Plato. However, Plato did not mean I 
that the gods wer e omniscient, knowing all the past, present, 
and future. The knowledge of God or the gods could have been 
limited to present and past events; there was here no indication 
,1 of complete knowledge of the future. 
In the Republic, Plato assel"'ted that the gods did not chan.ke 
because "the state of divine nature must be perfect in every 
way,"3 so that the gods were not changed by any external cause. 
Plato argued that if the gods changad, it would have been for 
11 the worst, for the gods were perfect and could not gain in per-
i' 
.faction, but w·ould only become imperfect if they changed. "Then !I 
a god cannot desire to change himsel.f. Being as per.fect · as he II 
can be, every god, it see1ns, remains simp}y- and .for ever in hiS J 
own .form. 114 This seemed to - indicate that the gods were as per-~ J 
.feet as possible. Howevel'", it vmuld be rash to extend Plato's ! 
meaning to omnipotence and omniscience.. Even . .if. the·_, phrase, 
81A (tr. C~ord ~ . 
I 
I 
I 
,, 
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II 
II 
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13A 
I 
limi~~ 
have 'I 
"as perfect as he can be" is talcen in itself, it seems to 
the God or gods by possibility~ since he (or they) could 
been only as perfect as possible. But in context, Plato v1as 'I 
I, 
arguing against the notion held by raany poets that the gods I 
changed their appearances and went about in various forms on il 
I 
earth. Plato's argument was meant to eradicate the notion be- 11 
cause it contradicted the goodness of God and the gods. He II 
pointed out that the divine na·t;ure did not need anything that 
1 I 
might be gained by transforming the physical form, for the di- il 
II 
vine nature was as perfect as could have been in this respect. 
I The problem of evil resulted in the more reasonable con-
caption of a finite God. 11Plato limits the power of God in 
order to preserve his goodness."l Even if the whole was good, 
II 
il 
I 
which explained away the existence of evil, God was certainly 
1
1 
not omnipotent so far as some of the parts were concerned. Pl~-
to's explanation of evil did not account for the existence of 
evil in the creation of a completely good God. 
Cornford replied to Taylor's assertion of the omnipotence 
of Plato's God by reminding Taylor of the eternal reaaity out- I 
side the nature of God, i.e., the pattern and the Receptacle. 2
1 
According to Cornford, these conditions outside God limited Go !. 
I The result was that God could do only the best possible under 
1 the given circumstances. The God of the Timaeus was not the 1 
I' I 
'I 
1. Demos, PP, 120. 
2. Cf. Cornford, Art.(l938), 326; Co~nford believed that the pdt-
tern was outside God. Although the pattern \'ITas probably in the 
~a!ure of God (C~ p. 70), Cornfold's belief does not alter the ;j 
I 
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only eternal ontological reality; God did not create the pattern 
or the Receptacle. 
The nature aftd position of the Demiurge cannot be 
finally determined without considering that central 
ntterance of the whole dialogue which declares that 
the universe is produced by a combination of Reason 
and Necessity • .!. 
Cornford asserted that necessity and chaos in the visible world: 
,, 
confronted God, with the result t hat there vras no omnipotent 
creator, since reason had to persuage necessity. ~thermore, , 
!~the omnipotent Creat6r and·:l the modern notion of natural law II 
I~ were equally foreign to the minds of ancient Greece. n2 I For thdi 
'( 
'I 
!I 
,, 
I 
I 
Greeks, the finite was a more perfect notion than the infinite. 
Cornford denounced the "desire to bring Plato in conformity wit!h 
I 
Christian doctrine or with some modern form of idealism."3 
In interpreting how reason persuaded necessity, asserted 
d 
Corni'ord, some have read into Plato the Judaeo-Christia.n omni~~ 
i ·'otent creator, as responsible for everything, even the defects,. 
I 
According to Cornford, necessity was a real factor confronting 
1
j 
God in creation. Taylor eXplained t h e reality of necessity a- :I 
way by saying that it was a part of the myth and was siL"'lply an '1 
I 
apparent notion, believed because of the lack of knowledge of 
the whole. Taylor asserted that necessity (or the Receptacle) ;J 
was merely lawful order and brute fact.4 Cornford replied: 1 
II 
'I 
!~But it is impossible to dispose of Necessity as a mere resi€1.- 1 
I 
~um of hitherto uneA~lained fact, which con~lete knowledge 
1. Corni'ord, PC, 35. 
2. Cornford, PC, )6 • 
4. Cf. Taylor, CPT, 300ff; 
Art.(l938), 185ff. 
.I 
I 
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I 
(if man could ever attain it) would reduce to nothing. nl l1lL. 1 
.J..UUS, 
II 
Cornford accused Taylor of explaining away necessity to make the 
I 
creator ontnipotent, and of asserting that necessity would be kri6wn 
as non-existent if more knov,rledge were present. Ho\vever, Corn- ' 
ford insisted, necessity was far from being natural law; it was 
the reverse; 
the indeterminate, the inconstant, tha anomalous, 
that which can be neither understood nor predicted. 
It is Force, 'Movement, or Change, vlith the nega-
tive attribute of not being regular, or intelli-
gible, or ~etermined by any knowable accident or 
condition. 
Cornford was obviously correct in his contention that the 
depicted a finite creator. 
I Timaeus 
II 
I 
The Demiurge was not the sole cause of Becoming; there was' 
at least one other cause against which God contended, the Recep-
tacle. Cornford opposed Taylor 1 s view· that the Receptacle was 
1
1 
I II 
'I simply ribrnte fact, n the result of a limited vision into the ' 
!I I 
1' vvhole, so that the cosmos was completely subordinated by reasoril. 
II 
II 
il 
,I 
!I 
11 
II 
·I 
I 
I 
1~ere was a factor not completely controlled by aivine reason. , 
"Irrational and merely necessary motions and changes, with caus'k.l 
and undesigned results, actually occur in Nature at all times. I 
••• :It is only •for the most part 1 that Reason can persuade Nec1~ s­
sity. n3 The Demiurge was not omnipotent because 11 in arranging \1 
the world he could not group physical qualities in such a way II 
:1 
as to secure all the ends he desired. 114 In creation, asserted ij 
Joad, there had to be some medium out of which God created; al Jo, I 
I 
I 
there had to be something other than dod to account for plurali~y 
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and evil,: "Must there not be something other than and addition-
al to God, some brute fact, intractable element in things, which 
thwarts His intentions, and impedes the realization of His will?"l 
The causal action resulting from self-moving soul was in-
telligent~ :causality resulting from 'IIVhat happened of necessity' 
·· was random movement without order. For Plato, necessity seemed 
II 
I 
,, 
I' 
J! 
I 
:I 
II 
'i 
,I 
II 
to be pictured as something against which God fought. I For example, 
in the Laws, the statement was made: 11Even God is said not to 
be able to fight against necessity."2 Plato was merely acknowlt-
edging this claim by some people, 3 but t;he passage indicated that 
for Plato, God did fight against necessity. 
Whether or not Plato intended that God should be conceived 
:j 
'I as finite in these respects ,. is un.l{nown, but it seems evident 
that his writings did depict God as limited by conditions. A .I 
defender of the Christian position of o1nnipotence against Plato's 
conception of God wrote that one cauld :not 
identify the activity of the Christian God with 
that of Plato's Demiurge. Such an identification 
would have been, to go no further, inconsistent 
Vlith the ascription of omnipotence to God, since 
a Demiurge is necessarily limited by his dependenpe 
both upon a given matter and upon a proposed end.~ 
I 
I 
I 
,, 
Perhaps the Christian God was not really omnipotent in the way ,, 
Foster thought, but whatever be the status of the ~hristian GoJ, 
Plato's God evidently was not onmipotent in the usual sense of l 
the word,; 
1. Joad, Art.(l933), 143. 
2. Laws 74lA (tr. Jowett). 
). Cf. Laws 818A, 345D. 
4. Foster, Art.(l935), 466. 
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Brightman de~ended the thesis that Plato's God was ~inite. 
Infinity as such, in Plato's ·thought, 11is not admirable or sub-
lime. It is not even good unless there are limits to it. 11 l 
Brightman pointed out the dualism in Plato's thought; God was' 
the cause of only good things, and God's creation was limited 
by the possible. 11 His will ••• did not create the conditions 
under which it worked, 11 for it was limited 11by rational prin-
ciples of order .and control" and chaotic motion. 2 
Was Plato's God personal or impersonal? This problem 
depends to a great extent on whether God was meant to be a 
literal figure or was a mere part of nyth. It has been pointed 
out previously that Plato 1 s God probably.;·vms not mythical, but 
was a real soul.3 Thus, there is a two-fold problem, one of 
which concerns the supposed mythical nature of God, and the 
other which concerns his personality if he was a real soul. 
The de:flinitlon o~ personality requires that one have cons~io.us-
ness and individuality~4 intelligence and purposiveness. I 
The fact of the personality of · God has been claimed by 
many interpreters of' Plato. 11 The Phaedrus and -IDimaeus ••• . 
plainly represent God as personal. 115 11 The 'efficient cause' 
of the world is thought of definitely as a 'personal' God. n6 1 
The reason for these contentions was based on the description 
of God as a soul. 
~Co~n.Po~~: ~ denied that God was a literal figure in Plato's 
thought, b:;:di:'l"g merely a part of the myth in the Timaeus, i.e., 
1. Brightman , POR, 287. 
2. Brightman, POR, 288. 
3. cr. p. 61r. 
- --= ~ ---==- -
4. Ci'. Hartshorne, Art.(l945) 1 , 
5. Brightman, Art.(l945)2, 593. 
·_'Q. Taylor, PLA, 41+1. 
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that the creator-God was mythical, the literal meaning being 
some crea tive rorce behind the universe. Cornford asserted I ' 
. ---
---
that Plato's God was intelligent punpose and reason only; there 
was no figure o.f_· personality meant. "Both the Demiurge and 
chaos are syniliols: neither is to be taken quite literally, 
both stand f'or real elements in the world as it exists."l 
I 
yet 
I 
For 
Cornford, Plato 1 s God was the symbol or some teleological fac-' 
l' tor in the universe; God v1as a "mythical symbol 11 standing for 
something "seriously meant": 
He is mythical in that he is not really a creator 
god, distinct from the universe he is represented 
as making. He is never spoken of as a possible 
object or worship; and in the th!rd part of the 
dialogue [the TimaeusJ the distinction between the 
Demiurge and tfie celestial gods, whom he mal{es and 
charges wi th2 the continuation of his vvorlc:, is obliterated. 
!According to Cornford, there was no essential distinction bet~een 
11 God 11 and "the gods" of the Tim~: 
ing 
The distinction between the created gods and the 
fiemiurge is not maintained. Throughout this last 
part or the dialogue, the work is done sometimes · 
by "the goas, 11 sometimes by "the god 11 ; at one 
place (71A) plural and singular are used in the 
same sentence.3 
1'. 
!I 
,, 
For Cornford, all the gods st(:wd · for ~, ~~a divine Reason work-
' 
.for ends that are good. 114 Thus, Corn.ford denied both tha~ 
: the Demiurge was distinct .from the gods and that the Demiurge 
' was .~, anything more than a principle in the univex•se, "being 
I 
absolutely devoid of quality and possessing no proper reality.1n5' 
l: 
lr II 
----- -~ -· 
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However, it has already been shovm that Plato's God was probably 
.not mythica~ as Cornford supposed .in interpreting the Timaeus.l 
If Plato's God was a person, then he had to be conscious 
and distinct from other beings. If God was not a person, then 
he could be either moving non-mental substance, or a mere prin-
' 
ciple. That God was a non-mental substance was contrary to the 
thought of Plato; he argued against such notions as the materi-
::_alists had. 2 On the other hand, God might have been a prin- , 
ciple, exemplifying the aspect of: purpose in nature. Again~·t 
~ assertmn that the God discussed in the Timaeus was merely 
I 
a principle1 wwever, Plato presupposed God's existence,3 and 
argued for an active soul functioning as God~4 
The emphasis that Plato placed on the soul seems to pre-
,' clude the possibility of the God in the Timaeus being merely 
a principle. For Plato, God had to be conceived as a soul, 
' 
active, intelligent, purposive, and caring for man. Such at- I 
tributes could not have been possessed by a mere principle or 
1
1 
non-mental substance. God was ~mo abstDact metaphysical prin-
1 
, ciple. n5 The attributes of will and goodness implied mentality; 
there had to be a consdbus person willing. 
Even if God v1as admitted to be a soul, it might be said 
' that he was not an individual soul, but the combination of ma.I?-Y 
souls, called gods by Plato, It has already been shovvn that 
Plato probably meant for the one God to be distinct from the 
II 
-=---· l._c~. _P. __ 6_l f __ __). _ Cf. ~ ._ ~"'6j'_f_._ _ _ ~. _ Shorey, \vP s, .349. 
2. c I • p • 1 o 1r f • 4:. c r . p • o 2r, ro • 
II 
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many created gods. 1 However, one might assert that God was 
~---.==.. 
identical with the Uorld-Soul. Plato described the universe 
as 11being itself a Living Creature embracing the viSible crea..: 
tures, a perceptible God made in t h e image of the Intelligible, 
most great and good and fair and perfect in its generation. 11 2 
However, even though the World-Soul was called a god , Plato 
asserted that it was created or generated; in other words, the 
World-Soul was not eternal as was God. God was not the Worldj 
Soul, but the creator of the World-Soul. 
Plato's indications of the affinity between God and the 
·~vorld-Soul probabltf l .. eferred to the fact that God made the 
World-Soul as good as he could, i.e., as much lil-ce himself as 
he could. Some interpreters of Plato, e.g., Ritter, confused 
God with the World-Soul. Perhaps this confusion was largely 
the result of failing to recognize the difference between God 
and the World-Soul, which was made in the image of God. 
God is scarcely distinguishable from the world soul • 
••• The world soul appears to be nothing more than 
the all-inclusive concept ~or these powers [i.e.~ 
active powers constitutive of the structure of the 
Demiurge] whose activity is exhausted in unconscious, 
teleological activity, and nothing seems to remain 
for p~rsonality. But clear agreement is lacking 
here. 
' For Ritter, the World-Soul was an appearance of God's 
i 
II i mmanence; 
I 
it was a manifestation of God or the whole of God: 
He placed a soul in the world. The ·more we con-
sider this world soul, whose thought processes 
regulate the details of the creations, the less 
II 
I 
:I 
--... 1--;- c.r.~ . 88-r ~--==---=-=--=- -=· ~:bt"te:e 1LF- ==-rt=L=-== 
2. Timaeus 92C (tr. Cornford). 
I 
II II 
• 
==-==-:o;:; --- -
we can differentiate it f~om the soul of the 
creative god or from God himself. We may with 
certainty say that this soul is immanent.l 
If' God was nothing but t he ·~vorld-Soul, then God vtas not 
really the creator of the universe. Also, since the World-
' Soul was not eternal, and God was eterna1, 2 then God existed 
I' before the World-Soul; so, there was at least something to God 
other -than the World-Soul. The transcendence of God over the 1 
universe was illustrated in the analogy of the craftsman. God, 
as 4esiring everything to be like himself and creating some-
thing other than himself, was transcendent.3 
Furthei•more, it seemed that the World-Soul was no part o~ 
1
or the i rnmanent manif'estation of God. The divine craftsman 
·I 4 
lj was not in or a part of' the cosmos. Since the World-Soul 
!! possessed i mperfect motions,5 and was made from the material 
•of the Receptacle,6 it could be no part of God, who was com-
' 
lpletely good.7 Thus, for Plato, God was a conscious, persona~ 
·· soul, the intelligent, good-willing ar~ificer of the 
and pilot of human goodness. 
, 1. Ritter, EPP, 371. 5. Cf. p. 80. 
2. cr. p. 77ff. 6. cr. p. 77. 
universe :I 
I 
I 
I 
- -- · ~: ~~:-;~~~~~~E~~-: r~~'ec=. o...======--7. Cf'_ --p_.. 1£,-~-l-2-2£'1':.===-1 -=--=---
11 
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CONCLUSIONS 
1. According to the later dialogues, God existed by virtue 
of the necessity for a first cause of motion and Becoming, and 
the need for a perfect exemplification of goodness. 
2. In the Timaeus and Laws, God was one in the sense of 
being the only eternal, uncreated soul, maintaining supremacy 
and power over all other beings. Gods were souls created by and 
entirely subservient in existence and power to the one God. 
3. Throughout all the dialogues, God and the gods were ab-
1 
solutely good (exc ept, possibly, for some evil gods) and caring 
for men, led to their achievement of goodness. 
4. God was distinct from any idea or ideas as a ~n~ole; the 
attributes of God were represented by ideas, which were general 
notions entertained by conscious minds. Although the Good in 
the Republic appeared to have divine qualities, the God of the 
Timaeus and the Laws was distinct from the Good. 
5. According to the Timaeus, God, as the good Demiurge, was 
responsible for forming the cosmos by bringing order rout .of dis-
order characterized by the Rec~ptacle, according to the ideal 
pattern within his mind. The product was the World-Soul, from 
which God created gods and human beings. The relation of the 
creative factors suggests an inherent dualism in Plato's t hought, 
resulting in metaphysical incoherence. 
139 
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6. The limitations imposed on God by the Receptacle, an 
unproduced, eternal reality, probably precuudes the possibility 
or an infinite God in Plato's theology. God was limited at least 
by the Receptacle, and possibly by the pattern of ideal values 
and logical laws. 
7. God was personal by virtue or his being a conscious, 
intelligent, purposive, individual soul. 
---= 
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PLATO'S CONCEPTION OF GOD 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the develop- , 
I 
I 
ment of Plato's conception of God throughout his dialogues and 
II 
to determine the predominant conception of God and its relatiom 
to other factors of Plato 1 s metaphysics. 'I 
In order to purify traditional religious conceptions, Pla~o 
charac terized'l 
as a developmental change through his dialogues. A rudimentar} 
I 
conception of ideas was found in the Socratic dialogues. The II 
actual beginning of the theory occundd in the Cratylus (affirm~ 
ing the logical permanence of qualities), the Symposium (with 
the idea of Beauty as a substantial reality independent of con~ 
crete particulars), and the Phaedo (generalizing the conceptiom 
I 
to other ideas). A more explicit theory of ideas was developed 
jl 
in the Republic; the idea of Good, which may have functioned as 
!I 
God, was the highest idea. Republic X inserted God as the cau~ e 
of ideas and tended to develop the conception of ideas as gene~al 
notions in minds; this conception was further developed by latf r 
dialogues. An implication of this developed theory of ideas is 
that God, a . soul, could not be identified with an idea or ideai 
I 
as a whole; the Good of the Republic cannot be identified with1 
li ~ffe~- ~~~ ws~,===============================#========== 
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I 
The cosmological function of God was explained in the Ti-
maeus. 
was used 
stated: 
Plato set out three premises before the mythical form 1 
I 
in discussion of cosmological processes; these premises 
(1) the difference between Being ar permanent reality ~ 
known only through reason (probably referring to the logical 
identity of ideas), and Becoming, or the sensible world, charab-
terized by continual flux of events; (!) the necessity of an ef-
ficient cause, i.e., God (probably known through Being), to ac-
count for the existence of' Becoming; and (3) the absolute good-
ness of God, who Hollowed a pattern in forming the cosmos. Th~ se 
I 
premises are important because fbr -the -:. 'I'irilae').ls~ ·=·they' ·.asmlined the 
reality of God and logical ideas. God initiated the process o~ 
Becomin&,;)f'Omfd.ng .:. oi'"dEn.' out 10f.: aaaos, due to his goodness. 
In the forming of' the cosmos, there were three creative fac-
tors: (1) God, the good Demiurge, who was the efficient cause 1 
bringiqg order out of' disorder; (2) the pattern, which was prob-
ably a constellation of systematizing and unifying value ideas 1 
I 
existing in God 1 s mind; (3) the Receptacle, which involved the l 
pre-existent material (separate from God~} functioning as the ne-
cessity of chaotic conditions, the spatial and temporal charac-
teristics of indefiniteness, and the container for the products 
of creation; and (4) the World-Soul, which was a unified organism 
composed of soul and body, representing the physical aspect of ll 
the universe, and characterizing 4ett1oa and human beings. 
Demiurge persuaded the Receptacle, neutral to good or evil, 
The 
to I 
take on orderly form, which was good. -------=~~======~~==~========~==============================--God was creator not ex 
.I 
,j 
I 
I 
'I 
'I 
I 
I 
•I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
·I 
ix · 
nihilo, but from a basic, unproduced material. Since time was l 
created along with the universe, the relation between time and l 
I 
eternity pPesented a pl"oblem. However, since time vvas measured 
by physical movements, eternity could not have this kind of ti~e. 
Thepe is no definite denial of temporal succession in eternityl 
The Timaeus supported an essential monmtheism, for the Demiurge 
was an eternal, single soul, the only one and the possessor of i 
power over everything else; God formed other souls, some of which 
were gods, who were created beings, subservient in existence a~d 
II 
power to the one God. The relation among the creative factors l 
I 
presents a problem for Plato. Although the pattern may be accrunt-
ed .for as existent in the natuPe of God, the Receptacle was an 'J 
eternal reality with existence separate from God. Thus, the re-
I 
lationship of God and the Receptacle presents an ineradicable I 
I 
dualism, sacrificing metaphysical coherence in order to insure l 
God's absolute freedom from any production of evil.· 
In Lavrs X, Plato discussed proof for God 1 s existence .. and 
• . l -
I 
the nature of God in the form of arguments against three heresies. 
Against denial of God's existence, P:lato repudiated materialis~ 
tic-mechanistic notions of reality and creation by a philosophical 
argument for God's existence on the basis of the nature of motion. 
Motion, due to its factor of activity, required an active sou1 11 
to produce it; motion implied a first cause or "best" motion II 
, I 
(self-moved and mover of all other motions). Thus, the analysfs 
I' 
of motion required the~~on of a purposive soul-God who created 
motion. II Affirming the absolute goodness of God, Plato attempt~d 
to account for evil by asserting its unreality due to the good-
! 
ness of the whole; but Plato contradicted this solu~:l.on by God's 
recognition of the reality of evil, the necessity of fighting ~ 
it, and the importance of care for all individual aspects of t he 
whole. However, an inei.pient solution to the problem may be found 
in the nature of the Receptacle, which hindered good and God. I 
Against the second and third heresies, Plato affirmed the
1 
I 
goodness of gods and their caring interest in the development of 
'I men toward good. Through his expression of goodness in creatiWn 
and care 'for his creatures, God probably 1nanifested what may be 
called love, although the concept of love in Plato's thought i k 
. I 
only a germ of the concept of divine love ip Christian thought l 
II 
The problem of whether Plato's God vtas infinite or finite requir·es 
the ':' ::· recognition what God \Vas certainly not unbounded as the II 
I 
only existent reality; also, God could not have been infinite n 
power due to the limitations imposed on hiln by the Receptacle 
(and perhaps the pattern as representing the limits imposed by 
values and logical laws). Although infinite in goodness, God as 
finite on the whole. The problem of whether or not God was a 
person depends on his possession of consciousness, intelligence, 
I 
purpos~~eness, and individuality. Denial that Plato's God was j 
a literal .. figure would destroy the concept of a personal God. 11 
However, due to the presupposition of a creator-God in the Timleus 
- 'I ---
and the factors of God 1 s conscious, intelligent purposfu:tene.ss ~;and 
I 
distinct individuality (e. g ., distinct from the World-Soul), II 
Plato's God was probably a person. 11 
